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The beef industry is considered one of the most unsustainable of the food sectors, due to the 
extensive and diverse issues surrounding its environmental, social, and economic performance. 
Moreover, the rise of the global population, the consequent increase in the demand of meat 
products, and the change in terms of food habits and concerns recently observed in consumers, has 
increased the debates around beef sustainability even further. Within this context, industry actors 
within Canada and the United States, which are important beef-producing countries, are 
implementing private voluntary standards and certification interventions aimed at improving the 
sustainability performance of their supply-chains through multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI). The 
national Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (CRSB) initiative is focusing on the Canadian 
market, while the U.S. transnational Grasslands Alliance initiative, is targeting both the American 
and the Canadian markets. This study analyses the legitimacy of the governance and interventions 
development processes of these MSIs. Legitimacy implies the acceptance of an intervention’s 
process and practices by the members of the supply-chain being governed by an MSI. Lack of 
legitimacy is associated with ‘greenwashing’ claims, authority denial, limited adoption of 
interventions, and ultimately works against improvements in the sustainability of the beef industry. 
Both the governance and the interventions development processes of CRSB and Grasslands 
Alliance were evaluated and compared against a mature MSI – the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO) – in terms of input legitimacy using the good global governance principles of 
participation, transparency, and accountability of the Global Administrative Law (GAL). This 
analytical framework was expanded by adopting the International Social and Environmental 
Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL) codes of good practice to define the three GAL’s 
principles. By conducting a qualitative content analysis and two case studies, it was identified that 
both initiatives have to evolve significantly in terms of good global governance principles, and 
that input legitimacy is more evident in CRSB than in Grasslands Alliance, as the former 
demonstrated more commitment with the participation principle than the latter. The comparison 
with RSPO revealed the need to monitor the changes in terms of the local context, mostly in terms 
of notions of legitimacy and engagement with vulnerable stakeholders. Furthermore, there is the 
challenging task of balancing the implementation of governance changes without compromising 
the efficiency, and thus the output legitimacy, of an MSI throughout its life time.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
The livestock sector, which includes the beef industry, is an important contributor to the 
global economy, being responsible for 1.4% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005. 
Nevertheless, they are also major sources of negative environmental impacts in terms of land use, 
climate change, water resources, and biodiversity (Steinfeld, Gerber, Wassenaar, Castel, & De 
Haan, 2006). For example, in terms of negative social impacts, these sectors and industries have 
also been associated with slave labor in some regions of Brazil (Freitas, 1994). Thus, in order to 
pressure members1 of the supply-chain linked to the livestock sector and the beef industry to 
promote changes, civil society representatives, primarily non-governmental organizations (NGO), 
are acting as ‘watchdogs’, raising public awareness of the sustainability threats caused by this 
industry. Greenpeace, for instance, recently used drones to reveal the inadvertent use of fresh water 
by a dairy farm in New Zealand (Scoop Regional, May 2018, & Zeal, n.d.).  
As a response to these civil society concerns, organizations associated with the livestock 
sector and the beef industry – producers, processors, and retailers – have been trying to address 
sustainability through global private governance interventions along the supply chain, such as 
through standards2 developed through international multi-stakeholder commodity roundtables 
(Gibbs et al., 2016, p. 32). Examples of such governance interventions aimed at greening 
commodity supply chains include the standards, and respective monitoring mechanisms (i.e. 
certifications3) developed by Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (MSI) such as the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and the Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS). Roundtables are a 
special system of global governance and consist of: 
…private arrangements with the aim of improving the sustainability of a global 
commodity chain. They are multi-stakeholder platforms where private parties – businesses 
                                                 
1 A person or organization that participates in an initiative such as multi-stakeholder or roundtable and has the 
right to decide about their governance. 
2 Standards are “the measures by which people, practices, processes, and products are judged” (Busch and 
Bingen, 2006, p.3) 
3 “the provision by an independent body of written assurance (a certificate) that the product, service or system 
in question meets specific requirements” (ISO, n.d.).  
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and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – have decision-making power  (Schouten and 
Glasbergen, 2011, cited by G. Schouten & Glasbergen, 2012).  
Complementarily, a multi-stakeholder platform is a particular type of global private 
governance initiative, where:  
NGOs, multilateral and other organizations encourage companies to participate in 
schemes that set social and environmental standards, monitor compliance, promote social 
and environmental reporting and auditing, certify good practice, and encourage stakeholder 
dialogue and ‘social learning’ (Utting, 2002, p. 61).  
 
Whether or not they are associated with a roundtable system of global private governance, 
MSI and the rule-making power exerted by their supply-chain interventions (e.g.  private voluntary 
standards and certifications) are viewed as a change in terms of environmental and sustainability 
regulation, from governments to private institutions, in “attempts to democratize politics and 
simultaneously foster more effective policies” (Bäckstrand, Khan, Kronsell, & Lövbrand, 2010, p. 
4).  Going even further, Roberts (2011, p. 143) claims that voluntary standards and certifications 
are the only interventions that attempt to substitute the government in all the five stages of the 
regulatory process: Agenda-Setting; Standards-Setting; Implementation; Monitoring; and 
Enforcement. 
However, certain issues such as the lack of an inherent rule-making power analogous to the 
state in these initiatives has been generating important concerns about the legitimacy of multi-
stakeholder interventions in establishing the ‘new rules of the game’ in terms of global private 
governance in the sustainability realm. According to Bodansky (1999), legitimacy is “…a quality 
that leads people (or states) to accept authority - independent of coercion, self-interest, or rational 
persuasion - because of a general sense that the authority is justified” (p. 600). Additionally, certain 
critiques related to the limited scope of some of those initiatives – they claim to be sustainable, but 
in fact only focus on some aspects of sustainability while neglecting others – are leading to 
greenwashing claims and legitimacy criticisms (A Seed Europe, 2005; Latham, Jonathan, 2012). 
Even more mature MSI suffer from criticisms associated with this ‘sustainability selectivity’ that 
can damage their legitimacy, such as deforestation and child labor issues not being properly 
addressed by RSPO (Kaye, 2017).   
Democracy is another debatable aspect of these non-state initiatives. The establishment of a 
democratic environment in terms of global private governance is regarded as an intrinsic aspect of 
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multi-stakeholder sustainability initiatives (Bäckstrand, 2006a; Hemmati, 2012). Nevertheless, 
some authors disagree that these initiatives are democratic, citing concerns related to power 
asymmetry, such as the incapacity to offset power imbalances among stakeholders (Cheyns & 
Riisgaard, 2014; Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Havinga, 2011) and the disproportional power usually 
exerted by large retail chains during the decision-making process (Fuchs et al., 2011). Private 
voluntary sustainability interventions led by MSI have also been the focus of some criticism, 
specifically related to: 1) the limited power engagement capacity of individual organizations to 
influence other organizations to green their supply chains through standard and certification 
interventions (Cox, Sanderson, & Watson, 2001); 2) the high costs of implementation for small 
producers (Brandi et al., 2015; Klooster, 2006); 3) the lack of appropriate engagement of all 
relevant stakeholders in the earliest stages of development (Winters et al., 2015); and, 4) 
stakeholders who incur the costs but do not receive the benefits of these interventions (DeFries, 
Fanzo, Mondal, Remans, & Wood, 2017). 
Notwithstanding the concerns associated with private voluntary standards and certifications 
developed by MSI, these interventions have been a common practice in the food-related sectors 
since the adoption of food safety standards and certifications in the early 1990s. In the beef 
industry, for instance, the Codex Alimentarius and the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP) are the primarily food safety standards and certifications (FAO, n.d.; Hulebak & 
Schlosser, 2002). In the scope of private global governance, these “elements of governance” (Ponte 
& Gibbon, 2005, p. 2) (i.e.  interventions),  are attempts to translate and enforce consumers’ 
demands, as “voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems are private governance 
institutions that set minimum standards for firms, products, or facilities to meet one or more 
consumer preferences” (Roberts, 2011, p. 84). Additionally, private voluntary standards and 
certifications are a growing phenomenon, with an exponential growth rate observed in the last two 
decades predominantly in agribusiness, due to pressures to comply with third-party certification4 
exerted by retailers on their upstream supply-chain (Hatanaka, Bain, & Busch, 2005). 
Nevertheless, retailers’ incentives alone cannot explain the growth of these interventions. In 
general terms, standards, and consequently certifications, are regarded not only as good methods 
                                                 
4 where an external party, not related to the party being assessed, conducts an independent analysis (RESOLVE, 
2017, p. 12)  
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for improving business efficiency (Tanner, 2000; Golan et al., 2001; Sanogo and Masters, 2002; 
Fagan, 2003; cited by Hatanaka et al., 2005, p. 355), but also as ways of modeling and adjusting 
practices and behaviours (Busch, 2000). In the sustainability realm, private voluntary standard and 
certification interventions can facilitate the process of due diligence, reduce transaction costs 
(Chkanikova & Lehner, 2015), promote sales increases of desired products (Chkanikova & Lehner, 
2015; Roberts, 2011), foster habitat conservation, and induce premium prices for small producers 
(DeFries et al., 2017) and certified products (Roberts, 2011).  
Thus, in an attempt to address, among others, the legitimacy of private voluntary standards 
and certifications interventions in the sustainability realm, the International Social and 
Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL) was formed in 2002 by a coalition 
of social and environmental NGOs involved in the private voluntary standard-setting movement: 
Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), International Organic 
Accreditation Services (IOAS), Marine Aquarium Council (MAC), Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC), Social Accountability International (SAI), and the Rainforest Alliance’s Sustainable 
Agriculture Network (SAN) (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014a). Through the enforcement of its 
procedural best practices in terms of “standard setting, certification and accreditation, and impact 
evaluation, which are built around the concepts of transparency, inclusiveness, consensus and 
accountability” (Djama et al., 2011; Cheyns, 2011, cited by Ponte, 2014, p. 262), ISEAL “acts as 
a market watchdog protecting the legitimacy of the sustainability standards movement” (Reinecke 
et al., 2012, p. 804). For some observers, compliance with ISEAL’s Codes of Good Practice 
improves both the governance process5 and the perceived legitimacy of sustainable interventions, 
primarily private voluntary standards and certifications (Glasbergen, 2011). Because of its 
oversight role over the development of these sustainable interventions, ISEAL is characterized by 
some authors as “part of the institutionalization of the sustainability field” (Loconto & Fouilleux, 
2014, p. 167) and classified as a private meta-governance regulator (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014b; 
L. Fransen, 2015; Glasbergen, 2011) with a ‘de facto’ rule-making power. Notwithstanding some 
criticism, such as compliance with its codes not necessarily leading to sustainability outcomes 
                                                 
5 How an organization is managed, structured, and organized. The governance process is usually state in 
governance-related documents such as by-laws. 
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(Ponte, 2014, p.262), mostly in terms of private voluntary standards and certifications, ISEAL 
seems to fill the regulative gap left where the governance over sustainability interventions changes 
from states to private institutions.  
Regardless of whether they are associated with ISEAL, some private national and 
transnational organizations are trying to intervene positively in their supply-chains by developing 
private voluntary sustainability standards and certifications in the food sector. For example, to date 
there are 38 sustainability standards associated with the meat sector registered in the Sustainability 
Map website (International Trade Centre, n.d.). In relation to the North American beef industry, 
the Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (CRSB) and the Grasslands Alliance are two MSIs 
that are trying to intervene in the sustainability of their supply-chains through the development of 
new private voluntary standards and certifications. CRSB, a national MSI associated with a 
transnational one, the Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (GRSB), launched its private 
voluntary standards and certifications for the beef industry in Canada in December  2017 
(Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-i). In 2015, Grasslands Alliance, a transnational 
multi-stakeholder initiative, began the development of its private voluntary standards and 
certification for the beef industry in North America. Although CRSB is an ISEAL subscriber (i.e. 
initial level of association), Grasslands Alliance has no association with ISEAL. These two new 
initiatives are about to increase the number of private voluntary sustainability standards and 
certifications in the North American market. Thus, legitimacy becomes even more relevant due to 
the public distrust and confusion related to the rising number of private voluntary standards and 
certifications (Loconto & Fouilleux, 2014, p. 168) and the risk of greenwashing accusations. It is 
likely that the initiative demonstrating greater legitimacy, with respect to its governance and 
intervention development processes, will be better positioned to enforce the adoption of their 
private voluntary standards and certifications by the beef industry supply-chain and thus promote 
improvements in the sustainability of this industry.  
This study adopts Global Administrative Law (GAL) as an analytical framework to assess 
the legitimacy of the CRSB and Grasslands Alliance initiatives, both in terms of their governance 
and of their private voluntary standard and certification development processes. GAL and its 
principles of participation, transparency, and accountability - the latter two related to democratic 
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mechanisms of private governance control (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008) is a project of the 
Institute for International Law and Justice (IILJ) at the New York University School of Law: 
The Global Administrative Law (GAL) Project is focused on an emerging 
field of research and practice: the increasing use of administrative law-type 
mechanisms — in particular those related to transparency, participation, 
accountability, and review — within the regulatory institutions of global 
governance. (“Global Administrative Law,” n.d.) 
GAL is an emerging field of study aimed at understanding the impacts and implications of 
public and private interventions promoted by national, transnational, and international 
organizations in global governance (Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005). Additionally, the 
principles of participation, transparency, and accountability of GAL are most closely associated 
with good governance practices6 (Gisselquist, 2012; Woods, 1999, 2000).  Because of its focus on 
various global governance themes (i.e. trans governmental network (Hamann & Ruiz Fabri, 2008), 
private regulation (Joerges, Sand, & Teubner, 2004), non-state actors’ regulation (Cassese, 2004), 
and standard interventions (Mattli & Büthe, 2005; Meidinger, 2006), GAL has been viewed as a 
relevant framework for analyzing standards and certifications developed by non-state transnational 
organizations: 
The emerging field of global administrative law, which considers 
accountability mechanisms for administrative action stemming from non-state 
actors exercising regulatory functions, such as NGOs, private institutions and 
international organisations, as well as for traditional state actors, would have been 
useful as an additional theoretical prism through which to view current 
transnational labelling and certification activities. (Young, 2006, p. 177) 
GAL is regarded as a suitable theoretical perspective for analyzing interventions operated in 
the global governance arena, notably private voluntary standards and certifications run by 
transnational organizations. It has been adopted for analyzing indicators (Koh, 2016) and standard-
setting (Kanevskaia, 2016; Mattli & Büthe, 2005), but there are no studies that use GAL to assess 
the legitimacy of the governance, standard, and certification processes of sustainability initiatives 
in their earlier stages of development. This is an important research gap that the present case study 
aims to fill in. In the scope of the present research, using GAL complements other research that 
studies the legitimacy of MSIs because it applies the widely regarded concepts of good global 
                                                 
6 The acts and decisions made to keep the governance process functioning. For instance, conducting periodic 
general meetings and the disclosure of the decisions made at these meetings in the minutes are governance practices. 
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governance – participation, transparency, and accountability – to analyze and compare two 
sustainable MSI in their very early stages of development.  
It is desirable to have new and legitimate MSIs that improve the sustainability of the beef 
industry. Moreover, legitimacy is even more relevant in the presence of increasing competition to 
impose interventions, which seems to be the case for the beef industry in North America in the 
near future: “the ‘regulatory competition’ is to an important degree decided by the public’s 
perception of the legitimacy of the said norms and governing entities” (Hachez & Wouters, 2011, 
p. 681). Additionally, it is important to consider legitimacy from the earlier stages of 
implementation of governance and sustainability interventions as it is easier to promote 
governance improvements in the developing stage than in more advanced stages of the initiatives 
(Ponte, 2014, p. 270).  
Legitimacy is relevant because it is the main focus of most of the literature around standards 
and certification that adopt an institutionalist approach (Ponte, 2014, p. 264), has a huge influence 
in private global governance arrangements (Bennett & Bennett, 2016; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007), 
is one of the principles of social responsibility (Wood, 2010), and can justify “policy development 
and enforcement measures” (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007, p. 351). Additionally, the perceived lack 
of legitimacy can be linked to greenwashing claims, raise questions about the democratic aspect 
of the initiatives, concerns associated to unequal distribution of power among stakeholders, among 
other issues, that have the potential of ruining the plans of sustainability initiatives in their initial 
stages of development. In fact, some greenwashing concerns have already been raised with respect 
to beef sustainability standards and certification in North America (Gelbard, 2018). GRSB, for 
instance, has being viewed as an industry-led greenwashing initiative (Friends of the Earth, n.d.), 
and its principles and criteria for sustainable beef have been criticized for lacking an outcome-
based approach (Gelbard, 2014). Thus, the primary objective of this study is to assess and compare 
the legitimacy of both governance and interventions – private voluntary standards and 
certifications – of two sustainability MSI, a national and a transnational one, in their efforts of 






1.1 Thesis structure 
Chapter 1 evolves from the overall context presented in the introduction to the background 
section, where information regarding both the beef industry and the main initiatives aimed at 
‘greening’ this industry in North America are presented. The next section, literature review, 
discusses the analytical framework adopted for evaluating the legitimacy of the two initiatives that 
are the focus of the study: CRSB and Grasslands Alliance. The research question and objectives 
are presented in the last section of Chapter 1.    
Next, in Chapter 2, the method adopted for conducting the qualitative content analysis in 
order to answer the research question and meet the objectives of the study is detailed. The checks 
on validity and reliability are presented.   
In Chapter 3, the results about adherence to the principles of participation, transparency, and 
accountability by CRSB and Grasslands Alliance are revealed, and the main findings regarding 
the three principles are presented. The level of adherence to the principles and their implications 
in terms of legitimacy are analyzed and discussed in Chapter 4.  
Finally, Chapter 5 presents the contributions and conclusion of the study, as well as 
recommendations for both similar initiatives and further research. Limitations of the study are also 
described in this Chapter. 
2. Background 
The beef industry is an important economic contributor to some countries, particularly 
Canada and United States of America (U.S.A.) – some of the major global players of this industry. 
The U.S.A. is the largest producer of beef, followed by Brazil, European Union, China, and India, 
while Canada is positioned in 12th in the 2017 World Beef Production Rank (Cook, 2018a). Canada 
and the U.S.A. have also a prominent role in terms of exports, being positioned in 6th and 4th place 
respectively, in the 2017 ranking of major exporting countries (the top countries are Brazil, India, 
Australia, and New Zealand is in 5th place) (Cook, 2018b). In 2017, Canada was ranked as the 8th 
largest beef consumer globally, with an annual per capita consumption of 57.7 pounds. The U.S.A. 
is among the top 5 beef consumers globally, with an annual per capita consumption of 79.3 pounds 
of beef in 2017 (Cook, 2018c).  
9 
 
The beef industry is a major contributor to Canada’s GDP. Beef production contributed 
CAN$16 billion to Canada’s GDP in 2016 (Canada Beef, 2017), and considering the beef and 
cattle industry together, the economic contribution was CAN$1.794 trillion in 2017. Thus, the beef 
and cattle industry together are positioned 11th in the ranking of industries that most contributed 
to the Canadian GDP in 2017 (Beef2Live, 2018). In 2017, Canada had a total of 11.9 million beef 
cattle (Beef2Live, 2018) while the U.S.A. had 31.2 million beef cattle in 2016 (National Cattle 
Beef Association, n.d.). In a ripple effect, the meat and poultry industry contributes to 6% of the 
U.S.A.’s GDP, and generates US$ 864.2 billion annually to the economy (North American Meat 
Institute, n.d.).  
Despite the economic relevance of the beef industry for Canada and U.S.A., there are 
important environmental issues associated with this industry. In Canada, some of the main 
environmental issues are greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, contamination of air and water, 
nutrient recycling, and preservation of surrounding pasture ecosystems (Environmental Footprint 
of Beef Production - Beef Cattle Research Council, n.d.). In the U.S.A., the “dead zone” formation 
in the Gulf of Mexico due to runoff of agricultural pollution into the sea is an important 
environmental issue (Tilman et al., 2001, p. 283). Moreover, beef industry activity is also a major 
promoter of deforestation (Fearnside, 2005) and slave labor in Brazil (Nepstad et al., 2006, p. 
1600). Additionally, there are increasing concerns about the safety of the beef, and the millennial 
generation is driving the establishment of standards related to animal welfare (Agweb, n.d.). The 
rise of the global population and the consequent increase in the demand for meat-related products 
has the potential to amplify these issues even more. Thus, stakeholders have been putting much 
pressure on this business, pushing the beef industry to address the environmental, social and 
economic aspects of its business sustainability. 
To address such overarching issues, global members of the beef industry supply chain, 
governmental institutions, NGOs, producers, processors, retailers, consumer’s representatives, 
among other stakeholders, have been trying to promote several joint initiatives to make the beef 
industry more sustainable. The Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (GRSB), a transnational 
MSI implemented to address the sustainability aspect of the beef industry, is one of the leading 
initiatives. Canada and U.S.A. are among its most active members and are the major actors in this 
industry that are implementing some sustainability interventions. The Canadian Roundtable for 
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Sustainable Beef (CRSB), one of the national roundtable constituencies of GRSB, defined the 
sustainable beef indicators for beef production and primary processing stages of the supply chain 
in Canada and released them for public consultation in 2017 (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable 
Beef, n.d.-g, n.d.-j). After this process, at the end of 2017, CRSB launched its standards and 
certification for the beef industry in Canada. The U.S. Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (USRSB), 
another national roundtable constituency of GRSB, is addressing issues such as indicators and 
goals for progress, verification, and sustainable solutions. The Grasslands Alliance, the result of a 
coalition between Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Food Alliance, and Rainforest-
Alliance (RA), is currently seeking public comment on the first standard draft – principles, criteria, 
and indicators – for a future certification scheme for Beef Cattle and Bison Ranch and Farm 
Grazing Operations in North America: Canada and the U.S.A.  All of these transnational and 
national MSIs comprise the adoption of indicators, private voluntary standards, and certifications 
interventions to improve the sustainability performance of the beef industry. The proliferation of 
these initiatives requires an evaluation of their legitimacy. Thus, information about the governance 
structure of the transnational and national MSIs acting to improve the sustainability of the beef 
industry in North America is presented in the following section. 
2.1. Transnational MSI 
2.1.1. The Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (GRSB) 
The process for establishing the Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (GRSB) was 
formally initiated in November 2010 when the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), 
McDonald’s and other global stakeholders decided to join efforts to form a multi-stakeholder 
initiative with the ultimate objective of improving the sustainability of the beef industry. Following 
similar roundtable initiatives aimed at developing sustainability standards for agricultural 
commodities, such as palm oil, soy, biofuel, and cotton, the GRSB was officially launched in 
February 2012 by WWF, Solidaridad, Rainforest Alliance, Cargill, McDonalds, Walmart, among 
other founding members (Beef Central, 2017; Brassett et al, 2012; McLaughlin, 2011; Nepstad et 
al., 2013; WWF, n.d.). 
The GRSB currently consists of 61 members in six stakeholder groups: Producer and 
Producer Group, Commerce and Processing, Retail, Civil Society, Roundtable, Observing and 
Consulting Members (GRSB, n.d.-b). GRSB aims to ‘green’ the global beef value chain by playing 
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a leadership role and working collaboratively with its members in the pursuit of sustainability 
solutions. GRSB acts on the strategic level, and all its work is backed up by its vision – “We 
envision a world in which all aspects of the beef value chain are environmentally sound, socially 
responsible and economically viable” – and mission: “The mission of the Global Roundtable for 
Sustainable Beef is to advance continuous improvement in global beef value chain sustainability, 
through leadership, science, and multi-stakeholder engagement and collaboration” (GRSB, 2014, 
September, p. 13). The purpose of GRSB is to guide the establishment of sector-based 
sustainability initiatives through both their definition of sustainable beef and their objectives, 
principles, and criteria (Figure 1) (GRSB, 2014, September, p. 14), which are the tools to be used 
by the industry in order to improve beef sustainability on a global scale (GRSB, n.d.-b, n.d.-c, n.d.-
a; Kashmanian & Moore, 2014).  
 
Figure 1: GRSB’s work scope (GRSB, 2014, September, p. 14) 
 
Most of the GRSB’s work is conducted by its Technical Working Groups. The working 
groups are nominated by the executive board, who also guides their scope of action, and all their 
resulting projects must be presented and approved by the GRSB’s members. A working group was 
nominated to develop the principles and criteria – the baselines – for defining sustainable beef.  
OBJECTIVE
What GRSB is trying to do
PRINCIPLES
What GRSB is fundamentally trying to do 
(Intent)
CRITERIA
What are the conditions needed to be met in 
order to achieve GRSB's principles
INDICATORS
What is going to be measured
MEANS OF VERIFICATION







After eighteen months of work, considering periods for public consultation and revisions, the 
Principles and Criteria Working Group presented the primary global definition of sustainable beef 
in 2014 during the first GRSB’s Global Conference on Sustainable Beef held in Sao Paulo, Brazil. 
The following definition, approved by 96% of the GRSB’s members, was presented at this 
milestone event: 
The Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef defines sustainable beef as a socially 
responsible, environmentally sound and economically viable product that prioritizes Planet 
(relevant principles: Natural Resources, Efficiency and Innovation, People and the 
Community); People (relevant principles: People and the Community and Food); Animals 
(relevant principle: Animal Health and Welfare); and Progress (relevant principles: Natural 
Resources, People and the Community, Animal Health and Welfare, Food, Efficiency and 
Innovation). (GRSB, 2016, p. 1) 
The five core principles that define sustainable beef – Natural Resources, People and the 
Community, Animal Health and Welfare, Food, and Efficiency and Innovation – encompass the 
three pillars of sustainability stated in GRSB’s vision: environmentally sound, socially responsible 
and economically viable.  
Each principle has a set list of criteria – “an element or set of conditions or processes by 
which a system characteristic can be evaluated” (GRSB, 2014, November, p. 4) – that should be 
observed in order to accomplish what is determined by the principle. The five principles and the 
thirty-six criteria for sustainable beef form the framework that defines sustainability for the 
industry globally (GRSB, 2014, November 1). According to GRSB, the adoption of the 
framework, which was built in a multi-stakeholder environment and in collaboration with the 
members of the value chain, creates commitment with sustainability improvement and thus has the 
potential of transforming the sustainability of the beef industry on a global scale. 
GRSB believes that a “one-size-fits-all approach to beef production will not work to improve 
industry sustainability” (GRSB, 2014, November 1, p. 1). Due to the variety of beef production 
systems around the world, GRSB believes that neither standards nor certifications should be on its 
scope of work. GRSB’s work is bounded within its sustainability framework, i.e. principles and 
criteria, thus allowing the national roundtables and other regional initiatives to take responsibility 
to further develop their own indicators and means of verification based on their unique contexts 
(e.g. political, geographical, etc.).  
13 
 
GRSB is a subscriber of the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and 
Labelling Alliance (ISEAL), an NGO that establishes not only principles for sustainable private 
standard systems implementation, but also good practices for standard-setting, assurance 
(certification and accreditation) and impact evaluation through its Credibility Principles, ISEAL 
Codes of Good Practice, and Good Practice in Claims and Labeling. ISEAL offers three levels of 
membership – subscriber, associate, and full member – with ‘subscriber’ being the initial level of 
association, defined as “individuals and organisations who support ISEAL's mission and are part 
of a community that works together to achieve it.” (ISEAL, n.d.-c). 
2.1.2. Grasslands Alliance 
The other transnational multi-stakeholder organization that is developing sustainability 
interventions – private standards and certifications – for the beef industry in North America, 
Canada and U.S.A., is Grasslands Alliance, an initiative formed by a coalition between “the Food 
Alliance, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Rainforest Alliance with 
support from other non-profit organizations, ranchers and farmers, scientists, and other 
stakeholders,” with contributions from the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN). The Food 
Alliance is an NGO that aims to improve the sustainability of the agriculture and food industry 
through a voluntary third-party certification program. Its first certification occurred in 1998 “with 
a single apple grower selling in three Portland grocery stores”, and since then has grown to certify 
more than 500 farms and ranches in Canada, Mexico, and 25 U.S. states who manage over 6.8 
million acres of range and farmland and 35 food processing and distribution facilities (Food 
Alliance, n.d.-a).  
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), another Grasslands Alliance founding 
member, is an NGO dedicated to “safeguard the earth—its people, its plants and animals, and the 
natural systems on which all life depends” through a series of programs that tackle several 
sustainability problems such as climate change, environmental justice, food and agriculture 
practices, water shortage, among others. Founded in 1970, NRDC counts on “more than three 
million members and online activists with the expertise of some 500 scientists, lawyers, and policy 
advocates across the globe” to fight for a better sustainable environment on earth. Working as 
research center, advocacy group, litigator, promoter of innovative business practices, and 
partnership builder, NRDC has through its programs achieved some impressive results in the 
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U.S.A. Some examples are the commitment of 42 percent of the U.S. chicken industry to 
responsible antibiotic practices; the protection of approximately 38,000 square miles of mid-
Atlantic ocean water habitat from harmful fishing practices; and the conservation of more than 3 
million tons of water through NRDC's Clean by Design program (NRDC, n.d.-a, n.d.-b). 
The third Grasslands Alliance founding member, the Rainforest Alliance, is an international 
NGO comprising of a “network of farmers, foresters, communities, scientists, governments, 
environmentalists, and businesses dedicated to conserving biodiversity and ensuring sustainable 
livelihoods” (Rainforest Alliance, n.d.-a). As well as NRDC, but in a global perspective, Rainforest 
Alliance tackles several sustainability issues related to deforestation, wildlife protection, climate 
change, the livelihood of local communities, food and farming, and human rights. The Rainforest 
Alliance was created in 1986 after a global conference about deforestation and has a long history 
of engagement to save worldwide rainforests and was one of the founding members of the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC). It also has large involvement with sustainability certification, 
launching its first agriculture certification for banana farms in Costa Rica and Hawaii in 1992. 
Since then, the Rainforest Alliance has expanded its scope of work: in August 2017, it assumed 
the ownership of the shared RA/SAN certification system and now certifies the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) third-party standards. With a presence in 78 countries, the positive impact in terms 
of sustainability improvements due to the Rainforest Alliance initiatives are notable and include: 
103,966,028 acres of land under sustainable management; 1,311,001 farms using Rainforest 
Alliance’s methods to protect ecosystems, workers and local communities; and earnings of 
US$130,573,000 for Indigenous and forest communities through their sustainable forest enterprise 
initiatives (Rainforest Alliance, n.d.-c). Rainforest Alliance is an ISEAL full member, which 
means it reached the highest level in ISEAL membership. This means that they commit to 
demonstrate their full compliance with the ISEAL Assurance Code within the first two years and 
achieving full compliance with the Impacts Code within three years (ISEAL, n.d.-b). 
Although it is not clear when the Grasslands Alliance emerged as an entity between these 
three organizations, it seems that it is the outcome of intense debates around beef sustainability in 
North America that date back from 2012, when “NRDC began researching standards for more 
sustainable livestock production in the United States” (Grasslands Alliance, n.d.-c; ISEAL, n.d.-
a). The Grasslands Alliance is currently working on a long-term governance structure in 
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partnership with their partners and other stakeholders (Grasslands Alliance, n.d.-a). However, 
Food Alliance is the organization that currently manages the Grasslands Alliance initiative.  
The Grasslands Alliance origins have a management focus. NRDC first identified best 
management practices (BMPs) to remedy important supply-chain impacts of poor management 
practices in the U.S livestock production and then consulted stakeholders in order to verify the 
economic and social barriers to enhance ranch and farm management. Next, NRDC analyzed 
current certifications programs applicable to farms and ranches and realized that the options 
available had some important gaps: Food Alliance presented low market acceptance and RA/SAN 
certification system covered only tropical areas (Grasslands Alliance, n.d.-c). Thus, NRDC, Food 
Alliance, and Rainforest Alliance defined that the future Grasslands Alliance’s standard will be a 
fellow RA/SAN standard for beef in Central and South America, with adaptations for the 
peculiarities of the farms and ranches in North America. In terms of development of the initiative, 
Grasslands Alliance is currently in the public comment phase of the first standard draft (principles, 
criteria, and indicators), and the period for public consultation ended on December 31, 2017 
(Grasslands Alliance, n.d.-d).  
2.2. National MSI 
2.2.1. The Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (CRSB) 
National MSIs also are working to make the beef supply chain in North America more 
sustainable. In Canada, the Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (CRSB) is the primary 
initiative. CRSB, a GRSB member that started its activities in 2013 (Canadian Roundtable for 
Sustainable Beef, n.d.-r), declares as its mission “To facilitate the framework for the Canadian 
beef industry to be a global leader in the continuous improvement and sustainability of the beef 
value chain through science, multi-stakeholder engagement, communication and collaboration” 
(Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-k). CRSB has more than 100 members segmented 
in the “Producer and Processor Associations; Food and Agriculture Businesses; Retail & Food 
Services Companies; Non-Governmental Organizations; Observers & Ex-officio” (Canadian 
Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-e) constituencies. These members elect the CRSB’s Council, 
comprised of representatives of each constituency group, and four committees – Indicator 
Committee, retired in January 2018 (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-m); 
Verification Committee, retired in January 2018 (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-
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s); Communications and Marketing Committee; and Scientific Advisory Committee – guide the 
development of CRSB’s core projects. Figure 2 demonstrates CRSB’s governance structure, 
regulated by memberships and Council, guided by committees, and supported by staff (Canadian 
Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-e). 
 
Figure 2: CRSB’s governance structure (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-
e) 
 
CRSB has focused its activities on three core projects: sustainability benchmarking, 
certification framework (formerly the verification framework), and sustainability projects 
(Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-d, n.d.-n). A Steering Committee conducted 















and economic performance of the Canadian beef industry (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable 
Beef, n.d.-h), and released its first National Beef Sustainability Assessment and Strategy Reports 
in May 2016. These reports not only showed where the beef industry in Canada is presenting good 
results in terms of sustainability, but also indicated aspects of that business that needs 
improvement, thus providing “a baseline to monitor and measure progress in future assessments” 
(Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-p). CRSB’s Scientific Advisory Committee will 
be in charge of conducting future assessments every five to seven years. The outcome of the first 
reports was the definition of ten sustainability goals to improve the beef industry in Canada through 
CRSB’s certification framework and sustainability projects (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable 
Beef, n.d.-o). Table 1 presents the overarching, environmental, social, and economic goals set by 
CRSB for improving the sustainability of the beef industry in Canada (Canadian Roundtable for 
Sustainable Beef, n.d.-p).  
Table 1: The 10 Sustainable Goals defined by the CRSB (Canadian Roundtable for 
Sustainable Beef, n.d.-p) 
Overarching 
Goal 1 Build a stronger and more united Canadian beef sustainability community 
Environmental 
Goal 2 Reduce the greenhouse gas footprint of Canadian beef per unit of product produced 
Goal 3 Enhance ecosystem services and biodiversity on lands managed by beef producers 
Goal 4 Enhance riparian health and reduce the water footprint of beef production 
Goal 5 Reduce post-harvest meat waste 
Social 
Goal 6 Promote farm safety and responsible working conditions 
Goal 7 Promote excellence in animal care 
Goal 8 Support the further development, monitoring and dissemination of best practices regarding antimicrobial use 
Economic 
Goal 9 Increase the financial viability of beef production in Canada 




The sustainability projects represent the commitment of CRSB to facilitate initiatives aimed 
at improving the sustainability of the beef industry. These projects are founded on the strategies 
and goals outlined in the sustainability benchmarking as well as on the CRSB’s Certified 
Sustainable Beef Framework (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-q). Currently, the 
CRSB is conducting one sustainability project – a collaborative partnership with ranchers to 
maintain and enhance wildlife habitat (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-q) – that 
addresses goals 3, “Enhance ecosystem services and biodiversity on lands managed by beef 
producers”, and 4, “Enhance riparian health and reduce the water footprint of beef production” 
(Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-p). . 
One of CRSB’s goals was to translate GRSB’s objectives, principles, and criteria for beef 
sustainability into local indicators through its Indicator Committee. Nevertheless, the first 
organization to reach this intent was McDonald’s Canada. In parallel and in collaboration with 
CRSB, the leading fast-food chain, in an attempt to speed up CRSB’s indicator and framework 
development processes and to help meet McDonald’s goal of sourcing all of its food sustainably, 
launched in January 2014 the Verified Sustainable Beef Pilot to evaluate the sustainability of the 
Canadian beef supply chain from ‘birth to burger’(“McDonald’s Sustainable Beef Pilot,” n.d.). 
The two-year-old project, which involved 170 participants, was concluded in 2016, and “tracked 
the journey of nearly 9,000 head of Canadian cattle, or the equivalent of 2.4 million patties” (“First-
ever Pilot to Verify Sustainable Beef in Canada Concludes,” n.d.). McDonalds’ pilot results were 
shared with CRSB, which has since carried the responsibility of “mapping the path forward for 
verified sustainable beef in Canada” (“First-ever Pilot to Verify Sustainable Beef in Canada 
Concludes,” n.d.). CRSB accomplished that challenge through the Certified Sustainable Beef 
Framework project. 
In order to launch the Certified Sustainable Beef Framework, in parallel with McDonalds’ 
pilot, the following development process was undertaken by CRSB. The Indicator Committee 
developed tools for the evaluation of beef production and the primary processing stages of the beef 
supply chain in Canada. Guided by GRSB’s Principles and Criteria (P&C), the Indicator 
Development Process started in November 2014 the Phase 1 - Process Design & Research, 
followed by Phase 2 - Drafting the Indicators & Stakeholder Consultations (Canadian Roundtable 
for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-r). After concluding the consultation on sustainability indicators for beef 
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production at the beginning of 2017, public consultation for the 1st draft of the sustainability 
indicators for primary processing closed in August 2017 (White, n.d.-a). After refinements on the 
1st draft of indicators for primary processing made by CRSB’s Council and Members, a second 
and final round of public consultation ended on November 4th, 2017 (White, n.d.-c). After the final 
Phase 3 – Indicator Approval, the “long-awaited Certified Sustainable Beef Framework and CRSB 
standards were released on December 6th and 7th, 2017 at the CRSB Annual General Meeting in 
Edmonton, Alberta (White, n.d.-b). Indeed, this tool has been very much expected and demanded 
by the industry (Blair, 2017; Kienlen-a, 2017; Kienlen-b, 2017) as future projects related to the 
sustainability of the beef industry in Canada, such as a sustainable beef label, depend on the 
framework to be implemented.  
Following the guiding principles of credibility, effectiveness, economic viability, valuable, 
and alignment demonstrated in Table 2 (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-l), the 
Certified Sustainable Beef Framework was launched with the purpose of being “a tool for 
producers and processors to demonstrate the sustainability of their operations and support retail 
and food service companies in their sustainable sourcing efforts”. Three of the four CRSB’s 
committees – Indicator, Verifications, and Communications and Marketing Committees – guided 
the development of this tool. Aspects such as “indicators development, verification protocol – 
scoring framework for the indicators and assurance manual – chain of custody requirements, 
claims and labeling guidelines, and a process for establishing equivalency with other tools and 
programs” are addressed by the Certified Sustainable Beef Framework (Canadian Roundtable for 
Sustainable Beef, n.d.-t). 
Table 2: Certified Sustainable Beef Framework’s guiding principles (Canadian Roundtable 
for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-t) 
Principle Description 
Credible  to all stakeholders securing trust through robust assurances, 
transparency, inclusivity and vigorous scientific review 
Effective in driving the advancement and understanding of sustainable beef 
production 
Economically Viable for the CRSB to manage and stakeholders to use 
Valuable to industry participants and consumers 
Aligned with the Five Principles of Sustainable Beef as set by the Global 
Roundtable for Sustainable Beef 
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The CRSB’s Certified Sustainable Beef Framework is comprised of four key parts: 1-The 
Standards; 2-Assurance Protocols; 3-Chain of Custody Requirements; and 4-Sustainability 
Claims. Standards for beef production and processing cover the indicators audited on farms and 
ranches and in beef processing facilities, respectively. The Assurance Protocols specify the 
certification process requirements. Chain of Custody Requirements covers technical and 
administrative requisites for tracking certified operations. Finally, Sustainability Claims gives the  
guidelines for proper communication of Certified Sustainable Beef (Canadian Roundtable for 
Sustainable Beef, n.d.-b).  
Like GRSB, CRSB is an ISEAL subscriber, which means it is not mandatory that CRSB 
observe even the baseline criteria of ISEAL Codes of Good Practice. Nevertheless, according to 
CRSB, the work of the Indicator Committee was “partially guided” by the ISEAL Code of Good 
Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards (Version 6.0) (Beef, n.d.-a). 
2.2.1.1. The Canadian Beef Sustainability Acceleration (CBSA) Pilot 
The goal of the beef industry in Canada is to be able to launch in 2018 a label for sustainable 
beef, backed up by an auditing process, to be adopted by retailers and restaurants (Southwick, 
2017). It will be necessary to evaluate the entire supply-chain, thus moving on from the first 
verification pilot from ‘birth to burger’ conducted by McDonald’s Canada and evolving on 
CRSB’s Certified Sustainable Beef Framework. In that sense, the Canadian Beef Sustainability 
Acceleration (CBSA) pilot was launched in October 2017 and has been managed by a beef 
processor, Cargill, an auditing organization (i.e. Verified Beef Production Plus (VBP+)), and a 
beef tracker (i.e., Beef InfoXchange Systems (BIXS)).  
CBSA is an innovative project, as it involves payment as an incentive for the participants in 
the pilot. CBSA’s methodology comprises the following stages: VBP+ conducts an initial auditing 
in the farms before they join the pilot; BIXS tracks the animals to ratify they were growing on 
VBP+ operation before being transported and processed by Cargill. McDonald’s, Loblaw, and 
Cara, the participating customers, buy the meat and subsidise the producer with credit for having 
the right to commercialize verified sustainable beef (Stockford, 2017). During 2018, the 
participating customers will payback to Cargill, on a quarterly basis, financial credits per pound of 
sustainable beef delivered. Cargill thus will distribute the money back to members of the supply-
chain according to the number of cattle heads qualified by the pilot (CBSA, n.d.).         
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After recruiting cattle producers, cow-calf operations, backgrounders, and feedlots 
(“Canadian Beef Sustainability Acceleration Pilot,” n.d.), the CBSA pilot was launched and some 
good results were already reported by VBP+: 
In the first quarter, producers earned a financial payback of $10 per head on qualified 
sustainable animals, and in total successfully certified over 550,000 pounds of beef. In the 
second quarter, the payback on certified animals rose to $20.11 per head. As more 
operations, especially cow-calf operations, become eligible, that payback could grow again. 
The really exciting part is we’re starting to prove that not only can this system verifiably 
track cattle through a sustainable chain of custody, now it can also move financial credits 
back down that chain to each person supplying certified sustainable animals. (Lowe, 2018) 
CBSA is currently “testing and validating the audit and traceability systems needed to meet 
the requirements of the Certified Sustainable Beef Framework — basically the standards 
producers, processors and retailers will have to meet to produce and market certified sustainable 
beef products” (Lowe, 2018). Thus, the CBSA pilot is an important step for the proper adoption 
and implementation of CRSB’s Certified Sustainable Beef Framework along the beef supply-chain 
in Canada. 
2.2.2. The U.S. Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (USRSB) 
Formed in March 2015, The U.S. Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (USRSB) has 105 
members distributed in five constituencies – Producers, Allied Industry, Packers/Processors, 
Retail, and Civil Society – comprising representatives of all the U.S. beef value chain (U.S. 
Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-b). The USRSB has defined as its main objectives to 
“establish sustainability indicators, recognize methods to verify sustainable beef, create a program 
philosophy for implementing sustainability objectives, generate field projects that prove 
sustainability concepts, and establish goals for progress” (U.S. Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, 
n.d.-a).  
The USRSB is currently producing its Sustainability Assurance Framework, which 
determines the operational scope for both USRSB and other organizations working to improve the 
sustainability performance of the beef industry’s value chain in the U.S. The framework shows the 
limits of USRSB efforts, as well as demonstrates the way other actors will work in conjunction 
with the American Roundtable. The Sustainability Assurance Framework is a four-year-old 
project, comprising the development of the following core initiatives by the USRSB team: High 
Priority Indicators and Sustainability Metrics, conducted by the Indicator Working Group; 
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Sustainability Assessment Guides and Outreach and Education Effort, conducted by the 
Engagement, Measurement & Progress Working Group (USRSB, 2017). The Sustainability 
Assurance Framework also includes Second Party Certification and Third-Party Verification 
initiatives, but their implementation is projected to occur only after the conclusion of the USRSB’s 
four-year-old projects, which are expected to be concluded in 2019. Those initiatives are projected 
to be implemented by other business of the U.S. beef value chain with the support of the USRSB’s 
Engagement, Measurement & Progress Working Group (USRSB, 2016). 
Like GRSB and CRSB, USRSB is an ISEAL subscriber. In alignment with GRSB’s vision 
and mission, USRSB understands that a broad beef sustainability standard is not feasible due to 
the variety of ecosystems of beef production. Thus, standard-setting is not on the USRSB’s scope. 
Additionally, as the work of the USRSB is still in the very early stages of development, this multi-
stakeholder initiative will not be considered for analysis in this research. 
3. Literature review 
The specific objective of this literature review is to relate the current knowledge and issues 
regarding MSIs, sustainability standards and certifications, and GAL, in order to define and 
validate the analytical framework to be adopted for conducting the research. The governance 
context around MSI and interventions and the ‘new’ concept of GAL are presented, global 
governance related-themes linked to GAL are addressed, and previous research applying GAL are 
described.  
3.1. Global Governance and Transnational Organizations 
The globalization of markets, as well as the absence of adequate governmental response to 
critical issues brought by globalization, such as sustainability issues, has resulted in a rise in 
transnational organizations with significant rule-making power (Bartley, 2007; Büthe, 2004; 
Kahler & Lake, 2004; Pollack & Shaffer, 2001). Although the difference between international 
and transnational organizations may seem indistinguishable (Colas, 2013), international 
organization is defined as “an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by 
international law and possessing its own international legal personality” (International Law 
Commission, n.d.), while a transnational organization can be regarded as a particular type of 
international institution, but having: status of authority (Kahler & Lake, 2003); broad regulatory, 
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administrative, and rule-making power (Bartley, 2007); scope of influence that transcends their 
operational limits and, in some cases, the states’ borders. In some cases, such organizations are 
literally taking administrative decisions on behalf of countries (Bartley, 2007; Tripathi, 2011) and 
consequently reshaping the status quo of governance structures within the states and globally. 
According to Kingsbury et al. (2005), these organizations can range from: 
 “regulation-by-non-regulation (laissez faire), through formal self-regulation (such as by 
some industry associations), hybrid private-private regulation (for example, business–NGO 
partnerships in the Fair Labor Association), … and inter-governmental organizations with 
direct governance powers (as with determinations by the Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees of individuals’ refugee status, or the WTO dispute resolution 
system for trade conflicts)” (p. 2). 
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is a primary example of a private organization that 
has been dictating the global rules for forest management. Through its sustainability criteria for 
forest use, as well as its private voluntary standards and certification for wood-related products, 
FSC exercises a type of hybrid private-private regulation in the global governance of the forest 
industry (Pattberg, 2005).  
This “new world order” (Slaughter, 2009), brought about by transnational organizations with 
significant rule-making power, is establishing a unified global state of regulation and has shaped 
the rise of the concept of global governance, a term considered imprecise and ambiguous for some 
authors (Finkelstein, 1995; Latham, 1999). ‘Global’ can be translated as “international, interstate, 
intergovernmental, or even, often, transnational” (Finkelstein, 1995, p. 367); however, 
‘governance’ is a more comprehensive term related to setting the guidelines and regulations of the 
players (Finkelstein, 1995; Hoff, 2003; Kjær, 2004; Rhodes, 1996). Notwithstanding its ambiguity, 
global governance is conceptualized by Finkelstein (1995) as “any purposeful activity intended to 
‘control’ or influence someone else that either occurs in the arena occupied by nations or, occurring 
at other levels, projects influence into that arena” (p. 368).  
3.2. Good Governance Principles 
Because of the proliferation of transnational organizations or initiatives that are practicing 
global governance, it is important to understand what are considered good global governance 
practices. Good governance practices, which create legitimacy, are associated with the principles 
of participation, transparency, and accountability (Gisselquist, 2012; Woods, 1999, 2000), and are 
24 
 
the main way of dealing with the side effects of globalization (Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005; 
O’Rourke, 2006).  
In their review and synthesis of the governance concept, Ruhanen, Scott, Ritchie, & 
Tkaczynski (2010) ranked involvement – a synonym for participation – transparency, and 
accountability among the most frequent elements cited in studies of systems of governance. At a 
broader level, Grindle (2010), in his critiques about the concept of ‘good governance’, cites the 
example of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP, in an attempt to 
encourage good governance practices between countries, lists among others participation, 
transparency, and accountability as the most important characteristics of good governance systems 
(UNDP, 1997, p. 12, cited by Grindle, 2010). Likewise, the World Bank cites participation, 
transparency, and accountability as characteristics capable of improving its own governance 
system (Mundial, 2007). 
The following section provides an overview of the concepts of legitimacy and the principles 
of good governance.  
3.2.1. Legitimacy and Good Governance 
Legitimacy has been studied through various theories and frameworks. Some studies analyze 
the legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness of MSIs (Bäckstrand, 2006b; Gulbrandsen, 2005), 
and focus on their governance, implementation, and legitimacy deficits (Bäckstrand et al., 2010; 
Partzsch, 2011). Others propose that MSI studies should be segmented based on whether they  
involve legitimacy or power issues (Cheyns & Riisgaard, 2014), arguing that the pursuit of 
legitimacy is the primary focus of studies founded on institutionalists literature, “based mainly on 
management and organization studies” (Tamm Hallstrom 2004; Fransen and Kolk 2007; Ponte et 
al. 2011, cited by Cheyns & Riisgaard, 2014, p. 412), while studies involving power issues is of 
concern in the political-economy literature (Busch, 2000; Hatanaka et al., 2005) and post-structural 
approaches. The post-structural approach is segmented into governmentality approaches 
(Foucault, 1980, cited by Cheyns & Riisgaard, 2014, p. 413), and convention theory (Dupuy et al. 
1989; Boltanski and Thevenot 2006 [1991], cited by Cheyns & Riisgaard, 2014, p. 413; Ponte & 
Gibbon, 2005). Regarding the latter, standards and certifications are analyzed in terms of the norms 
surrounding their developments. 
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Regardless of the various approaches to analyze MSIs, legitimacy can be defined and 
categorized in a variety of ways. Rooted in network governance studies, Human & Provan (2000) 
and Drori & Honig (2013) see internal legitimacy as that which involves those in the organization 
via “the acceptance or normative validation of an organizational strategy through the consensus of 
its participants, which acts as a tool that reinforces organizational practices and mobilizes 
organizational members around a common ethical, strategic or ideological vision” (p. 347). 
Nevertheless, greenwashing and open-washing7 claims, originating mostly from external actors 
acting as ‘watchdogs’, is a reality. Thus, external legitimacy is about gaining the respect and trust 
of a broad set of stakeholders, such as customers, governments, NGOs, and local communities, as 
articulated by Provan & Kenis (2008):  
Any form of governance must be responsive to external expectations. By doing such things 
as attracting customers, securing funding, dealing with government, and so on, network 
governance can provide the external “face” of the network. Outside groups can see that the 
network is an entity in its own right, and not simply a group of organizations that 
occasionally get together to discuss common concerns. Having external legitimacy can also 
reinforce the commitment of network participants, who are more likely to see themselves as 
part of a viable network. Establishing external legitimacy is a critical role of network 
governance, since individual participants (other than a lead organization), acting on their 
own, will generally not be seen by outsiders as representing the full network. (p. 243) 
In contrast, most legitimacy concerns in terms of global governance have roots in political 
science studies, where debates centre on democratic legitimacy. For instance, in analyzing aspects 
of democracy and effectiveness in the European Union, Scharpf (1999) differentiated between 
input legitimacy (related to the process) and output legitimacy (related to the quality of the 
normative outcomes) (Bernstein, 2011, p. 24). Input legitimacy focuses on democratic aspects of 
the decision-making process and is concerned with ensuring the participation of a broad and 
representative set of individuals during the development of norms and regulations. Output 
legitimacy, on the other hand, focuses on the problem-solving capacity of the outcomes (i.e. norms 
and regulations) to produce effective results on the ground.  
Evolving from this fundamental view of democratic legitimacy, Bekkers, Dijkstra, & Fenger 
(2016) came up with the concept of throughput legitimacy, which is positioned between input and 
                                                 
7 “The term “openwashing” is used to describe efforts by organizations to present a public image of 
transparency and accountability, while maintaining questionable practices in these areas.” (Brockmyer, 2016, p. 102) 
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output legitimacy, and which is concerned with the validity of the suite of processes and procedures 
that led to a normative and binding outcome. However, throughput legitimacy, which is evaluated 
in terms of ample participation, transparency, the efficiency of the decision-making process, and 
accountability (Schmidt, 2013, p.2) had been criticized by Fuchs et al. (2011) for being ‘too 
embracing’ for methodological purposes:   
The problem with the concept of throughput legitimacy is the combination of the aspects of 
transparency and responsiveness (or in our terms accountability), as well as of positive and 
normative criteria, which inhibit its systematic empirical application. (Fuchs et al., 2011, p. 
359) 
Additionally, Fuchs et al. (2011) point out another problem with output legitimacy, which 
inherently defines legitimacy based on its ‘effectiveness’. In this case, they argue that because 
private governance tends to be more ‘effective’ in terms of outcomes than, for instance, public 
governance, then it has output legitimacy, even at the cost or neglect of other aspects, such as 
participation, transparency, and accountability. Similarly to Fuchs et al. (2011)’s criticism of 
output legitimacy, Ponte (2014) claims that in some cases, initiatives that are less democratic but 
highly enforceable can be considered as having output legitimacy, because their interventions have 
positive sustainability impacts, but probably not input legitimacy. Therefore, output legitimacy, 
which implies ‘results’, can ultimately lead to ‘not so democratic’ initiatives, that do not allow 
ample participation of stakeholders in its decision-making process, that are not fully transparent 
about their actions, and that are not very committed to accountability to be regarded as legitimit. 
On the other hand, more democratic but very bureaucratic initiatives, such as MSIs, can have input 
legitimacy due to their inherent participative aspect, but outcome legitimacy can take longer to be 
achieved, as the impacts of their interventions might take longer to be realized.     
Hence, it is not surprising that democratic aspects of a process highly determine the 
legitimacy of norms and regulations according to many scholars (e.g. Mayntz, 2010; Pierre & 
Peters, 2005; Weber, 1978; cited by Hachez & Wouters, 2011; Bodansky, 1999). Thus, in a cause-
effect relationship, a binding normative system is only regarded as legitimate if its development 
process respects democratic conventions: 
The EU debate illustrates one important basis of legitimacy: democracy. Indeed, although 
dissatisfaction with democracy is common in Western countries, it is still no exaggeration to 
say that democracy has become the touchstone of legitimacy in the modern world. 
(Bodansky, 1999, p. 599) 
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Moreover, some authors do not recognize the general definition of legitimacy, but only 
democratic legitimacy, as an aspect to evaluate the authority of a rule-making entity, thus making 
a strong linkage between these two terms. For instance, according to Keohane (2003) “We live in 
a democratic era, and I share the widespread belief that rules are only legitimate if they conform 
to broadly democratic principles, appropriately adapted for the context” (p. 3). Thus, it is widely 
believed that in terms of private governance and their resulting interventions, democratic 
legitimacy, as opposed to legitimacy, is the important ideal. Democratic legitimacy here refers to 
the process that allows broad participation of stakeholders in the decision-making process, and 
their voices and aspirations are reflected on the outcomes. Thus, democratic legitimacy can be seen 
as a synonym of input legitimacy.  
3.2.2. Participation and Good Governance 
It is widely believed that a democratic and legitimate governance setting, where the 
engagement of a broad set of stakeholders is stimulated, has the potential of producing real impacts 
on the ground. From public governance (Bovaird, n.d.; Brockmyer, 2016) to global value chain 
governance in the agri-food sector (Vellema & van Wijk, 2015), the co-creation8 concept has 
evolved from customer-organization interaction strategies aimed at the development of products 
that translate consumer values (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004) to wide-ranging interactions with 
all stakeholders to co-create global and sustainability governance systems (Miller & Wyborn, 
2018). In the forest sector, for instance, the engagement of local communities, from the earliest 
stages of development of MSIs, have resulted in better social and environmental outcomes 
(Suiseeya & Caplow, 2013). Thus, it is important to include all groups affected by MSIs from the 
initial stages of development through the design and implementation of sustainability 
interventions.  
There are various levels and types of participation. In that sense, inclusiveness – defined by 
Boström (2006) as “the combination of the individual qualities and the members power resources 
that create the capacity for action as well as the credibility and authority of an initiative” (p. 354) 
– is both a criteria for deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2009) and an important strategy for 
                                                 
8 A management strategy that allows the collaboration of a broad set of actors in the production of a joint 
outcome (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004) 
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participation and good global governance practices. Inclusiveness is thus a way to assure authority 
and legitimacy to MSIs, based on the assumption that “it favours sharing knowledge and expertise 
among stakeholders” (Cheyns, 2011, p.2).  
However, there are degrees of stakeholder engagement, or inclusiveness, primarily identified 
by Arnstein (1969) in her continuum of stakeholder’s involvement, which ranges from information 
dissemination, or manipulation, to engagement, or citizen empowerment. In fact, the continuum 
of inclusiveness revealed by Fransen & Kolk (2016) in a recent study confirms the existence of 
variations in terms of stakeholder’s participation in the governance and standard-setting process 
of different MSIs. For instance, if a consultation regarding the standard-setting does not provide 
feedback or show accountability to those who participated in the process, it cannot be truly 
regarded as an engaging or involving process, and instead, may be seen as manipulative behavior.     
The disappointment with participative and collaborative models of governance with respect 
to lack of inclusiveness and their capacity to produce sustainability outcomes are addressed by 
studies of the deliberative democratic capacity of similar initiatives (Bäckstrand et al., 2010; 
Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; Hahn & Weidtmann, 2016; Greetje Schouten, Leroy, & Glasbergen, 
2012; Selfa, Bain, & Moreno, 2014). The definition of deliberative capacity is “the extent to which 
a political system possesses structures to host deliberation that is authentic, inclusive, and 
consequential” (Dryzek, 2009, p. 1382). It claims that the demands of all relevant and affected 
groups must be appropriately addressed in the governance process (Hahn & Weidtmann, 2016, p. 
101). In this regard, a fierce criticism related to the deliberative capacity of roundtable initiatives 
is made by Schouten et al. (2012): that is, they fail in terms of inclusiveness and thus, are 
deliberative, but are not democratic (p. 43). In a broader perspective, with respect to environmental 
governance, the “deliberative turn” movement from states to private institutions ultimately 
revealed some democratic and outcome deficits. For instance, according to Bäckstrand et al. (2010) 
“there is no guarantee that deliberative governance arrangements will deliver green outcomes” (p. 
225), and the authors see this turn more as a privatization movement of environmental resources 
than as a real “deliberative turn” towards more participation and engagement of stakeholders. 
The deliberative ideal subscribed by multi-stakeholder arrangements is derived from the 
prominence of democratic economies in these initiatives and their familiarity with this decision-
making method. Thus, the institution of a democratic governance process is regarded as 
29 
 
fundamental to reach legitimacy (Clark, 2007). The idea behind deliberative democracy is to focus 
on extensive and inclusive deliberation as an alternative to the absence of a democratic system of 
representation and votes (Hahn & Weidtmann, 2016, p. 92). By allowing broad stakeholder 
participation for sharing knowledge and expertise, all the voices and concerns are heard, and the 
most informed and best decision is reached through consensus, thereby instilling authority and 
legitimacy (Greetje Schouten et al., 2012). The deliberative democratic process is also transparent 
and holistic, and the particularities of the local context are considered.  
The problem is that deliberative democracy, while conferring legitimacy to an initiative, 
rarely translates to strong sustainability outcomes (Bäckstrand et al., 2010). In fact, too much 
deliberation and democracy can compromise the effectiveness of MSIs, by focusing too much on 
process and not enough on outcomes, which can “increase the governance costs and decrease the 
organizational autonomy of transnational rulemaking organizations” (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 
2009, p. 714).  
Ultimately, it is challenging to include concerns of all stakeholders in the decision-making 
process as in reality there are “constraining factors such as availability of experts and other 
resources” (Hahn & Weidtmann, 2016, p. 119). Nevertheless, there is a degree of inclusiveness in  
stakeholder participation in the governance process of multi-stakeholder arrangements (Greetje 
Schouten et al., 2012) that include notions of scope (“the range of stakeholder types that are 
included as members” (p. 43)) and quality (“linked to the equality of opportunities for stakeholders 
to participate in decision-making in an adequate way” (Dingwerth, 2007, p. 29, cited by Greetje 
Schouten et al., 2012, p. 43). However, there is still selectivity in some roundtable initiatives, 
where more technical and pragmatic approaches are adopted to the detriment of more radical 
approaches to sustainability, that ultimately demands not reconciliation but instead drastic changes 
and breaking away from the current system of sustainability governance (Greetje Schouten et al., 
2012, p. 49). Thus, despite being broadly regarded as the best approach to reach democratic ideals 
and improve the legitimacy of multi-stakeholder arrangements, deliberative democracy not only 
creates complexities in the decision-making process, which can compromise their capacity to 
produce sustainability outcomes, but also is limited in terms of the ability to include all 
stakeholders and more embracing approaches to sustainability.     
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3.2.3. Transparency and Accountability and Good Governance 
Most studies that involve transparency and accountability are related to democratic and 
legitimacy aspects of governance (e.g. Bäckstrand, 2006b; Fuchs et al., 2011; Mena & Palazzo, 
2012). Transparency is largely regarded as a good mechanism for increasing the trust in and 
promoting better outcomes for governments, corporations, and institutions (Hood & Heald, 2006). 
Once limited to politics, transparency has evolved to become a value demanded by the market as 
it is also a way of reducing the risks of business investments (Heald, 2006). According to Fuchs et 
al. (2011), internal transparency is demonstrated by allowing participation in the initiative and 
access to information to members, while external transparency can be demonstrated by allowing 
the public to have access to information related the initiative.  
Fox (2007) distinguished between opaque and clear transparency. Opaque transparency is 
related to the disclosure of information that in fact does not inform about the decision-making 
process or the outcomes of an initiative and thus is not reliable. In that sense, this type of 
transparency is an open space for greenwashing and open-washing claims. Clear transparency, on 
the other hand, offers reliable information about performance, responsibilities, and financial data 
through policies and programs that facilitate the access to information.  
Transparency is viewed as one of the most important elements for improving the 
accountability of NGO governance arrangements (O’Rourke, 2006, p. 909), a concept that likely 
can be extended to multi-stakeholder initiatives. Accountability is ‘a relationship between an actor 
and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the 
forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens, 
2007, p. 450). It evolved from initial concerns about the disclosure of financial information to 
donors and investors to “a broader notion of corporate governance in relation to the whole range 
of stakeholders (Kolk, 2008, p. 3). According to Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, & Colle 
(2010), there are two drivers for accountability: environmental protection trends reflected in 
sustainability business reporting; and regulatory demands that forced organizations to be more due 
diligent and exert more of an oversight role in economic, social and environmental aspects of the 
business. 
Although accountability is perceived as a way of conferring legitimacy to organizations, it 
alone does not assure legitimacy (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006). For example, the World Bank, is 
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highly accountable only to some of its biggest supporting countries, which can be seen as binding 
the bank to these countries’ agenda, while ignoring the countries that are subject to its regulation 
(Grant & Keohane, 2005). In fact, this gap in terms of appropriate participation of all affected 
countries, align with ethical concerns about the established accountability practices, can explain 
the perception of questionable legitimacy of this renowned global institution. Indeed, the lack of a 
contestation mechanism applicable to the final terms of accountability revealed by the World Bank 
example is viewed by Buchanan & Keohane (2006) as narrow accountability (p. 425). In 
comparison, broad accountability is viewed as an intricate network of accountability interactions 
which involves pondering various viewpoints and contexts (Romzek (1996), cited by Ospina, Diaz, 
& O’Sullivan, 2002, p. 28). 
Keohane (2003) proposes a more straightforward classification of two forms of 
accountability. Internal accountability, defined within principal-agent theory, refers to an 
accountability relationship among members associated with the same institution. The system of 
responsibilities and authority observed in the highest bodies9 of the governance structure, such as 
the accountability a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has with the Board of Directors, for instance, 
is an example of internal accountability. On the other hand, external accountability, is associated 
with managers and the ones externally affected by their deliberations. The adoption of third-party 
audit organizations and certification bodies is a way of demonstrating external accountability 
through intermediate organizations (Fuchs et al., 2011, p. 358). 
In contrast, Mashaw (2006) proposes ideal-type accountability regimes of governance (i.e.  
in the public, market, and social spheres), and is based on a set of accountability-related questions: 
Accountability to whom? Who is accountable? How is accountability conducted? Accountability 
for what? Which accountability standards? What are the expected effects of the accountability? 
Each ideal-type regime implies a specific set of answer to these questions. Thus, different actors 
and accountability systems (Bovens, 2007) have their own logic, which must be acknowledged for 
accountability strategies purposes. For example, in public systems, accountability relates to 
providing a public good for the community (Kramarz, Cosolo, & Rossi, 2017). In contrast, in 
private systems, accountability involves a variety of shareholders that might be concerned about 
economic benefits (Widerberg & Pattberg, 2017, p. 73). Adding to this, Fox (2007) sees 
                                                 
9 A group of people that lead an organization and has the power to define its governance process and practices. 
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accountability, or answerability, as soft when organizational actions are being justified, and as 
hard when the possibility of sanctions is added. Another system of accountability regimes that 
evolved from Mashaw’s (2006) work was pictured by Chan & Pattberg (2008) in their 
accountability and global environmental governance case study with the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC):   
Public accountability regimes encompass political (for instance electoral) systems, 
bureaucratic systems and legal systems … The marketplace accountability regime includes 
labor markets, capital markets and product markets… social accountability systems can be 
more or less formal (ranging from accountability systems in families to membership 
organizations) and resemble networks, constituting cultures and subcultures, wherein 
obligations are often informed by judgments of appropriateness. (p. 105) 
According to Chan & Pattberg (2008), the perceived state failure in addressing social and 
environmental global issues led to the evolution from public accountability regimes to marketplace 
accountability regimes which, in turn, due to accountability gaps perceived in the interventions 
produced by marketplace accountability regimes by civil society, evolved to more socially related 
accountability regimes such as “civil-society and hybrid public-private networks” (Chan & 
Pattberg, 2008, p. 107) – where MSI are positioned – in an evolutionary shift in terms of authority.  
In this regard, MSI and sustainability interventions are bound to a socially related 
accountability regime, or “soft laws” (Lobel, 2006, p. 968) that are “infinitely negotiable, 
continuously revisable, often unspoken; oscillating between deep respect for individual choices 
and relentless social pressure to conform to group norms” (Mashaw, 2006, p. 125). The need both 
to provide broad accountability and to comply with soft laws reinforces the perceived complexity 
of multi-stakeholder systems of governance and the usual claim that these arrangements are slow 
in terms of delivering outcomes. 
Finally, given the free access to much institutional information and data, promoted mostly 
by the internet, accountability strategies can put a lot of pressures on managers, which is even 
more prominent in a multi-stakeholder governance model, as managers have to be accountable to 
not only customers and shareholders, but also to a broader set of stakeholders. While this pressure 
can somehow reduce the chances of managers engaging in opportunistic behavior (Phillips, 
Freeman, & Wicks, 2003), it can lead to governance problems such as the “problem of many eyes” 
(Bovens, 2007, p. 455), as managers have to be accountable to a diverse and overarching set of 
forums, each one with their own requirements, and the “problem of many hands” (Thompson, 
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1980), as several stakeholders, in several forums and committees, produce together several policies 
and procedures, making it hard to define who is responsible for the final outcome. Thus, these 
problems can bring even more complexity to multi-stakeholder arrangements. 
3.2.3.1. Relationship between Transparency and Accountability 
Ultimately, the aim of transparency strategies is to achieve accountability. The association 
between transparency and accountability has been made by various researchers (e.g. Mena & 
Palazzo, 2012; Fox, 2007; Kosack & Fung, 2014). Mena & Palazzo (2012) argue that input 
legitimacy in MSIs requires both internal accountability, whereby those that are part of the 
initiative accept the authority of the MSI, and external accountability, whereby those that are 
outside of the MSI process view the initiative as having the right to regulate. Therefore, they 
conclude that the input legitimacy of MSIs is shaped by stakeholder inclusion, procedural fairness, 
consensual orientation, and transparency.  
In contrast, Fox (2007) contests the concept of ‘transparency in the promotion of 
accountability’, distinguishing between ‘clear’ and ‘opaque’ transparency, and ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
accountability, to identify  “what kinds of transparency lead to what kinds of accountability, and 
under what conditions” (p. 663). To Fox, the ideal conditions in terms of governance process and 
sustainability interventions is the establishment of clear transparency and hard accountability. 
Similarly to Fox (2007), Kosack & Fung (2014) identified four varieties of transparency: freedom 
of information (FOI) or right to information (RTI); transparency for responsible corporate 
behavior; regulatory transparency; and transparency for accountability (T/A). What Kosack & 
Fung (2014) added to Fox (2007) study is the idea of performance comparison. While FOI/RTI 
and transparency for responsible corporate behavior offer to the public data about the performance 
of institutions, regulatory transparency and T/A provide indices that allow public comparison 
among possible and competing interventions, which can be viewed as an evolution of Fox's (2007) 
idea of sanctions in the absence of accountability. The disclosure of performance indicators, such 
as the impact of standards and certifications, an example of T/A, not only allow some sort of 
comparison but also the ability to sanction competing interventions. The interventions that do not 
demonstrate being outcome-based, or that do not deliver sustainability results on the ground, could 
be seen as another greenwashing or open-washing initiative and, as a result, end up not being 
widely adopted.   
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3.3. Global Administrative Law: A Model of Good Governance 
Concerns around the phenomenon of transnational organizations determining the ‘rules of 
the game’ created debates around the need of an instrument to control and regulate this new 
governance model, which led to the development of the Global Administrative Law school of 
thought  (Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005), that embraces the broadly regarded principles of 
good governance: participation, transparency, and accountability. Global Administrative Law 
(GAL) has its roots in international and administrative law, and is fundamentally focused on the 
rules, principles, and mechanisms of administrative law and as such, encompasses notions of 
participation, transparency, accountability, and review (“Global Administrative Law,” n.d.) and 
their applicability to global governance. In order to fill the apparent gap of an analogous 
administrative law mechanism applicable to global governance (Mattli & Büthe, 2005), GAL 
claims that global governance should be regarded as administration, and thus must be “organised 
and shaped by principles of an administrative law character” (Tripathi, 2011, p. 355) with the 
ultimate objective of addressing the “accountability deficit in the growing exercise of transnational 
regulatory power” (Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005, p. 16). 
This accountability deficit in transnational organizations is leading to the rise of two parallel 
and different approaches to tackle this problem: an extension of the administrative law of the states 
to the regulation produced globally that is affecting the nations; and an adaptation of the 
administrative law to the global regulation (Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005). According to 
GAL, to properly address the accountability deficit in terms of transnational regulation in the 
“global administrative space” (p. 18), a unified adaptation of the institutionalized procedures and 
norms domestically adopted within the states – the concept of administrative law – should be 
applied to the governance system of transnational organizations to standardize, organize, and 
control their powerful global influence (Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005).  
The emergence of GAL can be seen also as tentatively dealing with the consequences of 
globalization, notably global interdependence in terms of: 
 …security, the conditions on development and financial assistance to developing countries, 
environmental protection, banking and financial regulation, law enforcement, 
telecommunications, trade in products and services, intellectual property, labor standards, 
and cross-border movements of population, including refugees (Kingsbury, Krisch, & 
Stewart, 2005, p. 16). 
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Decisions on these issues, once made by states, are now being made in global forums – 
mostly “transnational administrative bodies” (p. 16) – but the implementation and compliance with 
the de facto regulation produced and established by these global forums is a responsibility of the 
institutions located within a state’s boundaries. Particularly, GAL is concerned with the rise of 
regulation produced by private international standard-setting bodies, not subject to the control of 
the regional government or their legal systems (Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005). Private 
organizations are being ‘encouraged’ to comply with the interventions, mostly indicators, private 
voluntary standards, and certifications, defined by these transnational organizations. The Global 
Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (GRSB) is an example of a private international body that is 
trying to regulate beef sustainability, by defining at the global level what should be regarded as 
sustainable beef by their country members, as well as the objectives, principles, and criteria for 
sustainable beef, which should then be translated into regional supply-chain management 
interventions.  
Despite being a relatively new idea, Global Administrative Law (GAL) phenomena can be 
conceptualized as: 
…comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices and supporting social understandings 
that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in 
particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned 
decisions and legality and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make 
(Kingsbury, 2005, cited by Tripathi, 2011, p. 362).  
Although GAL is fundamentally linked not only to international and administrative law and 
upholds good governance practices of participation, transparency and accountability, it is still 
criticized because it is also linked to organizations with an imperial character. This is because it 
has “the capacity to guide conduct by providing incentives and permitting the imposition of 
sanctions even when they lack independent coercive powers” (Cohen and Sabel, 2005, cited by 
Tripathi, 2011, p. 357). In this way, GAL promises to ensure the democratization of international 
law by normalizing how these imperial institutions function and are organized, in order to assure 
the accomplishment of the basic premises of globalization “to promote democratic ideals, ensure 
free trade, equal opportunity, and free flow of information” (Tripathi, 2011, p. 358). Therefore, in 
the era of rule-making transnational organizations — a type of imperial institution – GAL can be 
seen as the guardian of globalization and democratic ideals. Through its normative commitment 
with “internal administrative accountability, protection of private rights or the right of the states, 
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and promotion of democracy” (Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005), GAL attempts to regulate 
and to confer legitimacy to the governance structures of those emerging, and eventually not 
broadly democratic, imperial institutions.  
The control of the governance systems of imperial institutions is a debatable and 
controversial aspect of the emerging Global Administrative Law (GAL) school of thought. By 
exerting its normative power over the governance of those institutions, GAL can be seen as 
maintaining the status quo, mainly the liberal ideas of capitalism and the dominance of both the 
global North over the global South and “the capitalist classes at the expenses of subaltern peoples” 
(Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005, p. 52). This critique of GAL enhances the classical 
opposition between law reformists and revolutionists. By improving the accountability of 
transnational organizations with an imperial character, GAL is seen by law reformists as exercising 
its normative commitment with the rule of law in order to give voice to the concerns of disregarded 
groups. In contrast, in the view of revolutionists, this promotes the stabilization of the current 
international order, when in reality what is needed is a radical change of the existing global order 
(Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005, p. 52). The stabilization of a new global order through the 
adoption of acceptable structures of dominance had been discussed by Chimni (2004), who claims 
that through the adoption of legal, political, sociology, and ethical worldwide acceptable norms, a 
global state is not just arisen, but also being accepted and consolidated within the states’ borders. 
Thus, according to Chimni (2004), “the social effectiveness of general norms is ensured by the 
enforcement power of international institutions conjoined with a fragmented and incommensurate 
structure of states, emphasizing the continuing significance of sovereign states even as the global 
state emerges” (p 5).   
Despite these criticisms, GAL still offers a good model of global governance for MSIs acting 
in the transnational and national arena. The local context, like the geopolitical environment, not 
only influence but also are influenced by MSI interventions. Thus, the legitimacy of an MSI can 
be affected if these particularities are not properly considered and addressed along both its 
governance process and interventions development.      
3.4. The role of local context in Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives and Interventions 
Stakeholder requirements are driven by the local context, reflecting political, geographical, 
cultural, economic, business, and other considerations. These requirements can vary significantly 
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in different parts of the globe, and therefore understanding and including the local context is crucial 
in understanding the development and outcomes of MSIs.  
In a broad perspective, the global North is more concerned with environmental issues, while 
in the global South, social issues are the prevalent sustainability concerns (Barkemeyer et al., 
2013). In a more narrow scope, the local political, cultural, and social aspects can affect notions of 
legitimacy as “criteria of legitimacy are contingent on historical understandings at play and the 
shared norms of the particular community or communities granting authority” (Bernstein & 
Cashore, 2007, p. 351). For example, Iceland fish producers and state allies developed a national 
non-governmental alternative to the transnational Marine Stewardship Council that reflected 
nationalism of its fishery industry and also attempts to create a program more reflective and 
responsive to local needs (Foley, 2017), while developing countries, such as Indonesia and 
Colombia, are concerned with power inequalities between the poor and less affluent and the 
powerful and dominant stakeholders (Köhne, 2014; Selfa, Bain, & Moreno, 2014). 
Thus, a fit also between local notions of legitimacy and the policies and enforcement 
mechanisms translated into sustainability interventions is desired as it can enhance the perceived 
legitimacy (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007, p. 352) of a multi-stakeholder initiative and influence the 
broad adoption of its interventions among members of the supply chain. Additionally, shifts in 
terms of local notions of legitimacy should be monitored, and governance arrangements, notably 
stakeholder engagement in the decision-making process, need to evolve and change either to keep, 
or even enhance, the perceived legitimacy of the initiative among local stakeholders and the broad 
public (Bennett & Bennett, 2016). This type of shift would also ensure political legitimacy, 
according to Bernstein & Cashore (2007). 
Local context can also affect the relevance or importance of science-based versus value-
based approaches to addressing sustainability issues. Perceptions, opinions, and values (Manning, 
2013, p. 11) vary from place to place, while science tends to be more global. Stakeholders from 
the north do not necessarily have the same values as stakeholders from the south, as already 
revealed by the comparison between some sustainability standards and certifications studies 
conducted in developed and developing countries (Foley, 2017; Köhne, 2014; Selfa et al., 2014). 
Additionally, Indigenous and traditional knowledge is often left out of deliberations. In that sense, 
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it is desirable to reach a ‘fit’ between local context values and organizational values, the latter 
reflected in the governance processes and sustainability standards and certifications interventions. 
In line with this ‘fit’ feature is the convention theory framework which, in an “interpretative 
approach to conventions” (Batifoulier, 2001, cited by Ponte & Gibbon, 2005, p. 24), postulates 
that “all action is justified in relation to common sets of principles” (Boltanski and Thevenot 
(1991), cited by Ponte & Gibbon, 2005, p. 7). In that sense, conventions (i.e. current and local 
social norms and standards) impose a relationship of mutual influence between individual and 
organizational decisions. Moreover, in convention theory, “at any particular time and locality, 
there may be multiple justifications of action operating at the same time” (Ponte & Gibbon, 2005, 
p. 7). Different from the rule of law, where enforcement is assured through a judicial system, the 
coercive capacity of conventions is less straightforward and conferred by potential social 
sanctions. The loss of a certification credential due to non-conformity with the standards, which 
can lead to public rejection and loss of market share, for instance, is a practical example of 
conventions’ normative sanction. 
Finally, the local business context is also important, in terms of drivers for sustainable supply 
chains (e.g. competitive advantage, reputation loss as well as stakeholder concerns (e.g. 
environmental and social pressure groups, consumer demands)) (Seuring & Müller (2008), p. 
1703). Furthermore, Seuring & Müller (2008) suggest that “focal companies”10, which receive the 
blame for environmental and social issues that occur downstream and upstream of their supply 
chains, usually adopt the strategy of demanding the members of their supply chain to comply with 
environmental and social standards (Seuring & Müller, 2008, p. 1704). Unilever, for instance, is a 
focal company that, pressured by their consumers and stakeholders, led and had a prominent role 
in the development of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007). Thus, 
focal companies are a type of ‘transnational-national’ organization that, influenced by both global 
and local context, tend to lead the implementation of sustainability interventions upstream and 
downstream of their supply chains.     
The fact that MSIs and their interventions are heavily influenced by local context, partly 
explains the proliferation of these types of initiatives and interventions on a global scale and their 
                                                 
10 Defined by Seuring & Müller (2008) as “those companies that usually (1) rule or govern the supply chain, (2) 
provide the direct contact to the customer, and (3) design the product or service offered” (p. 1699) 
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consequent governance-related problems. In particular, the local context is most influential on the 
levels of interaction and negotiation with local actors, so that there is an adequate balance between 
the interests of all stakeholders involved in the process. Nevertheless, multiple interpretations of 
the guidelines of a global governance system are inevitable so as to reflect the environmental and 
social realities of each geographical setting  (Arce & Viteri, 2013; Bain et al., 2013; Tallontire at 
al., 2011). Thus, the role of local context must be considered to evaluate and understand the 
successes and failures of MSIs.        
3.5. Evaluation of Good Governance in Multi-stakeholder Initiatives 
Studies that examine global governance as practiced by various MSIs and their interventions 
(i.e. standards and certifications) tend to use the broadly recognized key principles of good global 
governance: participation, transparency, and accountability (African Development Bank, 1999; 
Grindle, 2010; OHCHR, n.d.; The Asian Development Bank (ADB), 1998; World Bank, n.d.). 
Legitimacy is determined by adherence to good governance practices, and the pursuit of legitimacy 
exerts a huge influence over private global governance arrangements (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; 
Bennett & Bennett, 2016). For example, in Bernstein & Cashore’s study of non-state market driven 
(NSMD) governance initiatives, they found that their pursuit of political legitimacy was defined 
as “the acceptance of shared rule by a community as appropriate and justified” (Bernstein & 
Cashore, 2007, p. 348).  
The analysis of good governance based on participation, transparency and accountability, 
has been observed in the food retail business (Fuchs et al., 2011), and the natural resource 
management field, mostly forest law and management and water management literature (Khanal, 
2007; Markell, 2010; Montgomery, 2013; Secco, Da Re, Pettenella, & Gatto, 2014; Stojanovska, 
Miovska, Jovanovska, & Stojanovski, 2014). In general, evaluation of MSIs are concerned with 
the process of developing MSIs (i.e. input legitimacy) and of the outcomes of the MSIs (i.e. output 
legitimacy).  
3.5.1. Input Legitimacy Concerns of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives 
As previously defined, input legitimacy focuses on democratic aspects of the decision-
making process and is concerned with ensuring the participation of a broad and representative set 
of individuals during the development of norms and regulations. In general, researchers have found 
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MSIs to have a democratic deficit when it comes to their standard-setting and governance 
processes, specifically with respect to not engaging stakeholders, power imbalances, and lack of 
deliberative democratic capacity.  
With respect to participation, MSIs do not always promote the expected level of stakeholder 
engagement (Fransen & Kolk, 2016).  This is because MSIs tend to adopt a strategic approach to 
engaging with stakeholders, because of the challenges in including all stakeholders. That is, those 
involved “use the expedients of urgency, reaching consensus, and pragmatism to steer deliberation 
trajectories in specific directions, define categories of ‘stakeholder’ and frame acceptable formats 
of engagement.” (Ponte, 2014, p. 262). For instance, Cheyns (2011) study on inclusiveness in 
RSPO (Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil) and RTRS (Roundtable for Responsible Soy) in Asia 
and Latin America revealed that the strategic engagement approach adopted by these MSIs ended 
up having an exclusionist effect, and particularly limited the voices of local and smallholders 
communities wanting to deliberate principles of justice. Although inclusion is ideal, Köhne’s 
(2014) study shows that engagement and participation beyond the main stakeholders is a 
challenging task in a multi-stakeholder approach. 
Furthermore, there is often a lack of engagement of producers in the governance process 
(Bennett, 2017; Bennett & Bennett, 2016; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007). The inclusion of producers 
in the highest bodies of a multi-stakeholder initiative is viewed as a best practice (Lloyd et al., 
2008) and is seen as important to not only address the democratic deficit of MSIs (Bennett, 2017) 
but also to achieve moral legitimacy in the international arena (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007). The 
inclusion of small-scale producers is a matter of social justice and their inclusion in the governance 
process can foster knowledge and expertise sharing, and thus produce better outcomes (Bennett, 
2017). Nevertheless, there are indications that small-scale producers are not properly engaged in 
MSIs, particularly those producers located in developing countries (Bennett, 2017). Specifically, 
in Bennett & Bennett’s (2016) socio-political case study, they analyzed whether and how 
legitimacy shaped decisions about including producers in the governance of the Fair-Trade 
standards and certifications. They found that the pursuit of external legitimacy was the main driver 
for including and excluding producers from the governance process over the years. In another 
study, Bennett (2017) identified the prominent influence of focal companies at the highest levels 
of decision-making in MSIs to the detriment of producers’ involvement (Bennett, 2017).  
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Closely linked to weak stakeholder engagement is the presence of power imbalances 
amongst different stakeholders in MSIs (Cashore, Auld, & Newsom, 2004; Cheyns & Riisgaard, 
2014; Foley, 2017; Fuchs et al. 2011; Köhne, 2014; Selfa, Bain, & Moreno, 2014).  In their study 
of food retailers, Fuchs et al. (2011) highlighted the democratic deficit in terms of the lack of voice 
and the power imbalance between small farms located in developing countries and retailers located 
in developed countries. This latter aspect reinforces the traditional inequality between the global 
south and the global north extensively discussed in global governance literature, particularly in 
forest management (Barkemeyer, Figge, & Holt, 2013; Ebeling & Yasué, 2009; Higman, 
Nussbaum, AGUILAR, Nardelli, & Scrase, 2002; Marx & Cuypers, 2010; McDermott, 2013). 
Similarly, Bernstein & Cashore (2007) provide the example of Unilever, a multi-national 
corporation, which exerted a lot of influence on the highest bodies of Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) and created doubts about the democratic aspect of this NSMD initiative among some 
environmental and social groups. These concerns limited the adoption of MSC and prompted this 
MSI to promote governance reforms to overcome its deficit in terms of democracy and thus be 
perceived as more legitimate.  
Another concern related to participation is the lack of deliberative democratic capacity 
(Bäckstrand et al., 2010; Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; Hahn & Weidtmann, 2016; Greetje 
Schouten, Leroy, & Glasbergen, 2012), and related to this, the inability of some deliberative 
members to influence outcomes (Cheyns, 2011; Djama et al., 2011 cited by Ponte, 2014; Silva-
Castañeda, 2012). For instance, in the forest sector, the enforceable market capacity of a non-state 
market driven initiative – FSC certification – was deeply studied and testified by Cashore, Auld, 
& Newsom (2004), but more recent studies in the agriculture-related sector has shown that this 
binding characteristic of some multi-stakeholder arrangements is usually associated to a ‘quasi’ 
participative governance process. The deliberations derived from the decision-making process of 
those arrangements are usually a reflection of the voices of a select group of powerful stakeholders 
(Cheyns & Riisgaard, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the inadequate level of stakeholders’ participation and engagement even in 
deliberative governance arrangements is believed to be one of the causes of the emergence of 
conflicts among stakeholders (Gulbrandsen, 2005). This was shown in Köhne’s (2014) 
ethnographic study on land-related conflicts between rural communities and big palm oil producers 
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certified by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) in Sumatra, Indonesia. The power 
asymmetry between rural communities and certified producers and the lack of participation and 
engagement conferred to the communities into the scheme caused the rise of land conflicts. 
Thus, MSIs can reinforce established power structures (Cheyns & Riisgaard, 2014) and 
intensify power asymmetries among stakeholders (Fuchs et al., 2011; Partzsch, 2011), and thereby 
limit capacity to overcome the established political status quo, notably in developing countries. 
Selfa et al. (2014) revealed that the unequal distribution of power and associated social injustices 
that existed because of state laws was amplified by the adoption of Bonsucro biofuel certification 
by powerful sugar cane and ethanol producers in Colombia. In other words, this MSI was 
influenced by the political context in Colombia, and is in line with Seuring & Müller's (2008) 
claim that legal demands or regulations exert huge influence over initiatives and interventions. 
Similarly, in Indonesia, Köhne (2014) showed that the RSPO regulation ended up helping powerful 
and certified organizations to better impose their claims in land disputes with small farmers, while 
in Colombia, there was manipulation of state laws such that the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biomaterials (RSB) standards were set by powerful economic groups for their own benefit and to 
the detriment of the overall community (Selfa, Bain, & Moreno, 2014). Nevertheless, despite some 
evidence on the contrary (Foley & McCay, 2014, p. 10), these issues may be less pronounced in 
developed countries. In the Icelandic fishery sector, Foley (2017) demonstrated how the power of 
a coalition of local stakeholders, including the state, led by an influential fishing association, led 
to the successful development of a national sustainability standard and certification intervention.  
Thus, the local political and social context, can positively or negatively influence the 
governance process of MSIs with respect to democratic process and participation. Even when some 
less affluent groups participate in the decision-making process of MSIs, their capacity to influence 
the outcome is limited because some issues brought to the table by these more vulnerable groups 
are viewed as inappropriate to the overall sustainability debate. For example, local communities 
that brought political issues that impacted their livelihoods, such as land rights and GMOs, to 
RSPO and RTRS forums, respectively, ended up being disqualified by the MSIs through claims 
of militancy or idealism acts (Cheyns, 2011). This situation reveals not only a conflict between the 
already discussed notions of legitimacy among the stakeholders of both initiatives but also the 
denial of the political influence over their outcomes. 
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3.5.2. Factors Affecting Output Legitimacy of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives 
The democratic legitimacy gap in MSIs has been blamed for the lack of positive 
sustainability outcomes (Fuchs et al. 2011; Ponte, 2012; 2014), or output legitimacy. For example, 
when Suiseeya & Caplow (2013)  applied a procedural justice framework to their study of forest 
carbon projects, it revealed that the lack of proper stakeholder engagement, particularly non-
engagement with vulnerable groups, compromised the ability of standards, aimed at promoting 
social justice in global forest governance, to produce effective outcomes. Ponte (2012) also 
highlighted that the MSC’s lack of input legitimacy resulted in a lack of robust environmental 
results, the exclusion of labour and other socio-economic problems from its scheme, and 
insufficient engagement with fisheries in developing countries. Indeed, Ponte saw the MSC 
initiative as a way of creating a market for sustainable certified fish rather than as a means to 
generating effective sustainability outcomes.  
Despite conferring legitimacy to an initiative, deliberative democracy does not assure 
sustainability outcomes (Bäckstrand et al., 2010). In fact, power asymmetry is usually a reality in 
such arrangements and the inadequate level of stakeholders’ participation and engagement even in 
deliberative governance arrangements can reduce the prospect that members will exert influence 
on the outcomes (Cheyns, 2011; Djama et al., 2011 cited by Ponte, 2014). According to Dingwerth 
& Pattberg (2009), by overemphasizing deliberations and other aspects of good governance, MSIs 
end up focusing more on process rather than on outcomes, which can “increase the governance 
costs and decrease the organizational autonomy of transnational rulemaking organizations” (p. 
714).  
Thus, the inherent complexity of multi-stakeholder arrangements, particularly if they are 
highly democratic, limits their market expansion and, consequently, their capacity of producing 
sustainability outcomes (Ponte, 2014). In fact, top-down, business-led, and less democratic 
initiatives,  may have more power than MSIs to generate sustainability outcomes (Ponte, 2014).  
Nevertheless, when legal demands/regulation aligns with the goals of MSIs in a broad, 
participative, and inclusive governance process from the first stages of their development, the 
prospects for promoting sustainability impacts on the ground are greater. Foley's (2017) study of 
the production and power phenomenon in Iceland’s fishery industry that led to the successful 
implementation of the Iceland Responsible Fisheries (IRF) program, through “the integration of 
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social relations of production, state–producer collaboration, and globalized governance and trade 
norms” (p. 923), is a notable example of the positive influence of state participation in a sustainable 
MSI intervention. 
It is worth noting that MSIs might perform better in rich and democratic countries than in 
poor and ‘not so democratic’ ones, because in general, industries can afford to implement standards 
and certifications and have access to capacities and resources sometimes unavailable for 
developing country industries. Additionally, many of these countries have strong social and 
environmental regulations and educated citizens that coexist in a sense of community and mutual 
respect. In this context, injustice is less tolerated, and representative democracy is the norm. Thus, 
MSIs may be more democratic and have more impact in these countries. On the other hand, this 
raises doubts about the capacity of MSIs to produce positive impacts in countries that struggle with 
broad political and social problems such as corruption and power imbalances among poor and 
vulnerable and rich and powerful individuals. In such a difficult environment, other types of 
initiatives, such as state-related sustainability interventions and law enforcement, could be 
preferred and stimulated as those might be the only ones capable of producing real outcomes in 
developing countries. 
3.6. Evaluation of Governance using GAL 
The good governance principles of GAL have already been used to analyze governance 
strategies of transnational organizations. For example, Koh (2016) used the GAL framework to 
evaluate the adherence to good governance practices of an international governance regime, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Statistics Office (ASEANstats). The author 
viewed this indicator regime as a powerful method of governance for modelling behavior by 
“…regulating and influencing a state’s behaviour through the exercise of either diagnostic or 
mobilizing power…” (Koh, 2016, P. 162). In evaluating the indicator-building process using GAL, 
Koh aimed not only to understand ASEAN’s regulatory power through indicators, but also to 
explain how it may be “moderated, supervised, or kept in check” (Koh, 2016, p. 179). The author 
findings show that ASEAN has an authoritative potential, but the lack of good governance 
practices can impede its expansion. 
Standards are recognized as a good governance practice, being widely adopted by several 
business sectors to regulate organization’s behaviors in a supply-chain. Moreover, GAL is 
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evolving in the study of trans-governmental regulation and administration, including in private 
standard-setting activities (Thompson, 2012, p. 137). For instance, Kanevskaia (2016) used GAL 
to analyze the standard-setting development process of a hybrid organization, through an analyses 
of the legal framework of three standard-setting technology institutions. The analysis highlighted 
the value of using GAL to analyze the legitimacy of standard-setting initiatives to show:  the de 
facto powerful control produced by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), and the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards; and the participation, transparency, and accountability 
gaps of these institutions.   
Another noteworthy study by Mattli & Büthe (2005) was a comparison between the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a private transnational organization responsible 
for the establishment of international accounting standards, and the U.S. Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), a private national organization responsible for determining accounting 
principles (Kingsbury, Krisch, Stewart, et al., 2005, p.11) that should be followed by businesses 
in the U.S.A. Mattli & Büthe (2005) proposed a framework based on the Global Administrative 
Law (GAL) principles and a modified Principal-Agent (P-A) theory11 to study the influence of the 
macro-political climate (Latham, 1999, p. 25) on strengthening or loosening up administrative law 
procedures and on influencing how several public and private principals handled delegations to a 
private agent: one acting internationally – IASB – and the other acting nationally, in the U.S.A. – 
FASB. Mattli & Büthe (2005) demonstrated that there is great potential for both P-A and 
governance problems to be solved by applying principles of administrative law, in the case of 
FASB, and Global Administrative Law (GAL), in the case of IASB. 
Nevertheless, GAL is still an evolving analytical framework and its application to the 
evaluation of MSIs is still a relatively new concept.  
3.7. Thesis objectives and Rationale 
The primary aim of this case study is to evaluate the legitimacy of both the governance and 
the standard and certification development processes of two North America’s multi-stakeholder 
                                                 
11 “Agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates work 
to another (the agent), who performs that work” (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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sustainable beef initiatives – CRSB, a national initiative linked to a broader transnational initiative, 
and Grasslands Alliance, a transnational initiative, and compare and evaluate these initiatives with 
respect to the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) so as to confront their practices with a 
benchmark MSI. This thesis focuses mostly on good governance aspects related to the 
organizations (i.e. internal governance, such as who is governing CRSB and Grasslands Alliance, 
who’s excluded, etc.), but also on good governance aspects related to the rules produced by the 
organizations object of the case study (i.e. standards, principles, criteria, certification, 
implementation). In both cases, the development stage is the focus of the present study. 
Thus, this thesis tries to answer the following two research questions:  
1. To what extent do the two MSIs demonstrate input legitimacy in their governance 
processes and in the sustainability interventions they are developing?  
The input legitimacy is important as it can confer authority on these initiatives in terms of 
defining sustainable beef for the entire industry.  
2. What can be learned about input legitimacy by comparing the governance processes 
and interventions of these two MSIs to an established initiative (i.e. RSPO)?  
RSPO was used as a benchmark because it is an old and consolidated initiative, founded in 
2004, with full ISEAL membership status, and it has implemented lots of processes and practices 
to address several criticisms of its governance process over the years, such as lack of proper 
engagement with smallholders.  
The Global Administrative Law (GAL) principles of participation, transparency (particularly 
external transparency, which is the focus of this thesis), and accountability is the analytical 
framework adopted for analyzing legitimacy. This analytical framework is expanded by using 
ISEAL definitions of these principles, as described in the following chapter. The specific 
objectives of this study are to: 
 Evaluate the extent to which participation, transparency, and accountability in the 
governance process can be regarded as organizational principles; 
 Evaluate the extent to which participation, transparency, and accountability principles 
influence the private voluntary standard and certification development processes; 
By evaluating whether the participation, transparency and accountability principles of 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) are presented in the earliest stages of development of the 
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governance, private voluntary standard, and certification development processes of a national and 
a transnational MSI, this thoughtful and evidence-based approach will improve, in terms of 
legitimacy construction, both governance and private voluntary standards and certification 
structures in future sustainability initiatives, not only in the beef industry but also in other food 
systems. This knowledge may 1) serve as a benchmark tool for organizations acting in other types 
of meat industries and food systems who are interested in demonstrating the legitimacy of their 
initiatives; 2) assist retailers and end-users to analyze the private voluntary standards and 
certifications available in the market and to decide which one to select based on participation, 
transparency, and accountability criteria; 3) challenge other consolidated private voluntary 
standard and certifications initiatives to evaluate the need to reassess the legitimacy of their already 





CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY 
A qualitative content analysis is the method adopted in the present case study to evaluate 
whether and how the development of CRSB and Grasslands Alliance, a national and a transnational 
multi-stakeholder initiative, respectively, demonstrate the GAL principles of participation, 
transparency, and accountability. The criteria defining each principle was developed based on 
ISEAL best practices both for governance processes and for the development of private voluntary 
standards and certifications. Particularly, this study follows Harris's (2001) eight steps for 
conducting a qualitative content analysis research using secondary data. The documentation that 
is publicly available on the CRSB and Grasslands Alliance websites was examined. As the 
Grasslands Alliance governance structure is still being developed and therefore there are no 
governance-related documents, the documents of the Food Alliance, which is managing the 
Grasslands Alliance, were examined. 
1. Qualitative Content Analysis Methodology 
According to Weber (1990), there is no straightforward way of conducting Content Analysis 
(p. 13). Nevertheless, after evaluating the potential of using organizational secondary data in 
business ethics studies, Harris (2001) proposed a process for conducting Qualitative Content 
Analysis research, which aims to address the validity and reliability aspects of this type of method, 
using eight steps, as outlined below.   
Step 1 - Identify research questions and constructs 
The focus of the present study is to answer the research question To what extent do good 
global governance principles guide both the governance process and the interventions being 
developed by two MSIs aimed at making the beef industry in North America more sustainable, and 
what can we learn in terms of input legitimacy by comparing them to an established initiative (i.e. 




Step 2 - Identify the texts to be examined 
According to Koppell (2010), scholars will likely find evidence of an organization’s 
competitive strategy within its governance structure and associated texts, which reflect the 
principles that drive organizational practices (Bennett & Bennett, 2016, p. 337). Moreover, ‘Rules 
and conditions of participation’ are the main organizational governance instruments (Ponte & 
Gibbon, 2005) and are stated in by-laws, statutes, and other governance-related documents.  Thus, 
more than 1,500 pages of governance-related documents available on the internet (i.e. by-laws, 
annual reports, news, and websites from CRSB, Grasslands Alliance, and Food Alliance) were 
selected for analysis. 
Step 3 – Specify the unit of analysis 
According to Holsti (1969, p. 116, cited by Harris, 2001, p. 198), the unit of analysis is “the 
specific segment of content that is characterized by placing it in a given category”, and it must be 
consistent with the research question (Insch, Moore, & Murphy, 1997, p. 10). Thus, paragraphs 
were adopted as the unit of analysis, as answering the research question implied a fine and detailed 
examination of the governance-related documents to find evidence of the GAL’s criteria.  
Step 4 – Determine the categories to be used 
The definition of the categories for codes came from the Global Administrative Law (GAL) 
and its three principles of good governance practices: participation (“Allowing stakeholders to 
participate in the firm” (Greenwood, 2007, p. 319) ), transparency (“The perceived quality of 
intentionally shared information from a sender” (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson, 2016, p. 1788).), 
and accountability ("A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A's (past or future) 
actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct" 
(Schedler, 1999) ). 
Step 5 – Generate the coding scheme 
In order to generate the coding scheme, best practices (Table 3) for each of the three 
categories of GAL were identified and extracted from the ISEAL codes and guidelines, 
specifically, from its three Codes of Good Practice – Setting Social and Environmental Standards 
(ISEAL, 2010), Assessing the Impacts of Social and Environmental Standards Systems (ISEAL, 
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2014a), and Assuring Compliance with Social and Environmental Standards (ISEAL, 2018a) – 
Principles for Credible and Effective Sustainability Standards Systems (ISEAL, 2013a), and 
Sustainability Claims Good Practice Guide (ISEAL, 2015). ISEAL best practices in terms of 
participation, transparency, and accountability were selected to define the criteria for the GAL 
principles because ISEAL codes and guidelines are broadly recognized as the best instruments 
available for standard-setting initiatives acting in the sustainability realm to confer legitimacy to 
both their governance process and interventions: private voluntary standards and certification. 
The first version of the coding manual was developed by taking the best practices in Table 
3 and developing criteria related to participation, transparency, and accountability using ISEAL 
aforementioned documentation. This process yielded 13 criteria for participation, 11 criteria for 
transparency, and 10 criteria for accountability (see Criteria in Table A.1 Appendix A). In this 
step, the first version of the data collection form (Table A.2 Appendix A) was also developed and 
the coding rule was defined, such that organizational initiatives that had the presence of a best 
practice should be coded as ‘1’, and its absence should be coded as ‘0’. It was decided that multiple 
classifications of documents, paragraphs, and criteria would be acceptable during the coding 
process, i.e. documents and paragraphs could be allocated to more than one criterion, and a 




Table 3: Summary of Best practices for Global Administrative Law (GAL) using ISEAL Codes and Guidelines (ISEAL, 2010, 2013a, 2014a, 2015, 
2018) 
Global Administrative 
Law (GAL) Principles 
 
Best Practices Based on ISEAL Codes and Guidelines 
1. Participation The organizational environment is inclusive and non-discriminatory, promoting stakeholder’s involvement in the 
governance processes. External perspectives are taken into account, for example by making an intended sustainability claim 
available for stakeholders to provide feedback. Impartiality in relation to the promotion of stakeholders’ participation in the 
governance process is observed, and all of them, despite their size and/or geographic location, are treated fairly and 
objectively. Even in draft form, getting external input in the standard-setting process helps to ensure that there is a common 
understanding of the intent of the standard, and better informs stakeholder’s participation in the standard development stage. 
The standard system and certification scheme are accessible and affordable, with reduced barriers to implementation. Active 
inclusion of stakeholders in the assurance process increases the transparency and thus public confidence in the process and 
can be a vital source of information.  
2. Transparency A governance process that is transparent is impartial and is under the scrutiny of stakeholders so has less risk of corruption 
or conﬂict of interest. The most effective strategy in the presence of a conflict of interests is being transparent around the 
potential conflict. Transparency also builds confidence in the organizational processes as the public is more trusting of 
institutions that are open.  
3. Accountability The organization provides accountability to stakeholders and to those who are aﬀected by, and are meant to benefit from, its 
activities. Ensuring the participation in, and the transparency of, organizational activities and processes is a way to be 
accountable to the general public. A clear accountability process assures the responsible use of financial resources to 
organizational donors. Being an ISEAL full member is a best practice in terms of accountability. One of ISEAL’s objectives 
is to solve the perceived accountability gap of private standard-setting NGOs. ISEAL promotes the accountability of its 
members through its codes and guidelines.  
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Step 6 – Pilot study and revision 
In this step, tests on semantic and face validity, as well as on reliability, should be conducted 
in order to validate the categories and the coding scheme before proceeding with the real case 
studies (Harris, 2001, p. 199). Semantic validity certifies whether the phrases coded in a specific 
category have the same meaning and “relate to the category in a similar fashion” (Harris, 2001, p. 
194). Face validity, on the other hand, confirms whether the categories seem to evaluate the 
constructs that they are “intended to measure” (Weber, 1990 and Babbie, 1995, cited by Harris, 
2001, p. 195). For instance, a criteria has semantic validity if it is related to the category that it is 
supposed to be measuring. A criteria evaluating participation cannot be together in a group with 
other criteria related to a category evaluating accountability. Furthermore, the categories have face 
validity if their group of criteria are accurately evaluating what they are supposed to evaluate, i.e. 
the group of criteria within the participation category are adequately evaluating participation, and 
not something else. Finally, checks on reliability have the objective to validate the replicability 
and consistency of the method. In other words, a study can be considered reliable if similar results 
are observed by applying the same research method several times in other studies by other 
researchers (Hagood, 1941, p. 219, cited by Harris, 2001, p. 194).      
First Pilot Study 
After filling the coding manual with codes, as described in Table A.1 (Appendix A), one 
pilot was conducted by the principal researcher by applying the first version of the data collection 
form (Table A.2 Appendix A) to the governance-related documents available on the internet of 
The Accountability Framework (AF) initiative. The AF is an initiative that tackles the problems 
of deforestation and human rights violations in the supply chain of agriculture and forest industries. 
It was selected for the first pilot of the Content Analysis because it is a sustainability initiative 
analogous to the CRSB and Grasslands Alliance initiatives. Among CRSB’s core projects is the 
verification framework (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-t). Similar to the AF, 
CRSB’s verification framework set the principles for the development of both the private voluntary 
standards and certification that forms CRSB’s Certified Sustainable Beef Framework (Canadian 
Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-r). Rainforest Alliance (RA), a founding member of AF, is 
also one of the NGOs that formed the Grasslands Alliance, a coalition that is setting the private 
voluntary standards and the certification for sustainable, climate-friendly beef production in North 
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America (Grasslands Alliance, n.d.-d). Those aspects were regarded as strong arguments for 
considering AF for the first pilot of the Content Analysis. 
During the first pilot of the Content Analysis, the text describing criteria was refined as 
follows: 
 Participation: Criteria 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 was adjusted in order to reflect not only 
practices related to standard development but also governance-related practices. 
 Transparency: Criteria 2.4 of the transparency principle was reduced – the words 
internal and external were removed – with the purpose of simplifying the concept of 
stakeholders. Two more criteria – 2.13 and 2.14 – were added to the transparency 
principle. The first pilot was conducted with an initiative that has among its members 
organizations with broad experience in terms of the development of governance 
practices related to sustainability, and the disclosure of Theory of Change – “a 
comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is 
expected to happen in a particular context”  (“What is Theory of Change?,” n.d.)– 
and Project Workflow was observed in the Accountability Framework (AF) 
initiative.  
 Accountability: The text of criteria 3.1, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the accountability principle 
were also adjusted. The text of criteria 1 of the accountability principle was adjusted 
in order to consider either the organization’s object of the case study or at least one 
of their founding members as an ISEAL full member. Being an ISEAL full member 
is a demonstration of high commitment to the principle of accountability, as it is very 
demanding to follow all its principles, codes and guidelines. Having at least one of 
its founding members as an ISEAL full member is evidence that the principle of 
accountability is within the governance system of the organization object of the case 
study. The text of criteria 3.4 and 3.5 of the accountability principle were adjusted to 
expand the possibilities of communication channels and governance documents to be 
analyzed. Similarly, to the text of criteria 2.4 of the transparency principle, the text 
of criteria 3.7 of the accountability principle was reduced – the words internal and 
external were removed – to simplify the concept of stakeholders. Finally, the sub-
categories were adjusted to be aligned with the new text of each criteria and the code 
‘Not Applicable’ (NA) was added to both the coding manual and the data collection 
form in order to allow the eventual purge of criteria not related to the organizations 
object of the case study.  
After the first pilot, the coding manual had 13 criteria for participation, 13 criteria for 
transparency, and 10 criteria for accountability. Table A.3 (Appendix A) and Table A.4 (Appendix 




Second Pilot Study 
From the second versions of the coding manual and the data collection form, a second pilot 
was conducted by three coders, including the principal researcher, with the Sustainable 
Development Verified Impact Standard Project (VCS) Initiative (SD VISta) (Verra, n.d.-a). The 
objective of the second pilot was to train the two new coders in the coding procedure, and to 
conduct semantic and face validities reviews. 
The Sustainable Development Verified Impact Standard Project (VCS) Initiative (SD VISta) 
aims to develop a standard to be adopted by organizations that want to properly assess and 
communicate the social, environmental, and economic impacts of their projects. SD VISta main 
targets are project developers who need to demonstrate the sustainability outcomes of their projects 
to investors, buyers and other stakeholders in a consistent and transparent manner. SD VISta is a 
initiative conducted by Verra, a NGO founded in 2005 by “environmental and business leaders 
who saw the need for greater quality assurance in voluntary carbon markets” (Verra, n.d.-b). 
Verra’s SD VISta initiative will produce not only a standard for sustainability projects to 
demonstrate their outcomes effectively, but also a certification scheme preceded by an initial 
assessment process conducted by an independent third-party audit. The initiative is currently in 
the public consultation stage for its standard, an aspect that motivated its selection for the second 
pilot as Grasslands Alliance is in the same stage as SD VISta. 
After the second pilot, some adjustments were made in the text of the second versions of 
both the coding manual and the data collection form. The order for some criteria were modified to 
reflect a more logical sequence of evaluation. For instance, criteria 1.6 of the participation principle 
became criteria 1.1, as the mapping of stakeholders is a prior stage from which other organizational 
practices should evolve. Criteria 1.1, prerequisites for stakeholder participation, became criteria 
1.2 of the participation principle, as this stage can only be properly conducted after mapping the 
stakeholders. Examples were included in both criteria 1.1, 1.4, and 1.5 of the participation 
principle, and criteria 3.2, 3.7, and 3.8 of the accountability principle for clarification purposes. 
Further explanations were also added between ‘round brackets’ (()) for some criteria. That was the 
case for criteria 1.3 of the participation principle. The coders decided to make clear that the practice 
for improving stakeholder’s participation should be correlated with the membership segmentation 
– bodies – derived from the mapping process stated in criteria 1.1. The same occurred for criteria 
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3.5, 3.6, and 3.9 of the accountability principles, where a list of possible names of governance 
documents – by-law, statute, rules of procedures – that should be examined was added. Some 
criteria were divided in two in order to increase the accuracy of the coding process. Criteria 1.8 of 
the participation principle was split to both contemplate the occurrence of consultation practices 
not only in the present but also in the past and investigate the existence of a formal process for 
public consultation in the governance documents. The same happened in criteria 2.8 of the 
transparency principle: it was divided to contemplate in one criteria who is evaluated and in the 
other one the existence of an evaluation process in the standard system. The coders identified the 
need to include one more criteria in the transparency principle, criteria 2.13, to consider the 
practice of giving feedback to the public about the results of the consultation process. Additionally, 
criteria 1.13 of the participation, 2.5 of the transparency, and 3.10 of the accountability principles 
were removed due to their excessive level of subjectivity. Next, the sub-categories were adjusted 
accordingly, and three columns were added to the data collection form with the purpose of 
facilitating the referencing procedure of the coding process:  Reference – 
Document/Page/Paragraph/Item/Title – Key Words, and Comments. After conducting the second 
pilot, the coding manual had 13 criteria for participation, 14 criteria for transparency, and 9 criteria 
for accountability. Table A.5 (Appendix A) and Table A.6 (Appendix A) display the third version 
of the coding manual and data collection form, respectively. 
Third Pilot Study 
The third pilot was conducted by two coders, one of them being the principal researcher. The 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) initiative was chosen, and the third version of the 
data collection form was used in this stage. The objectives of the third pilot were to allow the 
coders to practice the knowledge gained from the second pilot, to test the procedures of the coding 
process, to check validity, and to assess the reliability of the two coders’ decisions. 
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) is a not-for-profit NGO initiative that aims 
to “transform markets to make sustainable palm oil the norm” (RSPO, n.d.-b), by acting in several 
sectors of the palm oil value chain: producers, processors, traders, consumer goods manufacturers, 
retailers, investors, banks, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). RSPO defines 
environmental and social criteria that shall be met by organizations in order to receive the Certified 
Sustainable Palm Oil (CSPO) certificate. Founded in 2003, RSPO is one of the oldest ‘roundtable 
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format’ sustainability initiative, counting nowadays with 3,698 members, and having certified near 
20% of the palm oil produced worldwide. RSPO was chosen for the third pilot due to its experience 
in sustainability private voluntary standard and certification development process. Additionally, 
as an ISEAL full member, RSPO must comply with ISEAL’s principles, codes, and guidelines, 
being thus a benchmark in terms of the adoption of participation, transparency, and accountability 
principles.  
Some final adjustments were made in the text of the third versions of the coding manual and 
the data collection form after the third pilot. The texts of criteria 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the 
participation principles, as well as criteria 2 and 6 of the accountability principle, were adjusted in 
order to become more clear. Criteria 13 of the participation principle become criteria 12 of the 
transparency principle. Information regarding the cost for implementing the certification system 
were considered by the coders to be more related to the transparency principle. Criteria 14 of the 
participation principle was removed due to its high-level subjectivity. Criteria 5 – Public 
information about the membership costs is available on the website – was added to the 
transparency principle, as the coders, while conducting the third pilot, considered it a primary 
information that must be available for public consultancy. Criteria 12 was removed from the 
transparency principle, as criteria 10 and 11 of the participation principle already covered the 
aspect of stakeholder’s engagement in the certification system. The text of the criteria 14 – now 
criteria 15 – of the transparency principle was adjusted not only to turn it more clear, but also to 
not limit to one year the demonstration of organizational accomplishments in a timeline. Criteria 
7 of the accountability principle was removed, as the release of relevant decisions made by the 
organization is an aspect already covered by criteria 2 of the accountability principle. Finally, some 
words were added by the coders to the key word column of the data collection form in order to 
guide the principle researcher in the process of finding relevant documents to be analyzed during 
the next stage: Step 7 – Collect the data. After the third pilot, the coding manual had 12 criteria for 
participation, 15 criteria for transparency, and 8 criteria for accountability. Table A.7 (Appendix 
A) and Table A.8 (Appendix A) show the fourth and final version of the coding manual and data 
collection form, respectively, after the refinements.  
The results from the coding process conduct by coders one and two are displayed in Tables 
A.9 (Appendix A) and A.10 (Appendix A), respectively. The inter-rate reliability (IRR) among the 
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two coders was calculated using ReCal (ReCal, n.d.) tool. ReCal2 calculates the IRR among two 
coders through, among others, the percent agreement reliability coefficient. The percent agreement 
coefficient was adopted to evaluate the IRR, and the result was 80%, thus in the range 77% to 97% 
to be regarded as acceptable (Harris, 2001). 
Step 7 – Collect the data 
The actual set of governance-related documents from CRSB, Grasslands Alliance, and Food 
Alliance were coded by the principal researcher using the fourth version of the data collection form 
(DCF) in the form of a spreadsheet. The documents available on the internet were meticulously 
searched and analyzed in order to detect the presence of good governance principles of the Global 
Administrative Law (GAL), where participation, transparency, and accountability concepts were 
defined and operationalized by referring to ISEAL best practices, in the governance, private 
voluntary standards, and certification processes and practices of these two MSIs.  
The coder conducted a detailed examination of a broad set of governance-related documents 
from CRSB, Grasslands Alliance and, when necessary, Food Alliance, such as by laws, statutes, 
webpages, reports, news, to find answers for the 35 questions related to participation, transparency, 
and accountability principles covered by the criteria column of the DCF. As Grasslands Alliance 
does not have a formal governance structure, and being managed by one of its founding members, 
the Food Alliance, by-laws and others governance-related documents of the latter were analyzed. 
The words contained in the key word column of the DCF were used as a guide to find the relevant 
documents to be analyzed, and the set of documents found and used to answer each question were 
registered in the reference column of the DCF. Regarding the documents and paragraphs analyzed 
and registered in the reference column of the DCF, the presence of evidence that satisfied the 
criteria of the DCF was coded as ‘1’, and the absence of evidence was coded as ‘0’ in the respective 
best practice column of the DCF. Questions considered not applicable by the coder were not only 
coded as ‘N/A’ in the same best practice column of the DCF but also expurgated from the 
calculation of the scores. The coder’s notes for each question were registered in the comment’s 
column of the DCF.  A maximum score of 35 – being 12 for participation, 15 for transparency, 
and 8 for accountability, was achievable for CRSB and Grasslands Alliance. Finally, the data 
related to the principles of participation, transparency, and accountability collected by the coder 
for CRSB and Grasslands Alliance are shown in Chapter III, in tables 4, 5, and 6, respectively. 
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Step 8 – Assess validity and reliability 





CHAPTER 3. RESULTS 
In this chapter the findings revealed by the qualitative content analysis conducted with the 
two MSIs, CRSB and Grasslands Alliance, are presented.  
1. Participation 
Overall, CRSB demonstrated more good governance practices related to the participation 
principle (9 out of 12) than did the Grasslands Alliance (3 out of 12) (Table 4). Criteria 1.1 to 1.4, 
related to stakeholder identification, membership, and representation, were present only for the 
CRSB. Based on these criteria, the CRSB initiative seems to be pursuing a very participative 
governance model, willing to give voice to its stakeholders in the decision-making process. For 
example, for Criteria 1.4, members vote for the CRSB Council Chair, who is the person that leads 




Table 4: Presence of Criteria for Participation and Details for CRSB and Grasslands Alliance. Coding: 1 = present, 0 = absent. 
Criteria 
# Criteria Description Code CRSB Code Grasslands 
1.1 
There is public information about the process for 
identifying stakeholders through an initial 
stakeholder mapping exercise (i.e. development of a 
list of bodies: steering groups, executive boards, 
members, etc.) 
1 
Demonstrates that a mapping process was 
conducted in the earlier stage of establishment 
of the initiative. 
0 
Lists some stakeholders to whom the 
standards and certification should be 
valuable and mentions membership but does 
not describe them. 
1.2 
There is public information about prerequisites and 
limitations for participation of all stakeholders in the 
governance process (membership). 
1 
Members must support its vision, mission, and 
principles, agree on improving sustainability, 
and pay annual fees. 
0 
There is no information about prerequisites/ 
limitations for participation in the 
governance process. 
1.3 
There is public information about the process for 
improving stakeholders’ participation in the 
governance process (based on the membership bodies 
derived from the mapping exercise). 
1 Efforts for engaging with stakeholders are presented in 2017 Annual Report. 0 
There is no evidence of a document that 
highlights the engagements efforts. 
1.4 
There is evidence that the requirements for 
participation in the highest body (i.e. Executive 
Board/Board of Directors) ensure the 
representativeness of all stakeholders. 
1 
Members vote for the CRSB Council Chair 
(CRSB has a Council instead of a Board) and 
for their representatives on the CRSB Council.  
0 It is not clear whether the Board represents all stakeholders. The latter are not described. 
1.5 
There is evidence that the decision-making process of 
the highest (i.e. Executive Board/Board of Directors) 
and relevant (i.e. Advisory Committees) bodies 
allows the participation of, and review by, all 
stakeholder groups through their representatives. 
1 
Members make appointments to the Council, 
partake in Technical Working Groups, advise 
the Council during meetings and general 
assembly, and vote/approve actions requiring 
membership input. 
1 
Board decisions and meetings are governed 
by consensus among board members. 
Disagreements are documented in minutes, 
or decisions are tested for a period of time. 
1.6 There is a process for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance process. 0 
Despite having a Communications and 
Marketing Committee, no evidence of a process 
for stakeholders to give suggestions for 
improving the governance process were 
identified. 
0 
No evidence of a process for stakeholders to 
give suggestions for improving the 
governance process are available. 
1.7 
There is a process (e.g. a vote), that allows members 
of the organization to participate in revisions (e.g.  of 
governance documents or standards). 
1 
Votes are adopted in General Assembly, 
Meetings of the Council, Committees, Technical 
Working groups, and Representatives elections. 
1 
Votes are adopted to remove members of the 
Board and Directors, to fill governance seats, 
and to approve debt incur requested by the 
Executive Director and staff. 
1.8 
There is a process of public consultation related to 
governance-related practices (e.g. the standard-
setting). 
1 The process of public consultation is stated in the standard documentation. 0 
There is no evidence of a process of public 
consultation for any governance-related 
practices. 
1.9 
There is evidence that public consultation related to 
governance-related practices is occurring or has 
occurred. 
1 
Indicator and Communication and Marketing 
Committees conducted 3 public consultations 
about indicators in 2017. 
1 
Conducted 1 public consultation about 





# Criteria Description Code CRSB Code Grasslands 
1.10 There is public information about how stakeholders can participate in the certification system. 1 
Stakeholders: Assurance protocol specifies their 
responsibilities in the certification process and 
Certification Body Requirements lists the 
procedures for conflict resolution. 
0 No information about how stakeholders participate in the certification system. 
1.11 
There is public information about the process for 
improving stakeholders’ participation in the 
certification system. 
0 
No evidence of practices for improving 
stakeholder’s participation, such as 
smallholders, in the certification system. 
0 
No information about the process for 
improving stakeholders’ participation in the 
certification system. 
1.12 
There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in 
the certification system, either as participants in the 
audit and review, or as observers during the 
assessment process. 
0 
No information about how stakeholders are 
engaged in the certification system, either as 
participants in the audit and review or as 
observers during the assessment process. 
0 
No information about how stakeholders are 
engaged in the certification system, either as 
participants in the audit and review or as 
observers during the assessment process. 
Total of Participation Criteria Present 9  3  
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Seats on the Council are allotted to at least one representative of each Organization Type 
(Table 5), which range from those involved in the beef supply chain to other stakeholders, such as 
NGOs. 
 
Table 5: CRSB’s Council Membership. (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-c, p. 5) 
Membership Category Organization Type Council Seats 
Chair Member/Observer/Ex-Officio 1 
Supply Chain Stakeholder Producer Organizations 3 
 Processors 2 
 Retail and Food Service 2 
Associate Members NGO 2 
Members at Large Food & Agriculture Business 1 
 Any Member of the CRSB 1 
Ex-Officio Government As requested 
Observers Scientific Advisors and Youth As requested 
 
Both CRSB and Grasslands Alliance meet criteria 1.5, which addresses the extent of 
representation and participation in the decision-making process. However, each initiative 
approaches this differently. CRSB members partake in various ways (e.g. technical working 
groups) and provide advice to the Council and then vote on actions requiring membership input. 
The main forum for decision-making processes is CRSB’s General Assembly, where according to 
the by-laws, "the deliberations of the General Assembly meetings shall be recorded in minutes 
signed by the Chair and approved by the General Assembly" (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable 
Beef, n.d.-c, p. 4).  In contrast, the Grasslands Alliance decision-making occurs at the level of the 
Board, which is governed by consensus among board members. If consensus is not reached, 
disagreements are documented in the minutes, or decisions are tested for a period of time. Thus, 
the Grasslands Alliance consensus and test period approach in the decision-making process seems 
to be an extra effort to reach internal legitimacy (Drori & Honig, 2013), being so regarded as more 
appropriate according to the literature as this demonstrates commitment with stakeholder 
engagement, the ideal level of stakeholder’s involvement  (Arnstein, 1969). 
Although the CRSB seems to uphold best practices by including stakeholders in decision-
making through representatives at the General Assembly, minutes were not publicly available and 
so it was not possible to evaluate the quality of stakeholder participation in the decision-making 
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process of CRSB. Additionally, the absence of the minutes made it difficult to evaluate 
stakeholder’s participation for improving the governance process. Furthermore, neither CRSB nor 
Grasslands Alliance seem to have a policy or process to allow stakeholders to give suggestions for 
improving the governance process (Table 4, Criteria 1.6), but if the minutes of the General 
Assembly were publicly available, this could have provided some examples of this practice.  
The CRSB, through its already retired Indicator Committee and Communication and 
Marketing Committee, has begun and finalized in 2017 a consultation process (Table 4, Criteria 
1.8 and 1.9), which included two rounds of public consultation for both CRSB standards for beef 
production and primary processing stages of the beef supply-chain. In the standard documentation 
available on its website, CRSB states the progress of public consultations, but it seems that this 
initiative still does not have a structured public consultation process implemented. 
The CRSB’s Indicator Committee (see Acknowledgments) developed the Standard through 
a multi-stakeholder, collaborative approach, which included two rounds of public 
consultation, that align with the five GRSB principles. (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable 
Beef, 2017b, p. 9) 
Indeed, as stated in the CRSB 2017 Annual Report, the 2nd draft of the Sustainability 
Indicators for Beef Production was released for public consultation on March 2017. From June to 
August 2017, CRSB released the 1st draft of the Sustainability Indicators for Beef Processing for 
public consultation. Finally, on October 2017 the 2nd and final draft of the Sustainability Indicators 
for Beef Processing was released for public consultation (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable 
Beef, n.d.-a, p.16). Nevertheless, the complete absence of information regarding the feedback to 
the public about the consultation stage of the standards can be seen as a lack of full engagement 
of stakeholders. In fact, regarding Arnstein (1969) continuum of stakeholder’s involvement, this 
situation evidences an absence of proper information dissemination to stakeholders by CRSB. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence that either CRSB or Grasslands Alliance have a process 
for improving stakeholders’ participation in the certification system or that stakeholders are 
engaged in the certification system, either as participants in the audit and review, or as observers 
during the assessment process (Table 3, Criteria 1.11 and 1.12). However, in some cases, the 
absence of a criteria is related to where the initiative is in terms of its maturity. For instance, the 
CRSB is still waiting for the results and conclusions of The Canadian Beef Sustainability 
Acceleration (CBSA) Pilot to start its Certified Sustainable Beef Framework certification system.  
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Nevertheless, due to the importance of the broad adoption of the certification system in order to 
realize sustainability outcomes, both initiatives could be starting to elaborate on how to improve 
participation of stakeholders in their certifications from the earliest stages of implementation.   
2. Transparency 
Similarly to what was observed during the evaluation of the participation principle, CRSB 
demonstrated more good governance practices (8 out of 15) than Grasslands Alliance (5 out of 15) 
(Table 6) in relation to transparency. According to Fuchs et al. (2011), “transparency can be 
internal and external, i.e. information available only to members and information available to the 
general public” (p. 358). As the present thesis focuses only on external transparency, this aspect 
can explain the low score for both initiatives, as the documents accessible only to CRSB, 
Grasslands Alliance, and Food Alliance members were not in the scope of the present study. 
There was no information on the CRSB and Grasslands Alliance websites on the 
requirements these MSIs follow to ensure transparency in the governance process (Table 6, 
Criteria 2.2). This is a curious aspect of the governance process of those initiatives as transparency 
is stated as a guiding principle of their certification systems. In the case of CRSB, the transparency 
principle is within the credible guiding principle of the Certified Sustainable Beef Framework: 
“credible to all stakeholders, securing trust through robust assurances, transparency, inclusivity 
and vigorous scientific review” (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-b). Likewise, 
Grasslands Alliance/Food Alliance (GAFA) addresses transparency in the certification system 
through one of its eight guiding principles: “Maintain transparency and the chain of custody” 
(Food Alliance, n.d.-c). Nevertheless, stating transparency as a guiding principle only of the 
certification system is not sufficient to assure governance transparency, which is defined as “access 
to information on decision-making structures and processes” (Fuchs et al., 2011, p. 358).
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Table 6: Presence of Criteria for Transparency and Details for CRSB and Grasslands Alliance. Coding: 1 = present, 0 = absent. 
Criteria 
# Criteria Description Code CRSB Code Grasslands 
2.1 Public information about the governance process available on the website 1 
Information regarding the governance structure of 
CRSB can be found in various documents. 1 
Grasslands Alliance has no governance structure 
so far, but Food Alliance's by-laws provides 
information about the governance process. 
2.2 
Public information about the 
requirements the organization follows to 
ensure transparency to the governance 
process available on the website 
0 
Transparency is within one of the guiding 
principles (credible) of the Certified Sustainable 
Beef Framework, but public information about the 
requirements the organization follows to ensure 
transparency is not available on the website. 
0 
Transparency is one of Food Alliance guiding 
principles but is more related to the certification 
system. No information about the requirements 
the organization follows to ensure transparency 
are available on the website. 
2.3 
Public information about mitigations 
procedures in the occurrence of conflict 
of interests are available on the website 
0 
There is a Conflict of interest Policy related to the 
certification system. In the governance level, it 
might be addressed in the codes of ethics, but this 
document is not available on the website. 
0 
There is a Code of Ethics related to the 
certification system (inspectors) to deal with 
conflict of interests, but it is not publicly 
available. No information on how it is dealt in the 
governance. 
2.4 Clear definition of organizational stakeholders available on the website  1 
Despite presenting the definition of organizational 
stakeholders on the website, the information is not 
consistent in all the documents available. 
0 
No clear definition of organizational stakeholders 
is available on the website, and there is no 
information about the process for identification of 
stakeholders. 
2.5 
Public information about the 
membership costs is available on the 
website 
1 
The Annual Revenue of each Organization Type 
defines the Annual Member Fees (2016/17) to be 
paid. 
0 
No information about the membership costs is 
available on the website or by-laws, only 
information regarding certification costs. 
 Public information about organizational activities related to the standard system available on the website   
2.6 1.      Information regarding the standard development process 0 
No information regarding how the CSRB standard 
development process was conducted. 0 
No information regarding how Grasslands 
Alliance and Food Alliance standard development 
process were conducted. 
2.7 2.      Information regarding the content of the standard 1 
Information about the Sustainable Beef Production 
Standard and the Sustainable Beef Processing 
Standard is available. 
1 
Information about, for instance, Food Alliance 
Sustainability Standard for Livestock Operations 
is available. 
2.8 3.      Information regarding the impact intended with the standard  NA 
As CRSB standards were just launched, no impact is 
available to be monitored. 0 
Food Alliance states some "general" impacts, but 
no concrete results and milestones reached are 
presented. 
2.9 
4.      Information about standard claims 
and the verification/traceability system 
that support those claims 
1 A chain of custody audit is conducted on processors willing to sell beef with a CRSB sustainable claim. 0 
The “Supply chain verification requirement” 
policy, with the requirements for labeling 
packaged products, is not available. 
2.10 5.      Information about who is evaluated 1 Beef producer or primary processor in Canada are evaluated. 1 
Beef cattle and bison, ranches and farms, in North 
America, are evaluated. 
2.11 6.      Information about the process of evaluation 1 The information is in the Assurance Protocol.  1 
The information is in the Food Alliance Producer 





# Criteria Description Code CRSB Code Grasslands 
2.12 
Public information about the costs to 
implement the certification system are 
available on the website 
0 
No information about the costs to implement the 
certification system are available on the website. 
CRSB lists only the type of audit and who should pay 
for them. 
1 
The information regarding the certification fees is 
available on Food Alliance Producer Certification 
Program Standards and Procedures Manual. 
2.13 A Theory of Change is available on the website 0 A Theory of Change is not available on the website 0 
A Theory of Change is not available on the 
website 
2.14 
There is evidence that the feedback 
from the public consultation was 
incorporated into the initiative 
0 
There is no evidence that the feedback from the 
public consultation was incorporated into the 
initiative. 
0 
It seems Food Alliance never conducted a public 
consultation about their standards, and 
Grasslands Alliance yet did not develop the 
standard after the public consultation. 
2.15 
A Timeline demonstrates organizational 
main goals and activities of governance-
related practices 
1 The 2016 Annual Report presented a timeline for the beef operations indicators development process. 0 
There is no timeline to demonstrate organizational 
main goals and activities of governance-related 
practices. 




CRSB and Grasslands Alliance are not fully transparent about the mitigation procedures that 
would be followed in the case of a conflict of interest (Table 6, Criteria 2.3). CRSB addresses 
conflict of interest that occurs in the certification system, with mechanisms to mitigate and manage 
their occurrence, through its Conflict of Interest Policy (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable 
Beef, n.d.-f). CRSB’s by-laws also make a reference about a Code of Ethics Policy (Canadian 
Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-c) that might address the issue of conflict of interest in the 
governance level, but this document is not available on the website. Similarly, GAFA has a Code 
of Ethics that addresses the conflict of interest that might occur in the certification system: 
“inspectors are bound by a code of ethics designed to ensure: Confidentiality of the information 
provided by the applicant; no conflict of interest exists between the applicant and the inspector; 
professionalism in representing Food Alliance” (Food Alliance, n.d.-b). Nevertheless, this code of 
ethics is not publicly available on the website. Thus, by not providing information about mitigation 
procedures in the occurrence of a conflict of interests that arise in the governance level, both 
initiatives demonstrate a lack of commitment with respect to governance and external transparency 
(Fuchs et al., 2011).  
Neither CRSB nor Grasslands Alliance provide structured information regarding the 
standard development process on their websites (Table 6, Criteria 2.6), nor demonstrate how they 
incorporated the feedback received from the public consultation on the initiative (Table 6, Criteria 
2.14). CRSB explains that its current affiliation to ISEAL as a subscriber does not bind it to comply 
with all ISEAL good practices, such as the disclosure of information on both the standard 
development process and the adoption of the feedback received from the public consultation. 
Wherever possible, the CRSB has followed the ….ISEAL…Standard-Setting and Assurance 
Codes to ensure good practices are followed throughout the framework development 
process. The CRSB is currently a subscriber to ISEAL, which is an initial step to full 
membership commonly used by programs in their early development stages. (Canadian 
Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-b) 
Indeed, the commitment with some ISEAL good practices can be observed in CRSB’s 
certification system, such as a description about its Standards revision process on the website: 
Revisions to a Standard are at the sole discretion of the CRSB. In the event that a Standard 
does not address a specific circumstance, or further clarification within a Standard is 
required, anyone can complete the CRSB Request for Revision to the Standard form and 
submit it to CRSB. The CRSB shall review all revision requests and may update the Standard 
if they determine an update is appropriate. The final decision on the request for revision will 
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be documented in CRSB meeting notes or via electronic vote. Revision requests will be 
handled in a timely manner based on the three to five year review cycle policy of the CRSB. 
(Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, 2017, p. 23) 
Likewise, GAFA states on its website some general procedures followed when developing 
its standards: 
Food Alliance often contracts with independent consultants to create standards. The concepts 
and practices found in the standards generally come from “best management practices” 
identified through research at public agencies and land grant universities. In addition to 
consultants, Food Alliance staff are advised in the standards development process by our 
Stewardship Council, a volunteer group of farmers, ranchers and other representatives of the 
food industry, university and agency researchers, and advocates for farm labor, animal 
welfare, the environment and consumer affairs. (Food Alliance, n.d.-d) 
The lack of information regarding both the standard development process and the adoption 
of the feedback received from the public thus demonstrates that CRSB and Grasslands Alliance 
are not following the general practice usually observed in MSIs of encouraging stakeholders 
engagement more in the standard development than in the governance process (ISEAL, 2015; Potts 
et al., 2014, cited by Bennett, 2017, p. 65).  
The CRSB and the Grasslands Alliance did not meet criteria 2.13, related to the 
establishment of a Theory of Change (ToC). The concept of Theory of Change, according to 
ISEAL, is described below.  
A planning and management tool that defines all building blocks required to bring about a 
given long-term goal. This set of connected building blocks–interchangeably referred to as 
outcomes or results is depicted on a map known as a pathway of change/change framework, 
which is a graphic representation of the change process (adapted from 
www.theoryofchange.org). (ISEAL, 2013)  
ToC defines the baseline in terms of inputs, outputs, and the aspirational outcomes from the 
adoption of the sustainability standards, which are expected to improve over time. Additionally, 
ToC can be adopted as the primary step of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) programme, an 
important practice for demonstrating compliance with 9 out of 10 ISEAL’s Principles for Credible 
and Effective Sustainability Standards Systems: 1. Sustainability; 2. Improvement; 3. Relevance; 
4. Rigour; 5. Engagement; 6. Impartiality; 7. Transparency; 9. Truthfulness; 10. Efficiency 
(ISEAL, 2013). Being an important feature to control and demonstrate the sustainability outcomes 
of standards, ToC would help to solve the issue of what seems to be opaque transparency – absence 
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of clear and reliable information about decisions and outcomes – assist in reaching clear 
transparency, and thus improve the reliability of both initiatives (Fox, 2007), and demonstrate 
transparency for accountability (T/A) (Kosack & Fung, 2014). 
3. Accountability 
Both initiatives had very low scores in relation to the good governance practices associated 
with the accountability principle: CRSB scored 2 out of 8 and Grasslands Alliance 3 out of 8 (Table 
7). This may be because of the type of ISEAL affiliation that each initiative has. It is assumed that 
the full adoption of ISEAL codes of good practices by MSIs aimed at developing private voluntary 
standards and certifications to address sustainability provides legitimacy and accountability to their 
governance processes (Dowdle & Dowdle, 2006; Paiement, 2017). Hence, a high weight was given 
to ISEAL full membership affiliation through Criteria 3.1, which states that at least one of the 
initiatives’ founding members shall be an ISEAL full member. Rainforest Alliance, one of 
Grasslands Alliance founding members, is an ISEAL full member.  
CRSB did not demonstrate a proper accountability process that assures the responsible use 
of financial resources to organizational donors (Table 7, Criteria 3.3). According to its by-laws, 
CRSB receives some donations from other organizations: 
The Executive Director of the CRSB serves at the pleasure of the Council. All other members 
of the Administrative Staff report to the Executive Director. Tasks include but are not limited 
to … (vi) Coordinating with institutions and organizations. Supporting projects with other 
organizations and donor agencies serving GRSB stakeholders and any interested party. 
(Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-c) 
The aforementioned statement, citing GRSB instead of CRSB, seems to be an error. GRSB 
is only mentioned in this part of CRSB’s by-laws. Probably CRSB used GRSB by-laws to write 
its own document and forgot to change GRSB to CRSB in this part of the text. Thus, it has been 
assumed that the correct text would be “… Coordinating with institutions and organizations. 
Supporting projects with other organizations and donor agencies serving CRSB stakeholders and 
any interested party” (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-c, p. 9). Additionally, it is 
stated in CRSB’s by-law 17: “Funding & Financial Obligations: (c) The CRSB is funded by 




Table 7: Presence of Criteria for Accountability and Details for CRSB and Grasslands Alliance. Coding: 1 = present, 0 = absent. 
Criteria 
# Criteria Description Code CRSB Code Grasslands 
3.1 
The organization, or at least one of its founding 
members organizations, is registered at ISEAL’s 
website as a full member 
0 CRSB is an ISEAL subscriber. 1 Rainforest Alliance is an ISEAL Full Member. 
3.2 
There is an accountability process/mechanism, a 
method for providing accountability (i.e. 
accountability report) implemented, extendable to its 
member and wider society, and available for public 
view on the website 
1 
CRSB gives accountability regarding its 
activities through reports and 
news/announcements. 
0 
Food Alliance gives accountability only 
regarding its finances, a legal requirement 
for NGO in the U.S. 
3.3 
There is evidence that the accountability 
process/mechanism assures the responsible use of 
financial resources to organizational donors 
0 
Canadian Cattlelmen's Association (CCA), 
which is neither an independent auditor nor a 
financial audit company, spearheaded 
CRSB and ratified CRSB’s budget.   
1 
The responsible use of financial resources 
is addressed in Article 8, Funds and 
Private Foundations of Food Alliance’s 
by-laws. 
3.4 
There are channels of communication, such as 
electronic newsletter, that send information regularly 
to stakeholders, making them accountable about 
organizational activities 
0 No channels of communication, such as electronic newsletter, were evidenced. 0 
No channels of communication, such as 
electronic newsletter, were evidenced. 
3.5 
Governance documents state a mutual accountability 
process among its members: i.e. the Executive 
Director reports to the Executive Board made up of 
elected representatives from its membership (see by-
law, statute, rules of procedures) 
1 
The Executive Director reports to the 
Council. The CRSB Council is appointed by 
the CRSB membership and is comprised of 
11 individuals that represent each 
Organization Type. 
1 
The Executive Director reports to the 
Board, which is comprised of food-related 
stakeholders.  
3.6 The organization has a mechanism to deal with dispute (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 0 
CRSB has no mechanism to deal with 
dispute. 0 
Food Alliance has no mechanism to deal 
with dispute 
3.7 
Public information about operational (i.e. meeting 
milestones, deliverables, progress workflow) and 
social measures (i.e. inclusiveness) of performance, 
that supplements organizational financial indicators, 
are available on the website 
NA 
CRSB’s measures of performance are going 
to be conduct in about five years, 
considering as a baseline the National Beef 
Sustainability Assessment benchmarks. 
0 
No public information about operational 
and social indicators are available on the 
website. 
3.8 
There is evidence that the accountability 
process/mechanism verifies / is compliant with 
regional legal requirements that can affect its local 
practices (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 
NA 
CRSB explicitly states that the legal aspects 
are not in the scope of the certification 
system. 
0 
There is no evidence that the 
accountability process is compliant with 
regional legal requirements that can affect 
its local practices. 




Thus, the evidence of financial donation receipt stated in CRSB’s by-laws indicates the need for 
compliance with Criteria 3.3. 
CRSB and Grasslands Alliance did not meet Criteria 3.6, related to the establishment of a 
mechanism to deal with a dispute. As stated in the evaluation of the transparency principle, CRSB 
has a Conflict of Interest Policy and GAFA has a Code of Ethics to deal with disputes and conflicts 
relative to the certification system, but neither of these initiatives have a similar mechanism related 
to the governance process nor disclose appropriate information related to the status of their 
disputes and conflicts. Besides addressing the aforementioned transparency issues, the 
establishment of appropriate mechanisms to deal with disputes in the governance process would 
help to manage the inherent “problem of many eyes” (Bovens, 2007), or too many people to be 
accountable to, usually experienced by managers in MSI. 
Neither initiative demonstrated disclosure of operational and social measures of performance 
(Table 7, Criteria 3.7). The novelty of CRSB explains the absence of these measures of 
performance. In 2016, CRSB conducted a preliminary benchmark assessment regarding the status 
of the beef industry in Canada in terms of economic, social, and environmental aspects. According 
to CRSB, this initial assessment will be the base for future evaluations: 
The first National Beef Sustainability Assessment, released in October 2016, benchmarked 
the current status of the Canadian beef industry across environmental, social and economic 
parameters, and provided a baseline to monitor and measure progress in future assessments. 
The assessment informed the development of the CRSB’s Sustainability Strategy to help 
target future work, particularly under the CRSB’s Sustainability Projects pillar. (Canadian 
Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-p) 
Thus, Criteria 3.7 was considered as ‘not applicable (NA)’ to CRSB. Nevertheless, it was 
considered applicable to GAFA. Even though Food Alliance is already an advanced initiative, it 
did not demonstrate measures of performance through a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system, 
the starting point for the establishment and control of operational, social, and other measures of 
performance:  
An ongoing process through which an organisation draws conclusions about its contribution 
to intended outcomes and impacts. A monitoring and evaluation system consists of a set of 
interconnected functions, processes and activities, including systematic collection of 
monitoring data on specified indicators and the implementation of outcome and impact 
evaluations. (ISEAL, 2014a) 
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The absence of data regarding operational and social measures of performance demonstrates 
not only an important gap in terms of broad accountability (as defined by Romzek (1996), cited 
by Ospina, Diaz, & O’Sullivan, 2002) for the GAFA initiative but also a lack of fit with the 
evolutionary notion of social accountability (Chan & Pattberg, 2008) where acclaimed multi-
stakeholders initiatives should be positioned. In other words, GAFA seems not to be full 




CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
This section discusses and compares the results presented in Chapter 3 related to the good 
governance principles of participation, transparency, and accountability for CRSB and Grasslands 
Alliance to RSPO. 
1. Participation  
As a subscriber of ISEAL, CRSB stated that it partially followed the ISEAL Code of Good 
Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards during the process of developing the 
Certified Sustainable Beef Framework, and this is shown by this study, as CRSB met the majority 
of the criteria of the participation principle. In contrast, Grasslands Alliance met only 3 of the 12 
criteria. Currently, Food Alliance is managing Grasslands Alliance and does not even have 
minimum ISEAL status. In fact, among the three Grasslands Alliance founding members, only the 
Rainforest Alliance has ISEAL status, being a full member (ISEAL, n.d.-d).  
CRSB demonstrated to be a real multi-stakeholder initiative. Of particular interest is that it 
allots 3 out of 12 seats on the Council for producers (Table 4, Criteria 1.5; Table 5), conferring the 
highest level of representativeness to this stakeholder group. Other stakeholder groups have only 
1 or 2 seats on CRSB’s Council. The inclusion of producers in the decision-making process of the 
highest bodies is considered by the literature as a best practice (Lloyd et al., 2008). Additionally, 
including producers in the highest bodies of the governance structure is not only a way to address 
the democratic deficit usually perceived in MSIs (Kingsbury et al., 2005; Tripathi, 2011) but also 
a way to encourage information sharing and to generate effective sustainability results on the 
ground (Bennett, 2017), thus conferring output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999) to an initiative.  
Both initiatives have adopted what is considered institutional best practices in their 
governance process, that is they have “an executive board or a board of directors; an assembly or 
council, often with specific chambers that represent different stakeholder interests; technical 
advisory committees of appointed experts; and an executive director with support staff that handle 
the day-by-day operations” (Ponte, 2014, p. 262).  
 Nonetheless, CRSB still needs to evolve in relation to some basic governance practices. The 
RSPO provides the minutes of the General Assembly, which clearly show actions and decisions 
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made (RSPO, n.d.-b, p.9). Although the CRSB by-laws state that stakeholders can participate in 
the decision-making process, it does not provide the minutes of the General Assembly, which 
could compromise the external legitimacy (Provan & Kenis, 2008) of this initiative. Furthermore, 
the absence of the minutes did not allow an evaluation of the quality of participation according to 
the ladder of citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969), and is also a concern as it could signal a lack 
of transparency.  
While CRSB and Grasslands Alliance do not seem to have a process that allows stakeholders 
to give suggestions for improving governance (Table 4, Criteria 1.6), the RSPO initiative allows 
member representatives to propose improvements to the governance process during the General 
Assembly meeting, and decisions are registered in publicly available minutes. For example, during 
RSPO’s General Assembly that occurred on November 10th, 2016, the representative of the 
Indonesia Growers Caucus, Edi Suhardi, proposed a resolution to the non-discrimination clause in 
the code of conduct, stating that: 
The resolution calls for the RSPO to honour and implement the code of conduct and to ensure 
the RSPO adopts the principle of non-discrimination. So far, there have been indications that 
the RSPO has treated members differently or discriminatorily. For example, some 
complaints were treated (attended to) faster, others took longer to resolve. Some members 
have been pushed to abide by certain rules where others are not. We want RSPO to explicitly 
say that it will uphold the principle of non-discrimination. If you look at the RSPO document, 
this is not explicit. (RSPO, n.d.-b, p.9) 
After some debate, the majority of RSPO members voted in favor of the proposed 
adjustments, which was registered in the minutes (RSPO, n.d.-b, p.10). Although this process is 
not formalized within the RSPO, a formal stakeholder engagement policy is considered a best 
practice for these types of initiatives (Lloyd et al, 2008, p. 43), and would be useful for CRSB and 
Grasslands Alliance since it would allow these initiatives to address issues of improving 
stakeholders’ participation in the governance process (Table 4, Criteria 1.3) and allowing 
stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance process (Table 4, criteria 1.6), and 
would thus show stronger adherence to the participation principle, and improve their input 
legitimacy (Mena & Palazzo, 2012). Indeed, CRSB seems to have recognized the need to engage 
more stakeholders, as in 2017 they: made efforts to engage with academia, with the establishment 
of CRSB’s Scientific Advisory Committee; added 16 new members/observers; and conducted two 
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rounds of public consultation on the indicators (Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-
a).  
A formal stakeholder engagement policy that sets up who, how, and when stakeholders 
would participate in governance-related activities, would establish the norms to be followed by 
CRSB and Grasslands Alliance when engaging stakeholders and help to address the accountability 
issues of the “problem of many eyes” (Bovens, 2007) and the “problem of many hands” (D. F. 
Thompson, 1980) inherent in MSIs. This could be particularly helpful for CRSB, as it is 
undertaking efforts to increase its membership base, which could add more complexity to the 
decision-making process. Additionally, formal engagement policies can improve governance 
efficiency, one of ISEAL credibility principles:  
Areas where stakeholders have a voice in decision-making are clearly defined, and it is clear 
how they are engaged. There can be a tension between meaningful stakeholder engagement 
and efficiency of the standards system. It is important to determine the most appropriate 
opportunities for stakeholder engagement, but not to engage stakeholders unnecessarily at 
the expense of efficiency. Conversely, arguments regarding efficiency are not used as 
excuses to avoid meaningful stakeholder engagement. A balance must be achieved. (ISEAL, 
2013) 
Nevertheless, a major challenge as noted by ISEAL, and also discussed by researchers (e.g. 
Cheyns, 2011; Ponte, 2014), is to reach an adequate balance between the level of stakeholder 
participation and the efficiency of the governance process.  
Neither CRSB nor Grasslands Alliance’s certification systems allow stakeholders to 
participate in the audit and review nor in the assessment process as observers (Table 4, Criteria 
1.12). These are regarded by ISEAL as optional good practices (ISEAL, 2018, p. 14), and even 
more mature sustainability initiatives, such as RSPO, do not seem to allow more in-depth 
participation of stakeholders in the certification system. RSPO is currently working on improving 
its assurance system, more specifically due to concerns about “the quality, independence and 
credibility of RSPO assurance system and RSPO’s systems of supervision” (RSPO, n.d.-e). Those 
concerns, debated and voted during the RSPO 12th General Assembly (GA12) over the 
“Resolution 6h – Ensuring quality, oversight and credibility of RSPO assessments” (RSPO, n.d.-
c, p. 10), lead to the establishment of the Assurance Task Force (TF) by RSPO Secretariat. The 
revision of RSPO’s Public Reporting and Stakeholder Engagement by TF is an indication that this 
initiative is planning to include more stakeholders in the certification system. This could be seen 
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as an attempt to comply with the ISEAL optional good practice related to stakeholder’s 
involvement in the assessment process. 
Improving the participation of stakeholders in the governance process, giving to them even 
more voice by allowing an active role in the certification system, can confer even more input and 
output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999) to the initiative and differentiate a particular standard and 
certification scheme from similar competitors. Moreover, the search for legitimacy and the 
competition among certifications schemes are one of the main drivers for improving stakeholder 
participation in similar initiatives (Bennett & Bennett, 2016). Thus, CRSB and Grasslands Alliance 
should consider furthering the engagement of stakeholders in the certification system as a strategy 
to not only comply with an ISEAL optional good practice, but also to leverage their comparative 
advantage. 
The CRSB and Grasslands Alliance initiatives are still in their early stages compared to the 
RSPO, which began in 2004. As these initiatives evolve, they can try to adopt advanced 
governance processes and practices to improve participation, such as establishing a stakeholder 
engagement policy12, identifying stakeholders that are struggling to implement the certification 
system, and implementing strategies to facilitate certification. For instance, RSPO, probably due 
to criticisms from NGO’s regarding the lack of voice given to smallholders on the decision-making 
process (Cheyns, 2011), implemented a Comprehensive Smallholder Strategy to deal with that 
issue (RSPO, n.d.-a, p. 41). More ambitious governance practices, such as allowing a more depth 
participation of stakeholders in the certification system, giving to them a more active role during 
the audit and review (ISEAL, 2018, p. 14), for instance, are desirable and can confer to the 
initiative a strategic advantage. Overall, from the RSPO experience, we can learn that an MSI to 
be ‘all inclusive’ must give voice to all stakeholders, including more vulnerable groups such as 
smallholders, on their decision-making forums. Thus, despite being located on developed 
countries, CRSB and Grasslands Alliance could conduct periodic checks to see if some vulnerable 
groups should be involved on their deliberations.     
                                                 
12 It is a way to demonstrate commitment with the accountability principles of the stakeholder engagement standard: 
Inclusivity, Materiality and Responsiveness: “Inclusivity is about engaging at all levels” (p. 11), materiality is about 
determining the importance of the issues to be addresses, and responsiveness is about “the decisions, actions, 




As observed during the assessment of the participation principle, the absence of the minutes 
of the General Assembly of CRSB and GAFA might have compromised the evaluation of some 
criteria of the transparency principle and could explain in part the low score received by both 
initiatives. For instance, members’ actions and decisions registered in the minutes could have 
demonstrated that the governance processes of these initiatives were transparent and that the 
conflict of interest arising at the governance level were properly addressed (Table 6, Criteria 2.2 
and 2.3). Even though CRSB and Grasslands Alliance did not present robust practices for 
improving governance transparency as RSPO, such as codes of conduct (RSPO, n.d.-k) and 
complaint systems (RSPO, n.d.-f), and did not disclose their Code of Ethics Policy to address 
conflict of interest that arise in the governance level, the minutes would had allowed a better 
assessment of these criteria. The availability of the minutes would also have improved external 
transparency (Fuchs et al., 2011).  
RSPO address governance transparency through, among other, their codes of conduct and 
complaint systems. In the RSPO Codes of Conduct for Members and Supply Chain Associates, 
governance transparency is directly addressed, at a more broad and strategic level, in the 
transparency, reporting, and claims section, item 2 of both codes. For example, RSPO’s Code of 
Conduct for Members states that “Members will commit to open and transparent engagement with 
interested parties, and actively seek resolution of conflict” (RSPO, n.d.-k). In a more narrow and 
operational level, governance transparency is addressed by RSPO through its Complaints System, 
“a fair, transparent and impartial process to duly handle and address complaints against RSPO 
members or the RSPO system itself” (RSPO, n.d.-f). In the RSPO’s Complaints System, 
complaints are registered, their status are available for public view, and even the minutes with 
registers of the decisions made monthly by the RSPO’s Complaints Panel are displayed on the 
website.  
RSPO’s codes of conduct and complaint system are not only practical examples of ways to 
tackle governance transparency at both the strategic and operational levels of the governance 
process but also can be seen as mechanisms for addressing transparency for responsible corporate 
behavior (Kosack & Fung, 2014) concerns. CRSB and Grasslands Alliance demonstrated 
governance transparency only at the strategic level of the certification system by stating 
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transparency as a principle of the Certified Sustainable Beef Framework (Canadian Roundtable 
for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-b) and as a  GAFA certification system guiding principle (Food Alliance, 
n.d.-c). They lack governance transparency not only at the operational level of the certification 
system but also at both the strategic and operational level of the governance process, an aspect that 
according to studies can compromise the internal (Drori & Honig, 2013) and external (Provan & 
Kenis, 2008) legitimacy of both initiatives.  
Indeed, in the scope of the certification system, a transparent policy to address conflict of 
interest is a requirement not only demanded by ISEAL but also by ISO and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (ISO/IEC, 1996). In the scope of the governance process, 
however, it is also important to have a policy to broadly address conflict of interest involving 
internal and external stakeholders (Lloyd et al, 2008, p. 63). Thus, the establishment and disclosure 
of policies to address conflict of interest in the scope not only of the certification system but also 
of the governance process would confer internal and external (Fuchs et al., 2011) transparency to 
CRSB and Grasslands Alliance initiatives. 
More developed MSIs, such as RSPO, usually establish and publicly disclose on their 
websites a formal procedure that informs about the processes related to standard development and 
review (RSPO, n.d.-l), a requirement associated with Criteria 2.6 (Table 6). Additionally, ISEAL 
Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards determines some steps that 
should be followed when setting standards. ISEAL lists some Desired Outcomes, “the results that 
standard-setting organisations should seek to achieve” (ISEAL, 2014b), that were not fully 
evidenced by CRSB and Grasslands Alliance. For instance, ISEAL’s Clause 4.1, Standard-Setting 
Procedures, demands that “The standard-setting organisation follows transparent procedures that 
are improved over time.” (ISEAL, 2014b). This primarily Desired Outcome demands that a 
standard-setting organization defines the procedures for standard development and review, taking 
into consideration stakeholders’ inputs, and leave them available for public view on the website. 
Nonetheless, CRSB and Grasslands Alliance did not fully comply with this ISEAL requirement.  
CRSB did not disclose whether the feedback received from the public during the consultation 
stage was adopted by both initiatives (Table 6, Criteria 2.14). Although CRSB demonstrated 
having a process for standard review, it did not demonstrate a formal process for standard 
development. In contrast, GAFA showed that it follows some general procedures for standard 
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development but did not have a formal process for standard development and review. Full 
compliance with this crucial ISEAL requirement related to standard development and review 
process would likely solve what seems to be a problem of opaque transparency (Fox, 2007) for 
both initiatives.  
Despite being a common practice among MSIs aimed at improving sustainability 
(Accountability Framework, 2016; RSB, 2014; RSPO, n.d.-m), the establishment of a Theory of 
Change (ToC) by standard-setting organizations in order to demonstrate their sustainability 
aspirations is not a compulsory ISEAL requirement: 
Governance and Operations: The sustainability objectives underpin and inform all decisions 
and actions taken by the standards system. The standard setter also clearly defines its 
approach to achieving these objectives and determines the appropriate operational model for 
the context in which they are working. The scheme owner may use a ‘theory of change’ to 
define and explain its strategy. (ISEAL, 2013b)  
The novelty of CRSB and Grasslands Alliance initiatives might explain the absence of a 
ToC. Nevertheless, similar MSIs, such as the Accountability Framework (AF), that alike CRSB 
and Grasslands Alliance is in the earliest stages of development, established and disclosed a Terms 
of Reference (TOR) document that presents and maintains updated not only general information, 
purposes, and milestones of the initiative, but also its ToC (Accountability Framework, 2017). In 
fact, TOR, a requirement stated on ISEAL’s Clause 5.1, Terms of Reference, which demands that 
“The standard-setting organisation has clearly articulated what the standard aims to achieve and 
why the standard is needed” (ISEAL, 2014b), was not evidenced by CRSB and Grasslands 
Alliance. Thus, the establishment of both ToC, a desired ISEAL practice, and TOR, a compulsory 
ISEAL requirement, would demonstrate not only external (Fuchs et al., 2011) and clear (Fox, 
2007) transparency with relation to their sustainable strategy, but also output legitimacy (Scharpf, 
1999) regarding the impacts and outcomes promoted by the initiatives over time, as a ToC serves 
as a clear baseline of an effective monitoring and evaluation programme. 
The transparency principle was one of the most compromised by the absence of the minutes. 
Criteria related to conflict of interest, for instance, could had been evidence in practice through the 
register of the acts of the highest bodies in the minutes, as it was the case for RSPO. Additionally, 
of particular concern is the non-compliance with some ISEAL basic requirements, or Desired 
Outcomes, such as information about the standard development process. Notwithstanding, as both 
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initiatives evolve over time, it is expected that they become even more aligned with ISEAL 
requirements related to the transparency principle, such as the development and disclosure of a 
Terms of Reference (TOR) that, among others, defines their Theory of Change (ToC). These 
important practices, if applied by CRSB and Grasslands Alliance, would not only confer clear 
transparency (Fox, 2007) to both initiatives but also improve their perceived legitimacy.   
3. Accountability 
To be an ISEAL full member (Table 7, Criteria 3.1), and to comply with all its principles 
and codes of good practices, can be regarded as the best practice for MSIs willing to demonstrate 
a commitment to the accountability principle. In that sense, Grasslands Alliance is well positioned 
as Rainforest Alliance, one of its founding members is an ISEAL full member and can thus exert 
a positive influence in Grasslands Alliance future governance process. Regarding CRSB, they are 
subscriber to ISEAL, which is an early stage of affiliation, and it is expected that CRSB evolves 
to ISEAL full membership and thus improve its commitment to the accountability principle in the 
course of time.  
Being transparent about, among other aspects, organizational financial performance is 
important to promote trust between stakeholders and the general public (Manning, 2013, p. 14). In 
that sense, financial accountability is an aspect of great concern for CRSB. As it receives some 
donations, the implementation of transparent and accountable financial governance procedures is 
needed. Moreover, to have the financial accounts audited annually by an independent auditor and 
to make them publicly available, as RSPO has done through its Finance Standing Committee – 
RSPO’s Annual Financial Reports are endorsed by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the 
independent financial auditing organization (RSPO, n.d.-h) – is an usual practice related to 
accountability.  
CRSB, on the other hand, has their finances audited not by an independent auditor, but by 
one of its members, the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association (CCA), as stated in CRSB’s by-laws: 
"(h) The CRSB budget will be approved by the CRSB Council and ratified by the CCA Board of 
Directors (for audit and accounting purposes) at the CCA Annual General Meeting" (Canadian 
Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, n.d.-c, p. 10). This seems not only inappropriate but also not to 
be in the scope of CCA activities to act as a financial auditing organization (CCA, n.d.-a). 
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Notwithstanding, CCA states that it “…spearheaded the Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef 
(CRSB)…” (CCA, n.d.-c), which is another odd aspect of the governance process of CRSB in 
relation to not only accountability, but also participation, as it can evidence a power imbalance 
problem in the governance structure. CRSB’s by-laws mention CCA only in this particular part of 
the text, and this accountability relationship between CRSB and CCA is not mentioned on the 
former’s website. Additionally, neither CRSB disclose its audited finances nor CCA, which annual 
audited financial reports are available for public view on its website, present any financial 
information about CRSB accounts (CCA, n.d.-b). Moreover, CCA’s finances are not audited 
annually by an independent auditor, but by a nominated auditor.  
The lack of transparency in terms of financial accountability can have a negative impact on 
the external legitimacy (Provan & Kenis, 2008) of CRSB. Thus, basic adjustments in CRSB’s 
financial practices, to make them clearer and more compliant with aspects of financial 
accountability, are needed to not only fix some errors in the by-laws – it seems that where it is 
written GRSB should be written CRSB – and missing information but also reflect improvements 
in its finance-related governance processes. 
Issues were observed with respect not only to financial accountability, but also governance 
accountability.  CRSB and GAFA have in place policies that deal with dispute and conflict in the 
certification system, but not in the governance process, and they are not transparent in relation to 
how resolution of disputes and conflicts occur. To have a dispute resolution mechanism (Table 7, 
Criteria 3.6) is a practice that can demonstrate a commitment to not only accountability but also 
the transparency principle, two governance principles that are very correlated (O’Rourke, 2006; 
Mena & Palazzo, 2012). Disputes and conflicts can arise in a multi-stakeholder environment and 
need to be properly addressed. Dispute resolution mechanisms, related to democratic mechanisms 
of control (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008), have been adopted by more mature MSIs to address 
potential disputes and conflicts related to the governance process and the certification system (e.g. 
ASI, n.d.; Bonsucro, n.d.; RSPO, n.d.-e). For instance, besides the RSPO Complaints System 
described previously in the discussion about the transparency principle, RSPO offers to its 
members a mediation service – The Dispute Settlement Facility (DSF): 
The Dispute Settlement Facility is RSPO’s in-house facilitation service to support RSPO 
members (notably growers), local communities and other stakeholders to effectively use 
mediation as a means to help resolve disputes. It facilitates disputant parties to gain access 
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to information, contacts, know-how and experiences to assist them to resolve palm oil 
production-related disputes in cases where at least one party is an RSPO member. It also 
aims to resolve disputes between companies and communities on matters specifically 
relating to RSPO Principles & Criteria 2.2, 2.3, 6.4, 7.3, 7.5, 7.6 (No 2). (RSPO, n.d.-g) 
Similar to its Complaints System, RSPO maintains a DSF website with, among others, its 
Terms of Reference (TOR), the list of DSF Advisory Group members, the minutes with registers 
of the decisions made by the Advisory Group, and the list and the status of current disputes (RSPO, 
n.d.-g). RSPO’s Complaints System and DSF are mechanisms that demonstrate the concern of this 
initiative regarding ensuring transparency, accountability, and legitimacy to its governance 
process, as through them RSPO manages and keeps stakeholders informed about disputes and 
conflicts resolutions. The implementation of a comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism by 
CRSB and Grasslands Alliance is important to better demonstrate their governance legitimacy, as 
it can not only address dispute properly but also evidence a serious commitment with transparency 
and accountability principles. 
A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system, associated with Criteria 3.7 (Table 7), is an 
important practice for demonstrating the sustainability of the outcomes and enhancing the 
legitimacy of CRSB and Grasslands Alliance. CRSB demonstrated that it might implement an 
M&E system as it evolves over time. Food Alliance, which manages Grasslands Alliance, on the 
other hand, is a consolidated initiative that did not present a mechanism similar to an M&E system 
to monitor and control its impacts. As previously mentioned, an M&E system is one of ISEAL’s 
most relevant practices, needed to demonstrate compliance with the majority of its Principles for 
Credible and Effective Sustainability Standards Systems. Indeed, more consolidated MSIs tend to 
adopt and implement an M&E system to be accountable with respect to their inputs, outputs, and 
intended impacts (Rainforest Alliance, n.d.-b; RSPO, n.d.-j). RSPO, for instance, has an M&E 
system in place to track the progress of RSPO’s certification system, and their results are presented 
and publicly available through RSPO Impact Reports (RSPO, n.d.-j). For example, RSPO’s 2017 
Impact Report presents both operational measures of performance, like results and projections 
regarding GHG emissions of certified palm oil producers, as well as social measures of 
performance, like results relative to the inclusion of smallholder in RSPO certification system 
(RSPO, n.d.-i). The implementation of an M&E system to control and give accountability 
regarding CRSB and Grasslands Alliance sustainability measures of performance is a way of 
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evidencing compliance with most ISEAL principles, an important step towards improving the 
external legitimacy (Provan & Kenis, 2008) of those initiatives.  
In summary, the unclear and unusual financial accountability relationship between CRSB 
and Canadian Cattleman’s Association (CCA), where the latter spearheaded the former and is 
responsible for auditing its accounts, needs to be addressed. Ideally, CRSB should both have an 
independent auditor validating its accounts and leave its financial reports available for public view 
on its website. The adoption of a broad dispute resolution mechanism by CRSB and Grasslands 
Alliance, to address disputes in the certification system and in the governance process, is an 
important practice to demonstrate transparency and accountability to stakeholders. Finally, a 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system is an important practice to give accountability about 
CRSB and Grasslands Alliance outcomes and to demonstrate output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999).    
4. Conclusion 
The good global governance principles of GAL – participation, transparency, and 
accountability – were identified to some extent in the governance process and interventions – 
standards and certifications – development process of CRSB and Grasslands Alliance. In line with 
the MSI literature, which seems to focus more on participation than in transparency and 
accountability, CRSB seems to be more concerned with participation than with the other two 
principles of good global governance. Participation had a great weight in the overall better 
performance evidenced by CRSB when compared to Grasslands Alliance and, as input legitimacy 
is very much associated to the participation principle, this aspect of CRSB’s governance process 
not only mostly explains it better performance but also can have a positive influence on its input 
legitimacy. 
Regarding the comparison to RSPO, this thesis reveals that both initiatives have to evolve 
significantly in terms of good global governance practices. But it seems it is going to happen in 
the course of time as CRSB and Grasslands Alliance are MSIs in their initial stages of 
development. Nevertheless, in terms of input legitimacy, the RSPO comparison demonstrated the 
importance of monitoring variations in the local context, particular in terms of notions of 
legitimacy and engagement with disadvantaged stakeholders’ groups, such as small farmers and 
producers. The latter aspect, in particular, is a usual source of conflict that can compromise the 
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perceived authority and thus, the legitimacy of an MSI if this group of stakeholders are not properly 
engaged in the decision-making process. In the initial stage of an MSI, it seems that a strategic 
approach to stakeholder engagement and the leadership of focal companies – which is the case for 
CRSB with McDonald’s and Cargill – seems to be a more appropriate strategy as it allows the 
quick promotion and implementation of the standards and certification in the beef industry and 
stimulate the earlier adoption of key members of the beef supply-chain. But as CRSB and 
Grasslands Alliance become more mature, they should reassess this strategy and check the need to 
engage with more disadvantaged stakeholders’ groups, mainly small farmers and producers, and 
review the influence of focal companies in the governance process. Nevertheless, the future and 
inherent challenge for CRSB and Grasslands Alliance will be to do all of this without 






CHAPTER 5. CONTRIBUTIONS, OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CONCLUSION 
1. Contribution of Research 
Situated in the research field related to the global private governance exerted by non-state 
national and transnational organizations with de facto rule making power, this study filled a 
research gap regarding the adoption of the principles of GAL – participation, transparency, and 
accountability – as an analytical framework to assess the level of legitimacy of the governance 
processes as well as the processes of developing private voluntary standards and certifications. 
Additionally, no study has operationalized GAL’s principles using ISEAL best practices. This lack 
of association between GAL and ISEAL can be viewed as a research gap of the academic literature 
that was addressed by this thesis.  
By applying a qualitative content analysis methodology and secondary data assessment in 
the governance-related documents available on the internet, this exploratory case study was 
conducted with two organizations acting in the beef industry, which is broadly recognized as an 
important contributor to negative social and environmental impacts. To date, MSIs developing 
sustainable private voluntary standards and certifications for the beef industry have only occurred 
in North America, and these organizations are in their earliest stages of the development process. 
The legitimacy assessment conducted by the present study at the earliest stages of these initiatives 
can be adopted as a framework for future similar research not only in the food but also in other 
economic sectors, and thus contribute to the development of effective sustainability initiatives and 
interventions in other industries by assuring that good global governance practices are observed 
from the development stage. 
2. Contribution to Practice 
CRSB and Grasslands Alliance would benefit directly from the results presented in this case 
study. As these MSIs and their sustainable interventions evolve over time, they can use the findings 
presented in this thesis to improve their governance, private voluntary standards, and certification 
processes in terms of legitimacy, notably in respect to the good governance principles of 
participation, transparency, and accountability. This study can be particularly useful for CRSB to 
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evolve from an ISEAL subscriber to and an ISEAL full-member, as important practices required 
to reach the ISEAL full-membership status are discussed in this thesis. Some examples are the 
establishment of a Standards Development and Revision Procedures, Theory of Change (ToC), 
and Terms of Reference (TOR). Despite having an ISEAL full-member – Rainforest Alliance – as 
one of its founding members, which can exert a positive influence on its future governance 
structure, Grasslands Alliance can benefit from this study as well. Grasslands Alliance is so far a 
multi-stakeholder coalition, evolving to an initiative that is currently defining its governance 
structure. Thus, the findings presented in this thesis can be used by Grasslands Alliance as 
guidelines for establishing effective and legitimate governance processes and practices.   
Other organizations related to the food sector that are trying to mobilize the members of their 
supply chain and organize themselves around a multi-stakeholder type of global private 
governance to tackle sustainability issues, might also benefit from the present study. Particularly, 
those that object to adopting similar interventions – private voluntary standards and certifications 
– can use the results of this thesis to implement good governance processes and practices that take 
into account the principles of participation, transparency, and accountability from their earliest 
stages of development.    
3. Opportunities for Further Research 
The present study relied on secondary data as input for the qualitative content analysis 
method, so future studies using primary data would complement the present thesis. For instance, 
interviews or surveys with members of CRSB and Grasslands Alliance could be used in future 
research with the objective of gathering data relative to their knowledge and perceptions regarding 
good global private governance principles, particularly participation, transparency, and 
accountability. Based on that, the prospect of their initiatives to implement sustainability 
interventions that reflect those principles could be evaluated, thus creating a link between survey 
or interview results and the likelihood of present and future interventions implemented by CRSB 
and Grasslands Alliance being both perceived as legitimate and adopted by the members of the 
beef industry supply-chain.       
Future research adopting a quantitative content analysis method would add to the arguments 
made in the present exploratory study. A list of words associated with the principles of 
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participation, transparency, and accountability of GAL, within ISEAL or other similar context, 
would be generated with the help of a quantitative content analysis software. This tool would then 
help the researcher to find the list of words in a broad range of governance-related documents, 
ideally not the limited ones available on the internet – secondary data – but also surveys and other 
complementary primary data sources. The scores received by CRSB – 75% for participation, 57% 
for transparency, 33% for accountability, and 54% overall – and Grasslands Alliance – 25% for 
participation, 33% for transparency, 38% for accountability, and 31% overall – as a result of this 
thesis would then be validated. This type of research approach would serve to provide a narrower 
and detailed assessment of the legitimacy of the MSI object of the present case study. 
This thesis focused on input legitimacy. Thus, future research could look at the output 
legitimacy of CRSB and Grasslands Alliance. Additionally, they could also assess and compare 
the input and output legitimacy of both MSI in the course of time. 
Similar qualitative and quantitative studies would not only have their findings used to 
complement and compared the ones presented in this thesis but also be applied to other food 
sectors.  Furthermore, the applicability of GAL analytical framework, within ISEAL or other 
similar context, preferable in a qualitative content analysis research method, in other words, a 
research design similar to the present study, could also be tested in other food sectors to assess the 
legitimacy of their sustainability interventions. Combining the findings of future research and the 
present thesis would collaborate even further to improve the academic literature related to 
legitimacy – or the lack of legitimacy – and global private governance exerted by national and 
transnational non-state actors intervening in the sustainability of their supply-chains.  
4. Limitations 
Due to the novelty and consequent exploratory nature of the present study, both a qualitative 
content analysis and case study approach were adopted. This study relied on a thoughtful 
examination of secondary data – the governance-related documents made publicly available on 
CRSB, Grasslands Alliance, and when necessary, Food Alliance websites – to find in the text of 
these documents parts associated with the principles of participation, transparency, and 
accountability, in order to do the coding process, and thus answer the research question. There are 
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some limitations related to the research approach and method – qualitative content analysis and 
case study. The limitations of this study lie within this context.   
4.1. Limitations of the Research Approach 
It is important to have a clear definition of what to be analyzed in any research project. It 
can be an even more critical aspect in research designs that involve qualitative content analysis 
that rely on secondary data and case studies approach to the problems. So, it is crucial to evaluate 
the quality of the documents that are going to be selected as input for the research regarding 
authenticity, credibility, and representativeness (Scott, 1990, cited by Byrman & Bell, 2016, p. 
334). As mention previously, organizational principles are declared in the governance-related 
documents, which texts can reveal the competitive strategy of an organization (Bennett & Bennett, 
2016, p. 337). The governance-related documents made freely available on the websites of the 
organizations objects of the case study were selected as input for the research. Thus, it can be 
inferred that these documents are authentic, derivate from incontestable sources; credible, as the 
information contain within their texts are accurate and free from misrepresentation; and 
representative, as they typically contain information about organizational principles and practices.  
4.2. Limitations of the Method 
4.2.1. Qualitative Content Analysis 
 A common problem in content analysis research is the possibility of being regarded as 
atheoretical (Byrman & Bell, 2016, p. 335). To avoid this problem, a robust literature review 
regarding GAL was conducted to keep the focus of the researcher on the analytical aspect of the 
study along the process, particularly when coding the governance-related documents of the 
organizations object of the case study: Step 7 – Collect the data of Chapter II. By doing so, an 
equilibrium between theory and practice was assured to the present study. 
Divergences in terms of data interpretation among different coders in a content analysis 
research is another important issue of this method (Byrman & Bell, 2016, p. 334). To address this 
limitation, three pilots were conducted, as already described in Step 6 – Conduct a pilot study and 
revise of Chapter II. Checks on semantic and face validity made during the first and second pilot 
resulted in adjustments in both DCF and coding manual. The first pilot was conducted by one 
coder, and after a training conducted by the principal research and a debate about the text of the 
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DCF, three coders worked on the second pilot. A third pilot was conducted with two coders, being 
one of them the principal researcher, and checks were made not only regarding semantic and face 
validity, but also reliability. The result from the third pilot was considered reliable, as the 
percentage agreement coefficient among the two coders was 80%. 
A critique associated with qualitative content analysis studies is the lack of information about 
how the themes are gathered: “the processes by which the themes are extracted in a qualitative 
content analysis are often left implicit, although they are usually illustrated with quotations from 
the text in question” (Bryman & Bell, 2016, p. 322). Thus, to overcome this critique, quotations 
extracted from the text of the governance-related documents analyzed were used to illustrate the 
findings and reinforce the arguments made during the discussion. 
4.2.2. Case Study 
A usual criticism made by scholars regarding case studies refers to the impossibility of 
generalizability of the findings (Byrman & Bell, 2016, p. 44). Nevertheless, as mentioned 
previously, particular context is an important aspect to be considered when developing private 
voluntary standards, certifications, and other sustainability interventions in the beef industry, due 
to the diverse amount of issues faced by the players acting in this business in different regions of 
the world. Thus, generalization is not one of the objectives of the present research. Furthermore, 





The present study aimed at answering the research question: To what extent do good global 
governance principles guide both the governance process and the interventions being developed 
by two MSIs aimed at making the beef industry in North America more sustainable, and what can 
we learn in terms of input legitimacy by comparing them to an established initiative (i.e. RSPO)? 
To accomplish this intent, an exploratory study was conducted through a research design that 
combined qualitative content analysis and case study methodologies. The novelty of the present 
study was in developing and applying a framework that operationalized the GAL principles with 
ISEAL best practices as the analytical construct. The results of the present study revealed that 
CRSB demonstrates more of the principles associated with legitimacy than Grasslands Alliance, 
but both initiatives have to evolve in terms of legitimacy. CRSB is well-positioned in terms of the 
participation principle but needs to evolve more in respect to the transparency principle and exert 
even more efforts to improve in terms of accountability. Grasslands Alliance demonstrated 
important gaps in terms of participation and has to evolve considerably with respect to 
transparency and accountability principles. Evolution in terms of ISEAL affiliation can help both 
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Table A.1: Coding Manual (Version 1) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle.  
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 1. Participation 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence 
Stakeholders are engaged 
in the governance 
process 
Stakeholders are not 
engaged in the 
governance process 
# Criteria Code Code 
1.1 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation in the governance process (membership) are available on the website 1 0 
1.2 There is evidence that the requirements for participation in the Executive Board ensure the representativeness of all stakeholders 1 0 
1.3 There is evidence that the decision-making process of the highest body allows the participation and review of all stakeholders group through elected representatives 1 0 
1.4 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the governance process (membership) are available on the website 1 0 
1.5 Channel of communication available for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance process 1 0 
1.6 Public information about the process for identification of stakeholders through an initial stakeholder mapping exercise in the standard-setting stage are available on the website 1 0 
1.7 There is a revision process, such as vote, that allows the participation of all the members of the organization in, for instance, standards revisions available on the website 1 0 
1.8 Public consultation about the standard-setting process is available on the website 1 0 
1.9 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation in the assurance processes (certification and accreditation) are available on the website  1 0 
1.10 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the assurance process (certification and accreditation) are available on the website  1 0 
1.11 There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in the assurance process (certification and accreditation) either as participants in the audit and review or as observers during the assessment process on the website  1 0 
1.12 Public information about the costs for implementation of the standard system and the certification scheme is available on the website  1 0 




Table A.1: Coding Manual (Version 1) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. (Cont.) 





The governance process 
is transparent 
The governance process 
is not transparent 
# Evidence Code Code 
2.1 Public information about the governance process available on the website 1 0 
2.2 Public information about the requirements the organization follows to ensure transparency to the governance process available on the website 1 0 
2.3 Public information about mitigations procedures in the occurrence of conflict of interests available on the website 1 0 
2.4 Clear definition of organizational internal and external stakeholders available on the website 1 0 
2.5 The information available on the website is of high-quality, presented in clear and accessible formats 1 0 
 Public information about organizational activities related to the standard system available on the website 1 0 
2.6 Information regarding the standard development process 1 0 
2.7 Information regarding the content of the standard 1 0 
2.8 Information regarding the impact intended with the standard  1 0 
2.9 Information about standard claims and the traceability system that support those claims 1 0 
2.10 Information about who is evaluated and under what process 1 0 






Table A.1: Coding Manual (Version 1) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 3. Accountability 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence 
The organization shows 
accountability to 
stakeholders of its 
activities 
The organization does 
not show 
accountability to 
stakeholders of its 
activities 
# Evidence Code Code 
3.1 The organization is registered at ISEAL’s website as a full member 1 0 
3.2 There is a formal accountability framework implemented extendable to its member and wider society available for public consultancy on the website 1 0 
3.3 There is evidence that the accountability framework assures the responsible use of financial resources to organizational donors 1 0 
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3.4 There is a channel of communication, such as electronic newsletter, that sends emails regularly to stakeholders, making them accountable for organizational activities 1 0 
3.5 By-law states a mutual accountability process among its members: i.e. the Executive Director reports to the Executive Board made up of elected representatives from its membership 1 0 
3.6 The organization has an appeal mechanism in the presence of dispute 1 0 
3.7 There is evidence that the organization reports relevant information regarding the decision-making process to its internal (i.e. managers) and external stakeholders through not only mandatory but also voluntary disclosures. 1 0 
3.8 Public information about operational and social measures of performance, that supplements organizational financial indicators, are available on the website 1 0 
3.9 There is evidence that the accountability framework contemplates the verification of regional legal requirements that can affect its local practices 1 0 









Table A.2: Data Collection Form (Version 1). 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 1. Participation 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence 
# Evidence Code=1 Code=0 
1.1 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation in the governance process (membership) are available on the website   
1.2 There is evidence that the requirements for participation in the Executive Board ensure the representativeness of all stakeholders   
1.3 There is evidence that the decision-making process of the highest body allows the participation and review of all stakeholders group through elected representatives   
1.4 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the governance process (membership) are available on the website   
1.5 Channel of communication available for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance process   
1.6 Public information about the process for identification of stakeholders through an initial stakeholder mapping exercise in the standard-setting stage are available on the website   
1.7 There is a revision process, such as vote, that allows the participation of all the members of the organization in, for instance, standards revisions available on the website   
1.8 Public consultation about the standard-setting process is available on the website   
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1.9 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation in the assurance processes (certification and accreditation) are available on the website    
1.10 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the assurance process (certification and accreditation) are available on the website    
1.11 There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in the assurance process (certification and accreditation) either as participants in the audit and review or as observers during the assessment process on the website    
1.12 Public information about the costs for implementation of the standard system and the certification scheme is available on the website    





Table A.2: Data Collection Form (Version 1). (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 2. Transparency 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence 
# Evidence Code=1 Code=0 
2.1 Public information about the governance process available on the website   
2.2 Public information about the requirements the organization follows to ensure transparency to the governance process available on the website   
2.3 Public information about mitigations procedures in the occurrence of conflict of interests available on the website   
2.4 Clear definition of organizational internal and external stakeholders available on the website   
2.5 The information available on the website is of high-quality, presented in clear and accessible formats   
 Public information about organizational activities related to the standard system available on the website   
2.6 Information regarding the standard development process   
2.7 Information regarding the content of the standard   
2.8 Information regarding the impact intended with the standard    
2.9 Information about standard claims and the traceability system that support those claims   
2.10 Information about who is evaluated and under what process   













Table A.2: Data Collection Form (Version 1). (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 3. Accountability 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence 
# Evidence Code=1 Code=0 
3.1 The organization is registered at ISEAL’s website as a full member   
3.2 There is a formal accountability framework implemented extendable to its member and wider society available for public consultancy on the website   
3.3 There is evidence that the accountability framework assures the responsible use of financial resources to organizational donors   
3.4 There is a channel of communication, such as electronic newsletter, that sends emails regularly to stakeholders, making them accountable for organizational activities   
3.5 By-law states a mutual accountability process among its members: i.e. the Executive Director reports to the Executive Board made up of elected representatives from its membership   
3.6 The organization has an appeal mechanism in the presence of dispute   
3.7 There is evidence that the organization reports relevant information regarding the decision-making process to its internal (i.e. managers) and external stakeholders through not only mandatory but also voluntary disclosures.   
3.8 Public information about operational and social measures of performance, that supplements organizational financial indicators, are available on the website   
3.9 There is evidence that the accountability framework contemplates the verification of regional legal requirements that can affect its local practices   






Table A.3: Coding Manual (Version 2) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 1. Participation 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence  
 
NA Stakeholders are 
engaged in the 
governance process 
Stakeholders are not engaged 
in the governance process 
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# Evidence Code Code Code 
1.1 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation in the governance process (membership) are available on the website 1 0 NA 
1.2 There is evidence that the requirements for participation in the Executive Board ensure the representativeness of all stakeholders 1 0 NA 
1.3 There is evidence that the decision-making process of the highest body allows the participation and review of all stakeholders group through elected representatives 1 0 NA 
1.4 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the governance process (membership) are available on the website 1 0 NA 
1.5 Channel of communication available for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance process 1 0 NA 
1.6 Public information about the process for identification of stakeholders through an initial stakeholder mapping exercise is available on the website 1 0 NA 
1.7 
There is a revision process, such as vote, that allows the participation of all the members of the 
organization in, for instance, revision of governance documents and standards available on the 
website 
1 0 NA 
1.8 Public consultation about the standard-setting or another governance process available on the website 1 0 NA 
1.9 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation in the assurance processes (certification and accreditation) are available on the website 1 0 NA 
1.10 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the assurance process (certification and accreditation) are available on the website 1 0 NA 
1.11 
There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in the assurance process (certification and 
accreditation) either as participants in the audit and review or as observers during the assessment 
process on the website 
1 0 NA 
1.12 Public information about the costs for implementation of the standard system and the certification scheme is available on the website 1 0 NA 




Table A.3: Coding Manual (Version 2) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 2. Transparency 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence  
 
NA The governance process 
is transparent 
The governance process 
demonstrates lack of 
transparency 
# Evidence Code Code Code 
2.1 Public information about the governance process available on the website 1 0 NA 
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2.2 Public information about the requirements the organization follows to ensure transparency to the governance process available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.3 Public information about mitigations procedures in the occurrence of conflict of interests available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.4 Clear definition of organizational stakeholders available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.5 The information available on the website is of high-quality, presented in clear and accessible formats 1 0 NA 
 Public information about organizational activities related to the standard system available on the 
website 1 0 NA 
2.6 Information regarding the standard development process 1 0 NA 
2.7 Information regarding the content of the standard 1 0 NA 
2.8 Information regarding the impact intended with the standard  1 0 NA 
2.9 Information about standard claims and the traceability system that support those claims 1 0 NA 
2.10 Information about who is evaluated and under what process 1 0 NA 
2.11 Information about the various ways in which stakeholders can engage 1 0 NA 
2.12 A Theory of Change is available for public consultation 1 0 NA 





Table A.3: Coding Manual (Version 2) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 3. Accountability 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence  
 
NA The organization gives 
accountability to 
stakeholders about its 
activities 
The organization does not 
give accountability to 
stakeholders about its 
activities 
# Evidence Code Code Code 
3.1 The organization, or at least one of its founding members, is registered at ISEAL’s website as a full member 1 0 NA 
3.2 There is a formal accountability framework implemented extendable to its member and wider society available for public consultancy on the website 1 0 NA 
3.3 There is evidence that the accountability framework assures the responsible use of financial resources to organizational donors 1 0 NA 




Governance documents state a mutual accountability process among its members: i.e. the 
Executive Director reports to the Executive Board made up of elected representatives from its 
membership 
1 0 NA 
3.6 The organization has an appeal mechanism in the presence of dispute 1 0 NA 
3.7 There is evidence that the organization reports relevant information regarding the decision-making process to its stakeholders through not only mandatory but also voluntary disclosures 1 0 NA 
3.8 Public information about operational and social measures of performance, that supplements organizational financial indicators, are available on the website 1 0 NA 
3.9 There is evidence that the accountability framework contemplates the verification of regional legal requirements that can affect its local practices 1 0 NA 






Table A.4: Data Collection Form (Version 2). 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 1. Participation 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence Not Applicable 
# Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA 
1.1 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation in the governance process (membership) are available on the website    
1.2 There is evidence that the requirements for participation in the Executive Board ensure the representativeness of all stakeholders    
1.3 There is evidence that the decision-making process of the highest body allows the participation and review of all stakeholders group through elected representatives    
1.4 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the governance process (membership) are available on the website    
1.5 Channel of communication available for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance process    
1.6 Public information about the process for identification of stakeholders through an initial stakeholder mapping exercise is available on the website    
1.7 
There is a revision process, such as vote, that allows the participation of all the members of the 
organization in, for instance, revision of governance documents and standards available on the 
website 
   
1.8 Public consultation about the standard-setting or another governance process available on the website    
1.9 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation in the assurance processes (certification and accreditation) are available on the website    
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1.10 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the assurance process (certification and accreditation) are available on the website    
1.11 
There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in the assurance process (certification and 
accreditation) either as participants in the audit and review or as observers during the assessment 
process on the website 
   
1.12 Public information about the costs for implementation of the standard system and the certification scheme is available on the website    




Table A.4: Data Collection Form (Version 2). (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 2. Transparency 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence Not Applicable 
# Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA 
2.1 Public information about the governance process available on the website    
2.2 Public information about the requirements the organization follows to ensure transparency to the governance process available on the website    
2.3 Public information about mitigations procedures in the occurrence of conflict of interests available on the website    
2.4 Clear definition of organizational stakeholders available on the website    
2.5 The information available on the website is of high-quality, presented in clear and accessible formats    
 Public information about organizational activities related to the standard system available on the 
website    
2.6 Information regarding the standard development process    
2.7 Information regarding the content of the standard    
2.8 Information regarding the impact intended with the standard     
2.9 Information about standard claims and the traceability system that support those claims    
2.10 Information about who is evaluated and under what process    
2.11 Information about the various ways in which stakeholders can engage    
2.12 A Theory of Change is available for public consultation    











Table A.4: Data Collection Form (Version 2). (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 3. Accountability 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence Not Applicable 
# Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA 
3.1 The organization, or at least one of its founding members, is registered at ISEAL’s website as a full member    
3.2 There is a formal accountability framework implemented extendable to its member and wider society available for public consultancy on the website    
3.3 There is evidence that the accountability framework assures the responsible use of financial resources to organizational donors    
3.4 There are channels of communication, such as electronic newsletter, that send information regularly to stakeholders, making them accountable for organizational activities    
3.5 
Governance documents state a mutual accountability process among its members: i.e. the 
Executive Director reports to the Executive Board made up of elected representatives from its 
membership 
   
3.6 The organization has an appeal mechanism in the presence of dispute    
3.7 There is evidence that the organization reports relevant information regarding the decision-making process to its stakeholders through not only mandatory but also voluntary disclosures    
3.8 Public information about operational and social measures of performance, that supplements organizational financial indicators, are available on the website    
3.9 There is evidence that the accountability framework contemplates the verification of regional legal requirements that can affect its local practices    
3.10 Standard’s claims are reasonable    
 
 
Table A.5: Coding Manual (Version 3) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 1. Participation 
Best Practice 




engaged in the 
governance process 
Stakeholders are not engaged 
in the governance process 
 
NA 
# Evidence Code Code Code 
1.1 
Public information about the process for identification of stakeholders through an initial 
stakeholder mapping exercise (i.e. development a list of bodies: steering groups, executive 
boards, members…) is available on the website. 
1 0 NA 
1.2 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for participation of all stakeholders in the governance process (membership) are available on the website. 1 0 NA 
1.3 
Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the governance 
process (based on the membership bodies derived from the mapping exercise) are available on the 
website 
1 0 NA 
1.4 There is evidence that the requirements for participation in the highest body (i.e. Executive Board/Board of Directors) ensure the representativeness of all stakeholders 1 0 NA 
1.5 
There is evidence that the decision-making process of the highest (i.e. Executive Board/Board of 
Directors) and relevant (i.e. Advisory Committees) bodies allows the participation and review of 
all stakeholders group through their representatives. 
1 0 NA 
1.6 There is a process for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance process available on the website. 1 0 NA 
1.7 
There is a revision process, such as vote, that allows the participation of all the members of the 
organization in, for instance, revision of governance documents and standards available on the 
website 
1 0 NA 
1.8 There is a process of public consultation about the standard-setting or other governance practices available on the website. 1 0 NA 
1.9 There is evidence that public consultation about the standard-setting or other governance practices is occurring or has occurred. 1 0 NA 
1.10 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation in the assurance processes (certification and accreditation) are available on the website  1 0 NA 
1.11 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the assurance process (certification and accreditation) are available on the website  1 0 NA 
1.12 
There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in the assurance process (certification and 
accreditation) either as participants in the audit and review or as observers during the assessment 
process on the website 
1 0 NA 
1.13 Public information about the costs for implementation of the standard system and the certification scheme is available on the website 1 0 NA 
 
Table A.5: Coding Manual (Version 3) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 2. Transparency 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence  
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The governance process 
is transparent 
The governance process 




# Evidence Code Code Code 
2.1 Public information about the governance process available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.2 Public information about the requirements the organization follows to ensure transparency to the governance process available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.3 Public information about mitigations procedures in the occurrence of conflict of interests are available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.4 Clear definition of organizational stakeholders available on the website  1 0 NA 
 Public information about organizational activities related to the standard system available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.5 1.      Information regarding the standard development process 1 0 NA 
2.6 2.      Information regarding the content of the standard 1 0 NA 
2.7 3.      Information regarding the impact intended with the standard  1 0 NA 
2.8 4.      Information about standard claims and the verification/traceability system that support those claims 1 0 NA 
2.9 5.      Information about who is evaluated 1 0 NA 
2.10 6.      Information about the process of evaluation 1 0 NA 
2.11 7.      Information about the various ways in which stakeholders can engage 1 0 NA 
2.12 A Theory of Change is available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.13 There are evidences that the feedback from the public consultation was incorporated on the initiative 1 0 NA 
2.14 A Timeline/Project Work Flow demonstrates organizational main goals and activities for at least a one-year period. 1 0 NA 
 
 
Table A.5: Coding Manual (Version 3) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 3. Accountability 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence  
 
NA The organization gives 
accountability to 
stakeholders about its 
activities 
The organization does not 
give accountability to 
stakeholders about its 
activities 
# Evidence Code Code Code 




There is a formal accountability process/mechanism, such as method for providing accountability 
(i.e. accountability report) implemented, extendable to its member and wider society, and available 
for public view on the website 
1 0 NA 
3.3 There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism assures the responsible use of financial resources to organizational donors 1 0 NA 
3.4 There are channels of communication, such as electronic newsletter, that send information regularly to stakeholders, making them accountable/knowledgeable about organizational activities 1 0 NA 
3.5 
Governance documents state a mutual accountability process among its members: i.e. the 
Executive Director reports to the Executive Board made up of elected representatives from its 
membership (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 
1 0 NA 
3.6 The organization has an appeal mechanism in the presence of dispute (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 1 0 NA 
3.7 There is evidence that the organization reports relevant information regarding its decisions to stakeholders (i.e. annual report) 1 0 NA 
3.8 
Public information about operational (i.e. meeting milestones, deliverables, progress workflow) and 
social measures (i.e. inclusiveness) of performance, that supplements organizational financial 
indicators, are available on the website 
1 0 NA 
3.9 There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism verifies / is compliant with regional legal requirements that can affect its local practices (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 1 0 NA 
 
Table A.6: Data Collection Form (Version 3). 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 1. Participation 
Best Practice Reference 
Key 




# Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA    
1.1 
Public information about the process for identification of stakeholders through an initial 
stakeholder mapping exercise (i.e. development a list of bodies: steering groups, 
executive boards, members…) is available on the website. 
   
   
1.2 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for participation of all stakeholders in the governance process (membership) are available on the website.    
   
1.3 
Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the 
governance process (based on the membership bodies derived from the mapping 
exercise) are available on the website 
   
   
1.4 There is evidence that the requirements for participation in the highest body (i.e. Executive Board/Board of Directors) ensure the representativeness of all stakeholders    
   
1.5 
There is evidence that the decision-making process of the highest (i.e. Executive 
Board/Board of Directors) and relevant (i.e. Advisory Committees) bodies allows the 
participation and review of all stakeholders group through their representatives. 
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1.6 There is a process for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance process available on the website.    
   
1.7 
There is a revision process, such as vote, that allows the participation of all the members 
of the organization in, for instance, revision of governance documents and standards 
available on the website 
   
   
1.8 There is a process of public consultation about the standard-setting or other governance practices available on the website.    
   
1.9 There is evidence that public consultation about the standard-setting or other governance practices is occurring or has occurred.    
   
1.10 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation in the assurance processes (certification and accreditation) are available on the website     
   
1.11 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the assurance process (certification and accreditation) are available on the website     
   
1.12 
There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in the assurance process (certification 
and accreditation) either as participants in the audit and review or as observers during the 
assessment process on the website 
   
   
1.13 Public information about the costs for implementation of the standard system and the certification scheme is available on the website    
   
 
Table A.6: Data Collection Form (Version 3). (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 2. Transparency 
Best Practice Reference 
Key 




# Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA    
2.1 Public information about the governance process available on the website       
2.2 Public information about the requirements the organization follows to ensure transparency to the governance process available on the website 
      
2.3 Public information about mitigations procedures in the occurrence of conflict of interests are available on the website 
      
2.4 Clear definition of organizational stakeholders available on the website        
 Public information about organizational activities related to the standard system available on the website 
      
2.5 1.      Information regarding the standard development process       
2.6 2.      Information regarding the content of the standard       
2.7 3.      Information regarding the impact intended with the standard        
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2.8 4.      Information about standard claims and the verification/traceability system that support those claims 
      
2.9 5.      Information about who is evaluated       
2.10 6.      Information about the process of evaluation       
2.11 7.      Information about the various ways in which stakeholders can engage       
2.12 A Theory of Change is available on the website       
2.13 There are evidences that the feedback from the public consultation was incorporated on the initiative 
      
2.14 A Timeline/Project Work Flow demonstrates organizational main goals and activities for at least a one-year period. 
      
 
 
Table A.6: Data Collection Form (Version 3). (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 3. Accountability 
Best Practice Reference 
Key 




# Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA    
3.1 The organization, or at least one of its founding members organizations, is registered at ISEAL’s website as a full member 
      
3.2 
There is a formal accountability process/mechanism, such as method for providing 
accountability (i.e. accountability report) implemented, extendable to its member and 
wider society, and available for public view on the website 
      
3.3 There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism assures the responsible use of financial resources to organizational donors 
      
3.4 
There are channels of communication, such as electronic newsletter, that send 
information regularly to stakeholders, making them accountable/knowledgeable about 
organizational activities 
      
3.5 
Governance documents state a mutual accountability process among its members: i.e. 
the Executive Director reports to the Executive Board made up of elected 
representatives from its membership (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 
      
3.6 The organization has an appeal mechanism in the presence of dispute (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 
      
3.7 There is evidence that the organization reports relevant information regarding its decisions to stakeholders (i.e. annual report) 
      
3.8 
Public information about operational (i.e. meeting milestones, deliverables, progress 
workflow) and social measures (i.e. inclusiveness) of performance, that supplements 
organizational financial indicators, are available on the website 




There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism verifies / is compliant 
with regional legal requirements that can affect its local practices (see by-law, statute, 
rules of procedures) 
      
Table A.7: Coding Manual (Version 4) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 1. Participation 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence  
 
NA Stakeholders are 
engaged in the 
governance process 
Stakeholders are not engaged 
in the governance process 
# Evidence Code Code Code 
1.1 
Public information about the process for identification of stakeholders through an initial 
stakeholder mapping exercise (i.e. development a list of bodies: steering groups, executive 
boards, members…) is available on the website. 
1 0 NA 
1.2 Public information about prerequisites and limitations for participation of all stakeholders in the governance process (membership) are available on the website. 1 0 NA 
1.3 
Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the governance 
process (based on the membership bodies derived from the mapping exercise) are available on the 
website 
1 0 NA 
1.4 There is evidence that the requirements for participation in the highest body (i.e. Executive Board/Board of Directors) ensure the representativeness of all stakeholders 1 0 NA 
1.5 
There is evidence that the decision-making process of the highest (i.e. Executive Board/Board of 
Directors) and relevant (i.e. Advisory Committees) bodies allows the participation and review of 
all stakeholders group through their representatives. 
1 0 NA 
1.6 There is a process for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance process available on the website. 1 0 NA 
1.7 
There is a revision process, such as vote, that allows the participation of all the members of the 
organization in, for instance, revision of governance documents and standards available on the 
website 
1 0 NA 
1.8 There is a process of public consultation about the standard-setting or other governance-related practices available on the website. 1 0 NA 
1.9 There is evidence that public consultation about the standard-setting or other governance practices is occurring or has occurred. 1 0 NA 
1.10 Public information about how stakeholders participate in the certification system are available on the website 1 0 NA 
1.11 Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the certification system are available on the website  1 0 NA 
1.12 There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in the certification system either as participants in the audit and review or as observers during the assessment process on the website 1 0 NA 
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Table A.7: Coding Manual (Version 4) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 2. Transparency 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence  
 
NA The governance process 
is transparent 
The governance process 
demonstrates lack of 
transparency 
# Evidence Code Code Code 
2.1 Public information about the governance process available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.2 Public information about the requirements the organization follows to ensure transparency to the governance process available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.3 Public information about mitigations procedures in the occurrence of conflict of interests are available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.4 Clear definition of organizational stakeholders available on the website  1 0 NA 
2.5 Public information about the membership costs is available on the website 1 0 NA 
 Public information about organizational activities related to the standard system available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.6 1.      Information regarding the standard development process 1 0 NA 
2.7 2.      Information regarding the content of the standard 1 0 NA 
2.8 3.      Information regarding the impact intended with the standard  1 0 NA 
2.9 4.      Information about standard claims and the verification/traceability system that support those claims 1 0 NA 
2.10 5.      Information about who is evaluated 1 0 NA 
2.11 6.      Information about the process of evaluation 1 0 NA 
2.12 Public information about the costs to implement the certification system are available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.13 A Theory of Change is available on the website 1 0 NA 
2.14 There are evidences that the feedback from the public consultation was incorporated on the initiative 1 0 NA 





Table A.7: Coding Manual (Version 4) - Criteria developed from best practices for each GAL principle. (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 3. Accountability 
Best Practice 
Presence Absence  
 
NA The organization gives 
accountability to 
stakeholders about its 
activities 
The organization does not 
give accountability to 
stakeholders about its 
activities 
# Evidence Code Code Code 
3.1 The organization, or at least one of its founding members organizations, is registered at ISEAL’s website as a full member 1 0 NA 
3.2 
There is a accountability process/mechanism, a method for providing accountability (i.e. 
accountability report) implemented, extendable to its member and wider society, and available for 
public view on the website 
1 0 NA 
3.3 There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism assures the responsible use of financial resources to organizational donors 1 0 NA 
3.4 There are channels of communication, such as electronic newsletter, that send information regularly to stakeholders, making them accountable/knowledgeable about organizational activities 1 0 NA 
3.5 
Governance documents state a mutual accountability process among its members: i.e. the 
Executive Director reports to the Executive Board made up of elected representatives from its 
membership (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 
1 0 NA 
3.6 The organization has a mechanism to deal with dispute (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 1 0 NA 
3.7 
Public information about operational (i.e. meeting milestones, deliverables, progress workflow) 
and social measures (i.e. inclusiveness) of performance, that supplements organizational financial 
indicators, are available on the website 
1 0 NA 




Table A.8: Data Collection Form (Version 4). (Cont.) 

























   
1
.1 
Public information about the process for identification of stakeholders through an 
initial stakeholder mapping exercise (i.e. development a list of bodies: steering groups, 
executive boards, members…) is available on the website. 
   
   
1
.2 
Public information about prerequisites and limitations for participation of all 
stakeholders in the governance process (membership) are available on the website.    
   
1
.3 
Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in 
the governance process (based on the membership bodies derived from the mapping 
exercise) are available on the website 
   
   
1
.4 
There is evidence that the requirements for participation in the highest body (i.e. 
Executive Board/Board of Directors) ensure the representativeness of all stakeholders    
   
1
.5 
There is evidence that the decision-making process of the highest (i.e. Executive 
Board/Board of Directors) and relevant (i.e. Advisory Committees) bodies allows the 
participation and review of all stakeholders group through their representatives. 
   
   
1
.6 
There is a process for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the 
governance process available on the website.    
   
1
.7 
There is a revision process, such as vote, that allows the participation of all the 
members of the organization in, for instance, revision of governance documents and 
standards available on the website 
   
   
1
.8 
There is a process of public consultation about the standard-setting or other 
governance-related practices available on the website.    
   
1
.9 
There is evidence that public consultation about the standard-setting or other 
governance practices is occurring or has occurred.    
   
1
.10 
Public information about how stakeholders participate in the certification system 
are available on the website    
   
1
.11 
Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in 
the certification system are available on the website     





There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in the certification system either 
as participants in the audit and review or as observers during the assessment process on 
the website 
   
   
 
 
Table A.8: Data Collection Form (Version 4). (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 2. Transparency 





















e=NA    
.1 Public information about the governance process available on the website       
.2 
Public information about the requirements the organization follows to ensure 
transparency to the governance process available on the website 
      
.3 
Public information about mitigations procedures in the occurrence of conflict of 
interests are available on the website 
      
.4 Clear definition of organizational stakeholders available on the website  
      
.5 Public information about the membership costs is available on the website 
      
Public information about organizational activities related to the standard 
system available on the website 
   
.6 1.      Information regarding the standard development process 
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.7 2.      Information regarding the content of the standard 
   
.8 3.      Information regarding the impact intended with the standard  
   
.9 
4.      Information about standard claims and the verification/traceability 
system that support those claims 
   
.10 5.      Information about who is evaluated 
   
.11 6.      Information about the process of evaluation 
   
.12 
Public information about the costs to implement the certification system are 
available on the website 
      
.13 A Theory of Change is available on the website 
      
.14 
There are evidences that the feedback from the public consultation was 
incorporated on the initiative 
      
.15 
A Timeline demonstrates organizational main goals and activities of governance-
related practices 




Table A.8: Data Collection Form (Version 4). (Cont.) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 3. Accountability 






















e=NA    
.1 
The organization, or at least one of its founding members organizations, is 
registered at ISEAL’s website as a full member 
      
.2 
There is a accountability process/mechanism, a method for providing 
accountability (i.e. accountability report) implemented, extendable to its member and 
wider society, and available for public view on the website 
      
.3 
There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism assures the 
responsible use of financial resources to organizational donors 
      
.4 
There are channels of communication, such as electronic newsletter, that send 
information regularly to stakeholders, making them accountable/knowledgeable about 
organizational activities 
      
.5 
Governance documents state a mutual accountability process among its members: 
i.e. the Executive Director reports to the Executive Board made up of elected 
representatives from its membership (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 
      
.6 
The organization has a mechanism to deal with dispute (see by-law, statute, rules 
of procedures) 
      
.7 
Public information about operational (i.e. meeting milestones, deliverables, 
progress workflow) and social measures (i.e. inclusiveness) of performance, that 
supplements organizational financial indicators, are available on the website 
      
.8 
There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism verifies / is 
compliant with regional legal requirements that can affect its local practices (see by-law, 
statute, rules of procedures) 








Table A.9: Data Collection Form (Version 4): Coder 1 – Pilot 3 – RSPO. 
 
Reference
# SC Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA
1 GS Public information about the process for identification of affected stakeholders through an 
initial stakeholder mapping exercise (i.e development a list of bodies: steering groups, 
executive boards, members…) is available on the website.
0
https://rspo.org/about/who-we-are- Board of Governors, steering committee, advisory committee "About RSPO" menu- provides a list  of everyone involved.  Infographic "who we are" provides details of 
all who is involved. There is no "process" defined for identifying.  Does not describe a process, per se, but  
does show transparently who's involved through membership categories, and the strucutre of membership 
and their interconnections, such as advisors to board and standing committees membership
2 G Public information about prerequisites and limitations for participation of all affected 
stakeholders in the governance process (membership) are available on the website. 1
https://rspo.org/members    https://www.rspo.org/files/pdf/Factsheet-RSPO-
Membership.pdf
membership. Membership rules "Membership" menu on main page provides extensive information under various sub-menus. Very 
transparent membership categories. (Ordinary, affiliate, supply chain associate). Code of conduct for 
membership requirement.  Searchable member database or shows a list of all members. Includes a hot 
button to apply for membership, type of membership and cost. There's a clear PDF describing members
3 G Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the 
governance process (based on the membership bodies derived from the mapping exercise) 






part icipation engage engagement, inclusion, collaborate, collaboration Series of web public consultations on principles and criteria, face to face public consultat ion, roadshows
4 G There is evidence that the requirements for participation in the highest body (i.e. Executive 
Board/Board of Directors) ensure the representativeness of all affected stakeholders 1
https://www.rspo.org/about/who-we-are/board-of-governors provides infromation on number of seats and sector, and the members are elected through the general 
assembly.
5 G There is evidence that the decision-making process of the highest (i.e. Executive 
Board/Board of Directors) and relevante (i.e. Advisory Comittes) bodies  allows the 
participation and review of all key stakeholders group through their representatives.
1
https://rspo.org/about/how-we-work decision-making; possible alternative "how we work"
6 G There is a process for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance 
process available on the website.
0
7 GS There is a revision process, such as vote, that allows the participation of all the members of 
the organization in, for instance, revision of governance documents and standards available 
on the website 1
https://rspo.org/principles-and-criteria-review; In line with ISEAL best practices, that the standards remain relevant and reflect stakeholder 
understanding of good sustainability practices,the RSPO P&C 2013 will be completely reviewed again 
and subsequently submitted for ratification by the General Assembly of RSPO by November 2018. Prior 
to the revision in 2018, any changes to the standard must be through recommendation made by the 
appointed RSPO Taskforce (as below) and approved by the General Assembly of the RSPO. Should you 
have queries on the matter, please send it through our askRSPO system and we will revert to you as 
soon as possible. includes TOR, members and timeline for review process
8 GS There is a process of public consultation about the standard-setting or other governance-
related practices available on the website. 1
https://rspo.org/news-and-events/news/stakeholders-collaborate-on-rspos-
theory-of-change; ht tps://rspo.org/cert ificat ion/principles-and-criteria-
assessment-progress
public consultat ion principles criteria standards theory of change T oC and Principles and Criteria consultat ion, plus a range of face to face and roadshows
9 GS There is evidence that public consultation about the standard-setting or other governance-





10 S Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation how 
stakeholders participate in the assurance processes (certification and accreditation) 




certification stakeholder consultat ion p. 7,9,12
11 S Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the 





to me these are the same as previous. This document seems to have both. I'm not sure if I interpreted this 
properly.
12 S There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in the assurance process (certification and 
accreditation) certification system, either as participants in the audit and review or as 





to me these are the same as previous. This document seems to have both. I'm not sure if I interpreted this 
properly.
13 S Public information about the costs for implementation of the standard system and the 
certification scheme to implement the certification system are available on the website 




doesn't  provide actual costs, just how they are determined; small holder fund available
14 S The costs for implementation of the standard system and the certification scheme are 
reasonable (?)
SUBTOTAL 10 2 0
Best Practice
Presence Absence NA CommentsDocument/Page/Item/Title/Paragraph Key Words
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 1. Participation
133 
 
Table A.9: Data Collection Form (Version 4): Coder 1 – Pilot 3 – RSPO. (Cont.) 
 
Reference
# SC Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA





strategy, vision, mission, objectives, policies
2 G Public information about the requirements the organization follows to ensure transparency 
to the governance process available on the website 1
https://rspo.org/about/how-we-work not sure about this one
3 G Public information about mitigations procedures in the occurrence of conflict of interests 




settlement See: Who can use the Complaints System




stakeholders; governance seems redundant from above
5 G Public information about the membership costs is available on the website
1
https://rspo.org/members/apply membership, cost
S Public information about organizational activities related to the standard system available on 
the website










standard see document 3






impact impacts achieved only
9 S        4.      Information about standard claims and the verification/traceability system that 




PalmTrace; mass balance, identity preserved; segregated; book and claim
10 S        5.      Information about who is evaluated
1
https://rspo.org/palmtrace
11 S        6.      Information about the process of evaluation 1 https://rspo.org/certification/supply-chains; 
https://rspo.org/certification
12 S        7.      Information about the various ways in which stakeholders can engage (1.10 
AND 1.11 ALREADY COVERED THIS ASPECT)
12 G A Theory of Change is available on the website
1
https://www.rspo.org/about/impacts/theory-of-change use simple ways to communicate ToC 







14 G A Timeline/Project Work Flow demonstrates organizational main goals and activities of 
governance-related practices at least a one-year period.
0
SUBTOTAL 12 2 0














# SC Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA
1 G The organization, or at least one of its founding members organizations, is registered at 
ISEAL’s website as a full member
1
https://www.rspo.org/news-and-events/news/roundtable-on-
sustainable-palm-oil-approved-as-iseal-full-member    
https://www.isealalliance.org/community-
members/roundtable-sustainable-palm-oil-rspo
2 G There is a formal accountability process/mechanism, such as a method for providing 
accountability (i.e. accountability report) implemented, extendable to its member and wider 
society, and available for public view on the website
0
3 G There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism assures the responsible use of 
financial resources to organizational donors 1
https://rspo.org/about/who-we-are/standing-
committees/finance
financial report includes financial reports and audited accounts
4 G There are channels of communication, such as electronic newsletter, that send informations 






several newsletters; also numerous impact reports, roundtable reports
5 G Governance documents state a mutual accountability process among its members: i.e. the 
Executive Director reports to the Executive Board made up of elected representatives from 
its membership (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures)
0
6 G The organization has an appeal mechanism in the presence of to deal with disputes (see by-




conflict, complaint, dispute see in particular View a visual summary of how the complaints system works 
(PDF)
7 G There is evidence that the organization reports relevant information regarding its decisions 
to stakeholders (i.e annual report, minutes) (3.2 ALREADY COVERED THIS ASPECT)
8 G Public information about operational (i.e. meeting milestones, deliverables, progress 
workflow) and social measures (i.e inclusiveness) of performance, that supplements 
organizational financial indicators, are available on the website
1
9 GS There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism verifies / is compliant with 
regional legal requirements that can affect its local practices (see by-law, statute, rules of 
procedures)
1
https://rspo.org/certification/national-interpretations by-law, local law through national interpretation of P&C
SUBTOTAL 6 2 0
TOTAL 28 6 0
Comments
Document/Page/Paragraph/Item/Title





Table A.10: Data Collection Form (Version 4): Coder 2 – Pilot 3 – RSPO. 
Reference
# SC Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA
1 GS Public information about the process for identification of affected stakeholders through an initial stakeholder mapping exercise (i.e development a 
list of bodies: steering groups, executive boards, members…) is available on the website.
1
1) https://www.rspo.org/files/pdf/Factsheet-RSPO-Overview.pdf / FACT  
SHEET  - Overview of RSPO /  RSPO Membership / page 4 / all the 
paragraphs
2) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 4. 
Memberships / page 3
Members/membership/stakeholders
T his is an old init iative. Despite not  having a process in place, the governance documents demonstrate 
that  a mapping process was conducted in the earlier stage of RSPO establishment. See "Types of 
memberships"
2 G Public information about prerequisites and limitations for participation of all affected stakeholders in the governance process (membership) are
available on the website.
1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 6. 
Admission of RSPO Members / page 4
2) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Membership Rules 
2016 / 3.0 Applicat ion for Membership  / page 5
Admission/Application/Member/membership
For examples, see:
1) Item (e), page 5
2) Item 3.5, page 5
It is of concern what  is writt en in 1) page 5: "(b) The Chief Executive Officer may reject any application 
request without  having to inform the interested party of the reasons mot ivating such decision."
3 G Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the governance process (based on the membership bodies derived
from the mapping exercise) are available on the website
1
1) https://www.rspo.org/files/pdf/Factsheet-RSPO-Overview.pdf / FACT  
SHEET  - Overview of RSPO /  Involving smallholders / page 3 
2) https://www.rsep.rspo.org/ / RSPO Smallholder Engagement Platform
3) https://rspo.org/key-documents/impact-reports / 2017 Impact Report / 
Engagement with Local Communities and Intermediary Organisations / page 
10
Involvement/Involving/Smallholders/Encourage/Engage/Improve ParticipationT hey even have a plataform to engage with smallholders
4 G There is evidence that the requirements for participation in the highest body (i.e. Executive Board/Board of Directors) ensure the
representativeness of all affected stakeholders
1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 11. 
Board of Governors / page 11
small/vote It can be observed clear evidence of a mechanism that  ensures the representativeness of small growers in 
the decisions made by the General Assembly 
5 G There is evidence that the decision-making process of the highest (i.e. Executive Board/Board of Directors) and relevante (i.e. Advisory Comittes)
bodies  allows the participation and review of all key stakeholders group through their representatives.
1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 7. 
Rights of RSPO Members / (a) Ordinary Members / (i) "Ordinary Members 
shall have vot ing rights at the General Assembly" 
2) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 9. 
Ordinary General Assembly / (a) Composition / (i) "The ordinary General 
Assembly shall be comprised of all RSPO Members"
3) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 11. 
Board of Governors / page 11
small/vote It can be observed clear evidence of mechanisms that allow the participation of small growers in the 
decisions made by the General Assembly 
6 G There is a process for stakeholders to give suggestions for improving the governance process available on the website. 1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/supplementary-materials/minutes-report s-
of-rspo-ga-ega / RSPO GA13 Meeting Minutes 2016 / Resolut ion  6b  – 
Resolution  to  adopt  “Non-discriminatory  entit lement  and responsibility 
for RSPO members under a specific sector or membership category”. / page 8
2) https://www.rt.rspo.org/about -ga14/
Minutes/meeting/report/channel of communication/proposals/resolutions
Despite not finding a formal process, the minute demonstrate that proposals (proposed resolutions) for 
improving the governance process are made and decided by members representat ives during General 
Assembly meet ing. See debate that start s on page 8.
7 GS
There is a revision process, such as vote, that allows the participation of all the members of the organization in, for instance, revision of governance
documents and standards available on the website 1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 9. 
Ordinary General Assembly / (a) Composition / (v)
revision/vote Votes can be made at a General Assembly, whether by itself or by proxy, or by other electronic means (E-
vote)
8 GS There is a process of public consultation about the standard-setting or other governance-related practices available on the website. 1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/certification/rspo-nat ional-interpretat ions
2) https://rspo.org/certification/nat ional-interpretat ions/public-consultations
3) https://rspo.org/key-documents/certification/rspo-certification-systems/ 
RSPO Cert ification System 2007 / 3. Public Consultation / page 27
public consultation T he process National Interpretation of the International RSPO Principles and Criteria encompass Public 
Consultation





Public information about prerequisites and limitations for stakeholders’ participation how stakeholders participate in the assurance processes
(certification and accreditation) certification system are available on the website 1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/certification/rspo-certification-systems / 
RSPO Cert ification System 2007 / 4.2. Assessment process / page 14
2) 1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/certification/rspo-certification-systems 
/ RSPO Certificat ion System 2007 / 4.3. Gathering evidence from 
stakeholders during certification assessments / page 17
cert ification system/stakeholder
11 S
Public information about the process for improving stakeholders’ participation in the assurance process (certification and accreditation) certification 
system are available on the website 1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/impact-reports / 2017 Impact Report / 
RSPO Smallholder St rategy Update / page 12
2) https://rspo.org/key-documents/impact-reports / 2016 Impact report  / 
pages 41 - 44
improve stakeholder/certification system RSPO Smallholder Support Fund (RSSF) and group certification are some of the initiatives in place to 
improve smallholders part icipat ion in the cert ification system.
12 S There is evidence that stakeholders are engaged in the assurance process (certification and accreditation) certification system, either as
participants in the audit and review or as observers during the assessment process on the website
1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/impact-reports / 2017 Impact Report / 
RSPO Cert ification Systems: Enhancing Quality, Credibility and Oversight / 
page 37
2) https://www.rspo.org/about/who-we-are/task-forces/assurance-task-force
3) https://www.rspo.org/about/who-we-are/task-forces/assurance-task-force / 
Assurance Task Report Progress Report 2nd Quarter / 5. Q2 2017 Progress 
Updates on Activities undertaken by the Assurance Taskforce / ACTIVIT Y 
3: Develop and institute a t ransparent and robust system for monitoring the 
quality of assessments / No. 3.2 - 
T ask "T o develop the minimum guideline and checklist for Part ial 
Certification and stakeholder consultation then provide training for growers 
audit/stakeholder/ T here is a task force implemented to address some issues related to the assessment process, and more 
involvement of stakeholders in the audit process is on the scope of this initiative. 
13 S
Public information about the costs for implementation of the standard system and the certification scheme to implement the certification system are 
available on the website (MOVE TO 2. TRANSPARENCY?) 0
1) https://askrspo.force.com/s/article/What-are-the-cost s-of-certification cert ification cost T here are no information regarding the cost of certification. RSPO recomends to contact a accredited 
Certification Bodies to get a quotat ion.
14 S The costs for implementation of the standard system and the certification scheme are reasonable (?)
SUBTOTAL 11 1 0
CommentsDocument/Page/Item/Title/Paragraph Key Words





Table A.10: Data Collection Form (Version 4): Coder 2 – Pilot 3 – RSPO. (Cont.) 
Reference
# SC Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA
1 G Public information about the governance process available on the website 1
1) https://www.rspo.org/files/pdf/Factsheet-RSPO-Overview.pdf / RSPO 
Governance Structure / page 4
2) https://rspo.org/about/who-we-are
3) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 4. 
Memberships / page 3
Governance Information regarding te governance structure of RSPO can be found in various documents. 
2 G Public information about the requirements the organization follows to ensure transparency to the governance process available on the website 1
1) https://rspo.org/members/complaints
2) https://www.rspo.org/file/resolut ions/GA10-Resolut ion6f.pdf
3) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Code of Conduct for 
Supply Chain Associates 2015 / 2. Transparency, reporting and claims / page 
2
4) 3) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Code of Conduct 
for Members 2015 / 2. Transparency, report ing and claims / page 2
Transparency T ransparency is addressed in the codes of conduct and in the complaint system.
3 G Public information about mitigations procedures in the occurrence of conflict of interests are available on the website 1
1) http://rspo.org/sit es/default/files/RSPOcertificat ion-systems.pdf / 4.5. 
Conflict of interest / page 15
2) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Code of Conduct for 
Supply Chain Associates 2015 / 2. Transparency, reporting and claims / page 
2
3) 3) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Code of Conduct 
for Members 2015 / 2. Transparency, report ing and claims / page 2
Conflict
Conflict of interest is addressed in the certification system, with mechanism to mitigate and manage their 
occurrence. See 1, item 4.5.1. In the governance level, it  is addressed in the codes of conduct , where it  is 
st ated that  members must commit to act ively seek the resolution of conflicts. See 2 and 3, it em 2.2 .
4 G Clear definition of organizational stakeholders available on the website 1
1) https://rspo.org/about / WHO WE ARE / 1st paragraph
2) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 4. 
Memberships / page 3 + 5. RSPO Membership Fee / (c) The Membership Fee 
Structure is as follows / page 4
Stakeholder
It  is stated at the "About Us" part  of RSPO website: "7 sectors of the palm oil industry: oil palm 
producers, processors or traders, consumer goods manufacturers, retailers, banks/investors, and 
environmental and social non-governmental organisations (NGOs)"  
5 G Public information about the membership costs is available on the website 1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 5. 
RSPO Membership Fee / (c) T he Membership Fee Structure is as follows: / 
page 4
Membership
S Public information about organizational activities related to the standard system available on the website
6 S        1.      Information regarding the standard development process 1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/certification/standards-sett ing-process / 
RSPO Standard Operat ing Procedure for Standards Set ting and Review, June 
2017
Standard T here is a procedure that describe how RSPO standards are set and reviewed
7 S        2.      Information regarding the content of the standard 1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/certification/rspo-supply-chain-
certificat ion / RSPO Supply Chain Cert ification Standards (Revised June 
2017)
2) https://www.rspo.org/key-documents/certificat ion/rspo-principles-and-
criteria / RSPO P&C for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil (2013)
RSPO Standard
RSPO P&C is the certification standard that applies to all Oil Palm Growers, thus covering the 
production side of the supply chain. T he standards of the Supply Chain Cert ification System (SCCS) 
covers the rest of the supply chain.
8 S        3.      Information regarding the impact intended with the standard 1
1) https://rspo.org/about/impacts/measuring-and-evaluat ing-impacts / Impacts 
System Report  - 2013
Impact RSPO has a  Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system for measuring and analyzing impacts.
9 S        4.      Information about standard claims and the verification/traceability system that support those claims 1
1) https://rspo.org/about/sustainable-palm-oil
2) https://rspo.org/key-documents/certification/rspo-supply-chain-
certificat ion / RSPO Supply Chain Cert ification Standards (Revised June 
2017)
3) https://www.rspo.org/key-documents/certificat ion/rspo-principles-and-
criteria / RSPO P&C for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil (2013)
4) https://www.rspo.org/palmtrace
Claim/traceability
Claims: 1 - broad claims (address deforestation, biodiversity protection, etc) 2 and 3 - specific claims 
(standards). In order to receive the RSPO certification, a third-party verification is conducted by an 
independent, accredited Cert ification Body. Addit ionally, RSPO has a tracebility system, Palmtrace, to 
assure the transparency of the claims (see 4).
10 S        5.      Information about who is evaluated 1
1) https://rspo.org/certificat ion
2) https://rspo.org/members/apply
certificat ion system T o be certified, a organizat ion needs to become an RSPO member. Members that are cert ifiable are 
growers and supply chain organizat ions.
11 S        6.      Information about the process of evaluation 1
1) https://rspo.org/key-documents/certification/rspo-cert ification-systems / 
RSPO Certification System 2007
assessment Item 4.2. Assessment process
12 S        7.      Information about the various ways in which stakeholders can engage (1.10 AND 1.11 ALREADY COVERED THIS ASPECT)
12 G A Theory of Change is available on the website 1 1) https://rspo.org/about/impacts/theory-of-change theory of change








T here are no evidences of feedback regarding the public consutation. The decisions are ratified by 
members in the General Assembly. T here are no minutes regarding the general assembly meeting that 
rat ified the supply chain standards in june 2017.
14 G A Timeline/Project Work Flow demonstrates organizational main goals and activities of governance-related practices at least a one-year period. 1 1) https://rspo.org/principles-and-criteria-review#tln timeline
SUBTOTAL 13 1 0
Comments
Document/Page/Paragraph/Item/Title










# SC Evidence Code=1 Code=0 Code=NA
1 G The organization, or at least one of its founding members organizations, is registered at ISEAL’s website as a full member 1
1) https://www.isealalliance.org/community-
members?f%5B0%5D=community_status%3A176








Report/accountability/news/announcements RSPO gives accountability regarding its activities through reports and news/announcements
3 G There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism assures the responsible use of financial resources to organizational donors 1
1) https://rspo.org/about /who-we-are/standing-committees/finance
2) https://rspo.org/key-documents/membership / RSPO Statutes 2015 / 9. 
Ordinary General Assembly / (d) / page 9
Finance/accountability
1) RSPO has their accounts audit annually by an independent auditor. T he annual audited accounts of 
RSPO are available for public view on the website. RSPO Annual Financial Reports were all endorsed by 
the financial auditor. 
2) It is also stated in the statute that T he Board of Governors shall cause to be prepared and present to 
the annual General Assembly, among other, "proper accounts, duly audited, of all funds, property and 
assets of the RSPO for the twelve months ending on (RSPO's financial year end) immediately preceding 
such annual General Assembly;"
4 G
There are channels of communication, such as electronic newsletter, that send informations regularly to stakeholders, making them accountable /
knowledgeable about organizational activities 1
1) https://rspo.org/ Newsletter At the end of all pages of the website, it  is possible to sign to receive RSPO Newsletters. An email for 
inquiries is also provided, and there is a link to follow RSPO in some social medias.
5 G Governance documents state a mutual accountability process among its members: i.e. the Executive Director reports to the Executive Board made
up of elected representatives from its membership (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures)
1 1) https://rspo.org/about /who-we-are/board-of-governors Governance
The Chief Executive Officer reports to the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors is comprised of 
16 members, designated by the General Assembly for 2 years.




1) RSPO Complaints System is the mechanism adopted by RSPO to solve dispute against any RSPO 
member or the RSPO system itself. 
2) RSPO offers to its members the Dispute Set tlement Facility services, that encourages the adoption of 
mediation in case of dispute.
7 G
There is evidence that the organization reports relevant information regarding its decisions to stakeholders (i.e annual report, minutes) (3.2
ALREADY COVERED THIS ASPECT)
7 G Public information about operational (i.e. meeting milestones, deliverables, progress workflow) and social measures (i.e inclusiveness) of 
performance, that supplements organizational financial indicators, are available on the website
1 1) https://rspo.org/about /impacts/measuring-and-evaluating-impacts performance
The MONIT ORING & EVALUATION (M&E) SYST EM tracks the progress of RSPO activities. T he 
Annual Impacts report s presents the results.
8 GS
There is evidence that the accountability process/mechanism verifies / is compliant with regional legal requirements that can affect its local
practices (see by-law, statute, rules of procedures) 1
1) https://rspo.org/certification/nat ional-interpretations National/regional/legal/law National and Local Interpretation of RSPO standards are conduct. The method is described in the RSPO 
Cert ification Systems document.
SUBTOTAL 8 0 0
TOTAL 32 2 0
Comments
Document/Page/Paragraph/Item/Title






Table 12: Data Collection Form (Version 4): CRSB and Grasslands Alliance - Transparency (Coments) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 2. 
Transparency Comments 
Criteria CRSB Grasslands 
Public information about the governance process 
available on the website 
Information regarding the governance structure of CRSB can be 
found in various documents. 
Grasslands Alliance has no governance structure so far, but Food 
Alliance's by-laws provides information about the governance process. 
Public information about the requirements the 
organization follows to ensure transparency to the 
governance process available on the website 
Transparency is within one of the guiding principles (credible) 
of the Certified Sustainable Beef Framework, but public information 
about the requirements the organization follows to ensure transparency 
is not available on the website. 
Transparency is one of Food Alliance guiding principles but is more 
related to the certification system. No information about the requirements the 
organization follows to ensure transparency are available on the website. 
Public information about mitigations procedures in 
the occurrence of conflict of interests are available on the 
website 
There is a Conflict of interest Policy related to the certification 
system. In the governance level, it might be addressed in the codes of 
ethics, but this document is not available on the website. 
There is a Code of Ethics related to the certification system 
(inspectors) to deal with conflict of interests, but it is not publicly available. 
No information on how it is dealt in the governance. 
Clear definition of organizational stakeholders 
available on the website  
Despite presenting the definition of organizational stakeholders 
on the website, the information is not consistent in all the documents 
available. 
No clear definition of organizational stakeholders is available on the 
website, and there is no information about the process for identification of 
stakeholders. 
Public information about the membership costs is 
available on the website 
The Annual Revenue of each Organization Type defines the 
Annual Member Fees (2016/17) to be paid. 
No information about the membership costs is available on the 
website or by-laws, only information regarding certification costs. 
Public information about organizational activities 
related to the standard system available on the website   
1.      Information regarding the standard 
development process 
No information regarding how the CSRB standard development 
process was conducted. 
No information regarding how Grasslands Alliance and Food 
Alliance standard development process were conducted. 
2.      Information regarding the content of the 
standard 
Information about the Sustainable Beef Production Standard 
and the Sustainable Beef Processing Standard is available. 
Information about, for instance, Food Alliance Sustainability 
Standard for Livestock Operations is available. 
3.      Information regarding the impact intended with 
the standard  
As CRSB standards were just launched, no impact is available 
to be monitored. 
Food Alliance states some "general" impacts, but no concrete results 
and milestones reached are presented. 
4.      Information about standard claims and the 
verification/traceability system that support those claims 
A chain of custody audit is conducted on processors willing to 
sell beef with a CRSB sustainable claim. 
The “Supply chain verification requirement” policy, with the 
requirements for labeling packaged products, is not available. 
0 
5.      Information about who is evaluated Beef producer or primary processor in Canada are evaluated. Beef cattle and bison, ranches and farms, in North America, are evaluated. 
1 
6.      Information about the process of evaluation The information is in the Assurance Protocol.  The information is in the Food Alliance Producer Certification Program Standards and Procedures Manual. 
2 
Public information about the costs to implement the 
certification system are available on the website 
No information about the costs to implement the certification 
system are available on the website. CRSB lists only the type of audit 
and who should pay for them. 
The information regarding the certification fees is available on Food 




A Theory of Change is available on the website A Theory of Change is not available on the website A Theory of Change is not available on the website 
4 
There is evidence that the feedback from the public 
consultation was incorporated into the initiative There is no evidence that the feedback from the public consultation was incorporated into the initiative. 
It seems Food Alliance never conducted a public consultation about 
their standards, and Grasslands Alliance yet did not develop the standard after 
the public consultation. 
5 
A Timeline demonstrates organizational main goals 
and activities of governance-related practices 
The 2016 Annual Report presented a timeline for the beef 
operations indicators development process. 
There is no timeline to demonstrate organizational main goals and 
activities of governance-related practices. 
 
Table 13: Data Collection Form (Version 4): CRSB and Grasslands Alliance - Accountability (Coments) 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Principle: 
3. Accountability Comments 
Criteria CRSB Grasslands 
The organization, or at least one of its 
founding members organizations, is registered at 
ISEAL’s website as a full member 
CRSB is an ISEAL subscriber. Rainforest Alliance is and ISEAL Full Member. 
There is a accountability 
process/mechanism, a method for providing 
accountability (i.e. accountability report) 
implemented, extendable to its member and 
wider society, and available for public view on 
the website 
CRSB gives accountability regarding its activities 
through reports and news/announcements. 
Food Alliance gives accountability only regarding its 
finances, a legal requirement for NGO in the U.S. 
There is evidence that the accountability 
process/mechanism assures the responsible use 
of financial resources to organizational donors 
Canadian Cattlelmen's Association (CCA), which 
is neither an independent auditor nor a financial audit 
company, spearheaded CRSB and ratified CRSB’s 
budget.   
The responsible use of financial resources is addressed 
in Article 8, Funds and Private Foundations of Food 
Alliance’s by-laws. 
There are channels of communication, 
such as electronic newsletter, that send 
information regularly to stakeholders, making 
them accountable about organizational activities 
No channels of communication, such as electronic 
newsletter, were evidenced. 
No channels of communication, such as electronic 
newsletter, were evidenced. 
Governance documents state a mutual 
accountability process among its members: i.e. 
the Executive Director reports to the Executive 
Board made up of elected representatives from 
its membership (see by-law, statute, rules of 
procedures) 
The Executive Director reports to the Council. The 
CRSB Council is appointed by the CRSB membership and 
is comprised of 11 individuals that represent each 
Organization Type. 
The Executive Director reports to the Board, which is 
comprised of food-related stakeholders.  
140 
 
The organization has a mechanism to deal 
with dispute (see by-law, statute, rules of 
procedures) 
CRSB has no mechanism to deal with dispute. Food Alliance has no mechanism to deal with dispute 
Public information about operational (i.e. 
meeting milestones, deliverables, progress 
workflow) and social measures (i.e. 
inclusiveness) of performance, that supplements 
organizational financial indicators, are available 
on the website 
CRSB’s measures of performance are going to be 
conduct in about five years, considering as a baseline the 
National Beef Sustainability Assessment benchmarks. 
No public information about operational and social 
indicators are available on the website. 
There is evidence that the accountability 
process/mechanism verifies / is compliant with 
regional legal requirements that can affect its 
local practices (see by-law, statute, rules of 
procedures) 
CRSB explicitly states that the legal aspects are not 
in the scope of the certification system. 
There is no evidence that the accountability process is 
compliant with regional legal requirements that can affect its 
local practices. 
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